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Abstract 
Phishing emails result in significant losses, estimated at billions of dollars, to 
both organisations and individual users (Herley & Florencio, 2008). Attempts to 
address the problem began with the first appearance of phishing emails in 1996 
(James, 2006). These have included the development of new technological defences 
that detect phishing emails before they even reach their victims (Bergholz et al., 
2008; Cook, Gurbani, & Daniluk, 2009; Fette, Sadeh, & Tomasic, 2007). None of 
these technological solutions, however, has been entirely successful. Accordingly, 
our research addresses non-technical aspects of the problem by investigating users 
themselves. While users have been targeted by educational programs, the focus of 
these programs has been on the technical side; for example, advising users not to 
respond to emails that include IP addresses in their links. The vulnerabilities of users 
themselves have received little attention. Therefore, there was a need to understand 
users’ detection behaviour with phishing emails. 
To reduce users’ vulnerability to phishing emails, we need first to understand 
users’ detection behaviour. To the best of our knowledge, no previous studies have 
investigated the full range of processes involved in this behaviour. Most research 
focuses on only one type of behaviour, namely, whether or not participants respond 
to phishing emails.  
To better understand users’ detection behaviour, we began by examining 
research into the cognitive process that users experience when they face phishing 
emails (Vishwanath, Herath, Chen, Wang, & Rao, 2011; Xun, Clark, & Jacob, 2008). 
This suggested that users’ detection behaviour goes through more than one phase, but 
there has been little attempt to investigate users’ detection behaviour from the 
beginning of the process of receiving and suspecting a phishing email. The extant 
literature fails to provide understanding of users’ detection behaviour and the impact 
of users’ characteristics on that behaviour. Our research aims to fill this gap. 
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The approach adopted in this empirical study is based on the theory of 
deception (Johnson, Grazioli, Jamal, & Glen Berryman, 2001; Johnson, Grazioli, 
Jamal, & Zualkernan, 1992) and on a model that allows this theory to be applied in a 
computer based environment (Grazioli, 2004). In order to examine users’ detection 
behaviour and the impact of users’ characteristics, the research had to engage 
participants in the process of detecting phishing emails. There was a need to ‘lure’ 
participants into an experiment that included sending phishing emails while ensuring 
that nothing in the study had the potential to jeopardise their safety (i.e. no harm 
would come to them from the phishing emails). Participants’ behaviour (responses) 
to the phishing emails was recorded and they were classified into detectors and 
victims. A quantitative method was used to relate participants’ characteristics with 
their behaviour and a qualitative method was used to generate in-depth understanding 
of participants’ detection behaviour.  
Of necessity, the study design itself involved an element of deception (Finn & 
Jakobsson, (2007), and we were sensitive to the ethical aspects of this.  Informing 
participants in advance that they are participating in a phishing email study would 
have had a negative effect on the results, since they would be likely to increase their 
detection behaviour (Wright et al., 2009). Accordingly, the real nature of the research 
was not revealed to participants before they were sent phishing emails that we had 
developed. The study was carefully designed to ensure that valid data could be 
collected without harm to participants, and it was approved by the University’s 
Ethics Committee.  
The output of the research is a new model to explain the impact of users’ 
characteristics on their detection behaviour. The model was tested through two 
studies in two different countries (Saudi Arabia and Australia), with a total of 780 
participants. In addition to testing the model, these two studies helped to measure the 
impact of culture on users’ detection behaviour. The final model was tested using 
structural equation modelling (SEM). The results showed that the proposed model 
explains 13% and 45%, respectively, of the variance in Saudi Arabian and Australian 
participants’ tendency to respond to phishing emails.  
The results also showed that users’ characteristics (individual factors) play an 
important role in affecting the three main phases in users’ detection behaviour: 
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susceptibility, confirmation and response. Specifically, high trust, high 
submissiveness and low perceived email richness significantly increase users’ 
susceptibility (first phase). Choosing poor confirmation channels and consulting 
unqualified persons decrease users’ confirmation (second phase). High susceptibility, 
a weak confirmation phase and certain personality traits significantly increase users’ 
response to phishing emails (final phase).  
Another important finding is that phishing email victims fall into three main 
categories: naive victims, who have low suspicion; doubtful victims, who suspect 
phishing emails but fail to confirm their suspicion; and risk-taker victims, who ignore 
warnings about phishing emails. Different strategies are needed to address the 
specific vulnerabilities of each type of victim. The ability to identify potential 
victims is of considerable benefit to both organisations and individual users in the 
quest to solve the problem of phishing emails.  
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contrast, email is considered a poor medium because it contains a very limited 
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter presents the background to the research and provides a detailed 
discussion of the research focus. The aim and significance of the study are explained 
and the organisation of the thesis is described.  
1.1 Background 
Since the inception of the Internet, the number of users has grown dramatically 
because of its many practical applications in daily life. One of these is to connect 
users with businesses. The Internet provides businesses with the opportunity for 
growth through the provision of online services.  Online services are attractive 
because they can connect users to businesses in distant locations and are available 24 
hours a day, seven days a week. With this convenience, however, come potential 
security issues.   
Online services that require a high level of security include banking and 
shopping. Because these online services often involve access to sensitive and private 
information, they require a similar level of security to that provided by their 
traditional counterparts.  In traditional banking for example, customers are 
encouraged to check that the automatic teller machine (ATM) is legitimate and to 
ensure that their personal identification number (PIN) remains secret. The same 
conditions apply in online banking, where clients are encouraged to ensure that the 
website they are visiting is legitimate and not to disclose personal information such 
as passwords. Unfortunately, some users fail to satisfy these requirements and this 
has attracted criminal activity (Mannan & Oorschot, 2008).  
One of the main forms of criminal activity that results from users’ failure to 
satisfy security requirements is known as a phishing attack. Phishing attacks “exploit 
characteristics of human behaviour in order to increase the chances of the user doing 
what is desired” (Karakasiliotis, Furnell, & Papadaki, 2006).  
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Phishing attacks generally involve a method known as ‘bait and hook’ (Emm, 
2006), in which phishing emails deceive users into connecting to phishing websites. 
The aim of these websites is to steal private information from users who connect to 
them. Phishing websites are harmless if no one connects to them. Therefore, their 
negative impact will be reduced if users can be prevented from complying with 
phishing emails. Unfortunately, users are not well prepared to defend themselves 
against phishing emails (Downs, Holbrook, & Cranor, 2007) and therefore become 
victims.  
The number of phishing emails is extremely high. A recent study recorded 
around 156 million phishing emails per day (Get Cyber Safe, 2013). Since the 
purpose of these attacks is financial gain, they mainly target financial and payment 
services. These sectors received 70% of the reported attacks in the first quarter of 
2013 (Anti-Phishing Working Group, 2013). It has been estimated that they result in 
an annual loss of between $2.4 million and $9.4 million per one million online 
customers in the banking sector alone (Trusteer, 2009). 
Given the large number of attacks, the corresponding number of victims and 
associated losses is also high.  Based on the number of phishing emails per day, the 
number of victims could reach 80,000 per day (Cyveillance, 2010).  Overall, the 
estimated monetary loss from phishing attacks ranges from $61 million to 
approximately $3 billion per year (Herley & Florencio, 2008; Pettey, 2006). These 
are likely to be the minimum numbers involved, since they are based on reported 
attacks and losses. Globally, the actual figures could be much larger because not all 
attacks are reported 
The large number of launched attacks, however, does not entirely account for 
the number of victims and associated losses. The success of phishing emails is also 
attributable to their clever design, which can trick even expert users with advanced 
technological knowledge (Aburrous, Hossain, Dahal, Bradford, & Thabatah, 2010). 
Adams (2012), for example, found that expert users who make careful and technical 
decisions about emails still fall victim to phishing emails. Clearly, general users with 
less knowledge of technology are even more vulnerable.  
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The problem of phishing emails becomes even more complex when 
consideration is given to differences among users. Such differences need to be taken 
into account when providing solutions and instruction. Phishing emails are not sent 
to specific individuals but en masse, which means that their recipients may come 
from different cultures. For example, a phishing email targeting the Queensland 
University of Technology (QUT) will not be limited to Australian students, since the 
university has a multicultural student body. Phishing emails target every user who 
owns an email account regardless of his or her background. It is an open question 
whether students from different cultures are similarly vulnerable. Our research 
investigates the impact of two different users from two different countries on their 
ability to detect phishing emails. Given both the scope and complexity of the 
problem, there is an urgent need to reduce the negative impact of phishing emails on 
users and organisations. 
While some previous research has addressed this problem, most solutions that 
have been developed focus on preventing phishing emails from deceiving users 
(Hong, Kelley, Tembe, Murphy-Hill, & Mayhorn, 2013; Purkait, 2012). These 
solutions include tools that either detect phishing emails or warn users about them. 
Less research attention, however, has been paid to users’ behaviour: What happens 
when these tools fail?  
The following section explains in greater detail the focus of our research.  
1.2 Research focus 
Users are the focus in phishing email attacks. Phishing emails must deceive 
users to be successful. Users are targeted because they have been identified as the 
weakest link in the Internet security chain (Herzberg, 2009). The protection and 
exchange of confidential information in the Internet occurs in the trust path, which 
comprises three main elements: servers, transit channels and users (see Figure 1).  
Confidential information is shared between servers and users through the 
transit channel, which authenticates users to servers. This means that whoever 
provides this information to servers will be granted the same access to online 
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services as authorised users would. Hence it is important to obtain this privileged 
information and perpetrators employ a variety of methods to do so. The Internet, 
however, is designed to make this as difficult as possible.  
 
 
Figure 1: Trust path with various attacks (Li & Wu, 2003) 
Protecting confidential information in these three elements is an important goal 
of Internet design. Servers employ advanced software to prevent confidential 
information from being accessed by an unauthorised entity. The transit channel 
protects the confidential information it carries using a protocol called Secure Sockets 
Layer (SSL) or Transport Layer Security (TLS) as a de facto form of protection 
(Oppliger, Hauser, & Basin, 2006). This protocol ensures that information exchanged 
between users and servers is encrypted inside the channel. Encryption prevents other 
parties from gaining access to it (Chomsiri, 2007). Users connect to the Internet via 
their devices (e.g. mobiles or laptops) to communicate with servers. Users can 
protect the confidential information entered into their computers by installing 
security programs such as anti-virus software. Of course, users themselves know 
their confidential information and this makes them a key target for perpetrators.  
Unfortunately, users can be tricked into revealing this information (Dhamija, 
Tygar, & Hearst, 2006). Criminals deceive users into exposing their confidential 
information by leading them to believe that the phishing emails are legitimate. They 
do this by exploiting the gap between what users think they are connected to and 
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what they are actually connected to (Downs, Holbrook, & Cranor, 2006; Li & Wu, 
2003; Wu, Miller, & Little, 2006). Phishing emails are effectively designed to make 
users think they are connected to a legitimate entity although they are actually 
connected to a malicious entity. There is an urgent need to stop users from 
legitimising phishing emails.  
Many forms of prevention have already been devised. For example, education 
programs have targeted users to teach them how to identify phishing email cues
1
 
(Kumaraguru, 2007; Kumaraguru, Sheng, Acquisti, Cranor, & Hong, 2008). Others 
have focused on users’ computers by providing tools that can distinguish between 
legitimate and illegitimate websites (Kim et al., 2008). Despite these innovations, 
users continue to fall victim to phishing emails (Jagatic, Johnson, Jakobsson, & 
Menczer, 2007; Sheng, Holbrook, Kumaraguru, Cranor, & Downs, 2010) and 
perpetrators continue to find ways around these solutions. Accordingly, there is a 
need to approach the problem from a different perspective and examine why users 
fall prey to phishing emails in the first place. This non-technical perspective has been 
under-researched.  
A substantial body of knowledge exists in relation to deception (lying). It has 
been shown that people are able to detect deception using non-technical cues. Of 
particular importance to the ability to detect deception are individual characteristics, 
such as experience, personality and culture, among others (Anderson, DePaulo, 
Ansfield, Tickle, & Green, 1999; Carlson, George, Burgoon, Adkins, & White, 2004; 
Miller & Stiff, 1993; Wright, Chakraborty, Basoglu, & Marett, 2009). These factors 
have not been thoroughly investigated in relation to the problem of phishing emails. 
Phishing emails employ the same principle of deception, that is, they lure users into 
erroneous conclusions. Therefore, findings from deception studies are potentially 
relevant to studies in the field of phishing emails. This project investigates whether 
the same factors that are relevant to detecting deceptive messages in conversations 
are also related to users’ ability to detect phishing emails.  
This work on deception, together with some previous research on phishing 
emails, suggests that there may be a connection between users’ characteristics and 
users’ detection behaviour. In particular, Wright et al. (2009) found from qualitative 
                                                 
1
 These are the signs that can identify phishing emails. 
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data that participants used non-technical means of evaluating the legitimacy of 
phishing emails. For example, one participant reported that he did not respond 
directly to the phishing email that requested private information but waited for the 
request to come directly from the lecturer before taking action (Wright et al., 2009). 
Unfortunately, the investigation did not pursue this important finding further.  
Another potentially relevant factor is culture. Deception (lying) studies have 
found that users from different cultures have a high level of accuracy in detecting 
deception across cultures if the deception is conducted via a rich medium
2
 such as 
video. By contrast, detection across cultures was found to be difficult when the 
deception was conducted in a poor medium such as voice recording (Bond, Omar, 
Mahmoud, & Bonser, 1990). Emails are considered to be a poor medium and this 
may affect users’ ability to detect deception across cultures. Kumaraguru et al. (2009, 
2009) conducted two similar experiments in two different cultures. The results 
showed different patterns in the factors affecting users’ detection ability in the two 
experiments. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.  
Interesting demographic differences have been found between users who are 
detectors and those who are victims, but these have not been followed up by 
researchers. For example, studies whose main focus was on improving the efficiency 
of education programs have identified differences in users’ demographics that affect 
their ability to detect phishing emails (Kumaraguru et al., 2009). Other studies have 
investigated demographics in relation to the design of phishing emails (Jagatic et al., 
2007), but again the non-technical factors were not the primary focus. Moreover, 
previous studies failed to investigate users’ detection behaviour3 and its impact on 
their ability to detect phishing emails. Users do not automatically become victims of 
phishing emails and they apply different strategies to judge the authenticity of an 
email (Downs et al., 2006). There is currently little understanding in the literature of 
users’ detection behaviour and the impact of users’ characteristics on this behaviour.  
Further research is needed to explain why users respond to phishing emails. If 
weaknesses in their detection behaviour can be identified, .these can be targeted to 
improve users’ detection ability. The characteristics that impact on users’ detection 
                                                 
2
 Rich medium refers to a medium that can convey several cues. The face-to-face medium, for 
example, conveys eye movement, body language and voice tone. 
3
 Users’ detection behaviour refers to users’ behaviour when they encounter a phishing email. 
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behaviour should also be investigated. If there is an association between certain 
characteristics and a particular weakness, this would allow vulnerable users to be 
identified in advance to improve their defence against phishing attacks.  
1.3 Aim and Significance of the Study  
The aim of our research is to identify victims of phishing emails from their 
characteristics and their behavioural weaknesses in detecting phishing emails. The 
overall purpose is to improve users’ protection against phishing emails.  
To achieve this aim, the first task is to identify weaknesses in users’ detection 
behaviour when they receive a phishing email. A review of the extant literature 
shows that most previous research on phishing emails has focused on whether or not 
users respond to phishing emails. There has been little investigation into the whole 
process of detection which contributes to users becoming victims or detectors. 
Therefore, we began by looking for research on phishing emails that is relevant to 
understanding users’ detection behaviour.  
Since there has been relatively little research specifically addressing the topic 
of users’ detection behaviour, we explored studies that have investigated the 
cognitive process involved in decision-making about phishing emails in the last 
decades. These decisions are essential in making users behave in a certain way. 
Three main cognitive models have been used to illustrate the mental process of 
making decisions about phishing emails (see Section 2.3). For example, Grazioli’s 
(2004) model identifies four phases in this process. There are differences between 
detectors and victims in these four phases (see Section 2.4). While the cognitive 
process sheds light on decision-making vulnerability, it does not fully explain why 
some users become victims. Other aspects of behaviour affect users’ decisions, and 
these require further investigation.  
Grazioli’s model, which is applied in our research, identifies the cognitive 
phases that underpin users’ deception detection behaviour. Decision-making does not 
occur instantly but progresses through different phases until the user makes the final 
choice of whether to respond to or ignore a phishing email request. Researchers who 
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focus on the final phase have missed the opportunity to identify other weaknesses 
that render users vulnerable to becoming victims. Understanding these weaknesses in 
users’ detection behaviour is important if we are to help people avoid making costly 
mistakes.  
There are several issues involved in measuring users’ detection behaviour. 
Existing measurements are inadequate because they do not investigate the whole 
process of users’ detection behaviour. Most studies have a specific focus on only one 
phase. These studies fall into two main categories: those that present participants 
with an image of a phishing email and ask them to choose an action (Jakobsson, 
Tsow, Shah, Blevis, & Lim, 2007; Sheng et al., 2010), and those which record users’ 
behaviour after they have received a phishing email (respond or ignore) 
(Kumaraguru et al., 2008; Wright et al., 2009). These studies fail to investigate all of 
the detection behaviour involved in users’ decision-making about phishing emails.  
Studies in the first category (i.e. showing images of phishing emails) have 
several limitations. First, they involve asking a direct question about whether these 
images are phishing emails (Jakobsson et al., 2007; Karakasiliotis et al., 2006). This 
kind of question actually initiates the process of detection. Users who are asked to 
judge the legitimacy of phishing emails may not have suspected these emails in 
everyday life. In other words, this type of study begins from the first step in the 
detection process, whereas some users may not even get this far (see Section 4.8).  
A second limitation arises from the request to choose a response (Downs et al., 
2007; Sheng et al., 2010). This is a measure of users’ intentions rather than of actual 
behaviour, and involves no potential risks (unlike the real life situation).  
Finally, the study design requires users to make an immediate decision. In real 
life, however, users may see a phishing email and postpone their response until they 
receive the request in person (Wright et al., 2009). Therefore, this is not a suitable 
way of measuring final behaviour (i.e. whether users actually respond to or ignore 
phishing emails).   
In the second category of studies, subjects’ actions following receipt of a 
phishing email (i.e. final behaviour) are recorded. The limitation here is that these 
studies ignore those behaviours that occur before users reach this stage. Users do not 
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arrive at the final behaviour (respond or ignore) without interacting with the phishing 
email or being influenced by their own characteristics or knowledge. Our research 
avoids these issues by investigating the whole process of users’ detection behaviour 
from beginning (spotting a phishing email) to end (final behaviour).  
The impact of user characteristics, including cultural differences, is an 
important dimension that has been neglected in previous research.  Phishing emails 
do not discriminate―any user with an email account is at risk. Our study takes these 
differences into account as factors that may impact on detection behaviour.  
1.4 Research Questions 
The following research questions informed our study design.  
  
1. What is the process of users’ detection behaviour? 
Users who receive phishing emails fall into two categories: detectors and 
victims. It is important to investigate the differences between these two types. 
Clearly, they make different behavioural choices (ignore or respond). In order to 
explain this difference, we need first to compare their respective detection behaviour. 
As previously discussed, the literature lacks sufficient information to permit such 
comparison, since most research has focused on whether users respond to or ignore 
phishing emails  
Accordingly, one of our research objectives is to identify the whole process of 
users’ detection behaviour. In this way, detectors can be compared with victims to 
establish any differences between them and this, in turn, helps to identify the 
weaknesses in victims’ detection behaviour. This knowledge is necessary for the 
development of appropriate preventative strategies.  
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2. How can the process of detection help in differentiating phishing email 
victims? 
Victims of phishing emails are generally identified as those who respond to 
phishing emails. Our research, however, strongly suggests that the process of 
detecting phishing emails is not limited to one phase (i.e. respond or not). Rather, 
response is preceded by other phases, which also need to be investigated for 
weaknesses that make users vulnerable to a phishing attack.  It is important to 
establish, for instance, whether victims share the same weakness or have different 
kinds of weakness. 
If victims have different weaknesses in different phases, this suggests that there 
can be no ‘one size fits all’ preventative strategy. The literature proposes solutions 
that are expected to be equally effective for all victims, but experience shows that 
this is not the case. For example, education programs have proved successful in 
improving users’ ability to detect phishing emails, but some people who receive 
these programs still become victims (Bekkering, Hutchison, & Werner, 2009; 
Kumaraguru, Sheng, Acquisti, Cranor, & Hong, 2010). Therefore, it is important to 
know whether victims share a common weakness or if there are several weaknesses 
that require attention.  
 
3. What is the impact of individual differences on the process of detection? 
After identifying users’ detection behaviour, we need to identify differences 
between users themselves. We obtain that by investigating the impact of users’ 
characteristics on their detection behaviour. As noted above, users’ characteristics 
impact on their ability to detect deception in general, but their role in relation to 
phishing emails has received little research attention. 
Our study will investigate users’ characteristics and their impact on detection 
behaviour. The investigation is not limited to the final phase of detection behaviour 
(respond or ignore) but includes the whole process. This contributes to our goal of 
improving users’ detection ability through non-technical means.  
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4. What is the impact of collective differences on the process of detection?  
In broad terms, most citizens of a country share a common culture. Culture 
affects users’ ways of thinking and behaving (Hofstede, 1993).  Culture is an 
important source of difference between groups of users who may receive phishing 
emails. Therefore, this study seeks to identify the impact of culture on users’ 
response to phishing emails. For example, would a phishing email that impersonates 
an Australian company or authority have the same effect on Australian and Middle 
Eastern users?  Does a particular type of phishing email have the same response rate 
in different cultures? Phishing emails are sent to users who have email accounts, 
regardless of their cultural differences. Our study therefore investigates the impact of 
culture on users who receive similar phishing emails, as well as the influence of 
users’ characteristics. 
 
Better understanding the differences between detectors and victims allows us to 
identify the factors that need to be addressed in order to improve users’ protection 
against phishing emails. Knowledge of victims’ characteristics will also assist 
organisations to identify vulnerable users and deploy appropriate protective 
strategies.  
1.5 Study Design 
This study adopted a mixed methods approach to data collection. Both 
quantitative and qualitative methods were used because of their ability to provide a 
comprehensive overview of the problem. Quantitative data were collected about 
users’ susceptibility4 to phishing emails, users’ characteristics and users’ 
confirmation channels
5
 (Research Questions 1 and 3). Quantitative data were 
collected to measure relationships between variables of relevance to our research. 
The experimental method involved users in actual detection behaviour with phishing 
                                                 
4
 Users’ susceptibility refers to the first phase in users’ detection behaviour. 
5
 Confirmation channels are those channels that users choose to confirm or deny their suspicion about 
phishing emails. 
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emails (Research Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4), while the qualitative data generated in-
depth insight into users’ detection behaviour (Research Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4).  
Question 4 relates to the impact of group differences represented by culture on 
users’ detection process. Therefore, the research comprised two separate studies in 
two different cultures. The first study was conducted in Saudi Arabia and had a total 
of 350 participants. The second study was conducted in Australia and had a total of 
430 participants.  
1.6 Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2 presents a critical review of the literature on phishing emails and 
identifies gaps in existing research-based knowledge. Chapter 3 describes the 
research model that underpinned the design of the present study. Chapter 4 presents a 
detailed account of the research methodology, which involved a mixed methods 
(quantitative and qualitative) approach. The quantitative analytic procedures and 
findings from the studies in Saudi Arabia and Australia are presented in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 6 describes the procedures used to analyse the qualitative data and presents 
findings from both studies. A detailed discussion of all results is provided in Chapter 
7. Chapter 8 summarises the theoretical and empirical contributions of the study, 
identifies its limitations, and makes recommendations for future research.  
1.7 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the background to the present study and identified 
the research problem it addresses. The aim and significance of the research have 
been explained and the specific research questions that informed the study design 
have been elaborated. The chapter concluded with an overview of the thesis 
organisation.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter presents a critical review of literature relevant to the research 
topic. It defines phishing emails and describes their main design features, with 
particular attention to how these features are used to deceive users.   
As well as technical dimensions, the review addresses users’ decision-making 
in relation to phishing emails. Three key cognitive models of decision-making are 
examined with a view to identifying areas of vulnerability among users. The main 
theory employed in this research, the theory of deception, is explained and applied to 
an examination of differences between detectors and victims.  Users’ weaknesses in 
detecting phishing websites are explored to shed light on their vulnerability to 
phishing emails, which deploy similar technical tricks.  
Next, various solutions that have been developed to tackle the problem of 
phishing emails are described and evaluated. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of gaps in the knowledge base, with particular focus on users’ detection 
behaviour and the influence of users’ characteristics on the ability to detect phishing 
emails.  
2.1 Phishing Emails: Overview  
Phishing emails have been defined as those emails which employ both social 
engineering and technical tricks to steal secret information from users (Anti-Phishing 
Working Group, 2009) and which “exploit characteristics of human behaviour in 
order to increase the chances of the user doing what is desired” (Karakasiliotis et al., 
2006). Thus phishing emails are characterised by exploitation and deception. 
Phishing emails trick users by making them believe that they are revealing their 
secret information to a legitimate entity.  Through their design, the senders 
impersonate legitimate organisations to convince users to comply with their request. 
A phishing attack relies on users’ inability to distinguish between legitimate and 
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illegitimate entities. Believing that they are connected to the legitimate entity, users 
reveal their confidential information to access their account.  
To be successful, these emails need to make users reveal their confidential 
information outside the trust path (see Figure 1), since information outside the trust 
path is not protected. By impersonating legitimate entities, they deceive users into 
thinking that they are using the trust path to submit this information. The deception is 
perpetrated in two ways: through click action or reply action. Click action involves a 
request for the user to visit a phishing website in order to steal their confidential 
information (see Figure 2). Reply action involves a request for the user to reply by 
sending their secret information to these emails (see Figure 3). The design features of 
these deception techniques are discussed in more detail in the following sections.  
 
 
Figure 2: Phishing email click action 
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Figure 3: Phishing emails reply action 
2.2 Design Features of Phishing Emails 
This section explains the design features that phishing emails employ to make 
them appear credible and which we used in the design of our own phishing emails 
(see Section 4.6.1). This discussion draws on two main studies (Wang et al., 2009; 
Sharma, 2010) that examined these techniques.  
 
2.2.1 Alleviating suspicion  
Wang et al. (2009) analysed 195 phishing emails using the elaboration 
likelihood model (ELM) (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The ELM explains how users 
make decisions (see Section 2.3.3). The findings show that phishing emails are well 
designed to reduce users’ suspicion and comply with their request.  
For example, the ELM proposes that the quality of the message’s argument 
strongly influences the receiver’s attitude towards message acceptance. Argument 
quality refers to the strength of conviction in the argument that is embedded in the 
message (Bhattacherjee & Sanford, 2006). Message acceptance is necessary if the 
phishing attack is to succeed. For example, a phishing email might tell users that 
there is a problem in their account and they need to perform an urgent action or their 
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account will be suspended. Not surprisingly, Wang et al. (2009) found that the design 
of phishing emails always includes close attention to argument quality. What makes 
a phishing email successful is its high level of perceived acceptance by users. Users 
with a low level of perceived acceptance are more likely to suspect phishing emails. 
This difference in perceived level of acceptance reflects differences in individual 
characteristics.  The level of acceptance of a phishing email can be increased through 
careful design. Wang et al. (2009) identify four key design features that are used to 
enhance the credibility of phishing emails (see Table 1).   
 
Table 1: Key design features (Wang, Chen, Herath, & Rao, 2009) 
Dimensions No. Features 
Email title 3 Impact, Company name, Urgency 
Email argument quality 7 Event, Impact, Urgent, Courtesy, Justification, 
Response action requested, Penalty  
Message appearance 8 Authentic looking email sender, email signatory, 
Personalization, Media type, Typo, Third party icon 
for trustworthiness, Copyright, Company logo 
Assurance mechanism 7 Third party icon for assurance, Anti-fraud/privacy 
statement, SSL padlock, General security lock, Help 
link/feedback, mechanisms, Authentication 
mechanisms, HTTPS link 
 
 
 
 Email title: An attractive title increases users’ motivation to open these emails. In 
psychology, motivation is defined as “an internal state or condition, sometimes 
described as a need, desire or want, that serves to energize behaviour and give it 
direction”  (Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981). The main goal of a phishing 
email’s title is to encourage users to open it. 
 
 Email argument quality (central route): This refers to the strength of the 
argument embedded in a message (Bhattacherjee & Sanford, 2006). Argument 
quality increases the likelihood that the argument in a message will be accepted. 
In the ELM, this is known as a central route process of decision making. If users 
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accept the argument (e.g. that there is a problem in the system), they will agree 
with the message’s conclusion and comply with the embedded action.  
 
 Message appearance (peripheral route): Well-designed images and copyright 
information will increase message credibility. In the ELM, this is called a 
peripheral route of decision making (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). It is assumed that 
victims of phishing emails fall because they are mainly judge message credibility 
using the peripheral route (Dhamija et al., 2006). 
 
 Assurance mechanisms: Signs assuring the privacy or security of information 
increase users’ trust and reduce any perceived potential risks, such as loss of 
money or private information (Lee & Rao, 2007). Grazioli (2004) suggests that 
users who base their judgment on assurance cues are at higher risk of becoming 
victims. 
 
2.2.2 Persuasive techniques 
Sharma (2010) studied 150 phishing emails randomly selected from 3181 such 
emails collected by the Anti-Phishing Working Group. A categorical content analysis 
and semantic network analysis were used to investigate how these emails persuaded 
users to perform the embedded action. Sharma identified three key dimensions: 
source credibility, message credibility and message structure. 
Source credibility refers to those features that make the message appear 
trustworthy because it comes from a reputable organisation. Sharma measured six 
such indicators of source credibility (see Table 2): legitimate sender prefix (e.g. 
security, service), legitimate sender domain (e.g. ebay.com.au or nab.com.au), clear 
specific sender (e.g. IT department), contact telephone number, contact email address 
and company logo. 
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Table 2: Source credibility (Sharma, 2010) 
Index Frequency Percentage 
legitimate sender (prefix) 110 73% 
legitimate sender domain 112 75% 
clear specific sender 99 66% 
Contact telephone number 5 3% 
Contact email address 6 4% 
company logos 67 45% 
 
 
Message credibility refers to the effect of both the appeals contained in a message 
and its structure (Sharma, 2010). Sharma identified three categories of message 
appeals (rational, emotional and motivational) and three characteristics of message 
structure (explicit message, message order and message length). The results of his 
analysis are shown in Table 3 and Table 4.  
 
Table 3: Message credibility (Sharma, 2010) 
Index Frequency Percentage 
Rational appeal Reasoning from cause 116 77% 
Reasoning from sign 25 17% 
Reasoning from analogy 9 6% 
Emotional appeal Fear 92 61% 
Happy 5 3% 
Affection 40 27% 
None 13 9% 
Motivation appeal Safety  117 78% 
Belongingness/Love 14 9% 
Self-esteem  19 13% 
 
 
In Table 3, rational appeal refers to the logic of the message argument. Rational 
appeals use formal logic rules as persuasive techniques. These techniques explain the 
relationship between two different events and take three forms: 
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 Reasoning from cause (event A is caused by event B). 
 Reasoning from sign (event A is a sign of event B). 
 Reasoning from analogy (events A and B are similar) (Dillard, 
1994; Dillard & Pfau, 2002; Trenholm, 1989). 
 
The importance of rational appeals in the design of phishing emails is supported by 
Wang et al. (2009). Phishing emails always present a justification (cause) for the 
response action (see Figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 4: Argument quality measurement framework (Wang et al., 2009) 
 
Emotional appeal refers to a message argument that targets users’ emotions. Many 
phishing emails target negative emotions such as fear, distress and anxiety, and this 
has been found to increase the chances of users responding to these messages (Witte, 
1992). For example, users may be told that they will incur a penalty if they do not 
comply.  
 
Motivational appeal refers to a message argument that targets users’ perceived needs 
(Gass & Seiter, 2007). According to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1943, 
1954, 1971), people are motivated to achieve certain needs (physiological, safety, 
belongingness/love, self-esteem and self-actualisation). When there is an apparent 
opportunity to satisfy these desires, they are motivated to act. Phishing emails exploit 
users’ needs. For example, some phishing emails exploit users’ need for safety by 
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suggesting that their account has been approached by an unauthorised entity, thus 
creating fear for the security of their information and money. 
 
Message structure refers to the organisation of the message elements in a persuasive 
message. The main elements are shown in Table 4.  
 
Table 4: Message structure (Sharma, 2010) 
Index Frequency Percentage  
Message Explicit 136 90.67 
Implicit 14 9.33 
Repetition Repetition 50 33.33 
Non-repetition 100 66.67 
Order Climax 150 100 
 
 
Explicit messages have been found to be more persuasive than implicit 
messages (Perloff, 2010; Trenholm, 1989). Repetition has a negative impact on 
users’ attention and interest while moderate repetition has a positive impact on 
persuasion (Dillard & Pfau, 2002; Trenholm, 1989). When a strong argument 
appears at the beginning of a message, the order is one of anti-climax; when it comes 
at the end, the order is one of climax. A message is more persuasive when it has a 
strong argument regardless of the position of the argument (Gass & Seiter, 2007). 
Longer messages are more persuasive than shorter ones when they have strong 
argument quality (O'Keefe, 2002).  
The following section discusses the main decision making processes that have 
been reported from research on phishing emails. These help to shed light on key 
areas of vulnerability among users. 
2.3 Cognitive Processes in Decision-Making 
This section explores the cognitive processes that users employ to judge 
phishing emails and account for their subsequent actions. This is important for 
identifying weaknesses in users’ decision-making that lead them to respond to 
phishing emails. 
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We examined three main decision-making models: the model of detecting 
deception (MDD), the decision-making model and the elaboration likelihood model 
(ELM). These were chosen because they can help to identify areas of weakness in 
users’ decision-making with regard to phishing emails.  
 
2.3.1 The model of detecting deception (MDD) 
The MDD applied the theory of deception in computer based environment 
(Grazioli, 2004). According to The theory of deception the detection is a cognitive 
process which involves examining different cues (e.g. words tone with body 
language) (Johnson & Grazioli, 1993; Johnson et al., 1992).  The theory of deception 
is applied on a high rich medium (face-to-face). Face to face medium provides rich 
information which detectors can use to identify deception. Some of these richness’s 
are: real time response, ability to examine different signs (e.g. vocal sign and body 
signs) and two path conversations between detector and deceiver. In a computer 
based environment, the process has one-way conversation. This means that in a 
computer based environment, the deceiver sends a message to the user and the user 
has to make a decision based on available information carried out by the message. 
One-way conversation is unlike in a face to face environment where a user can ask 
questions and observe real time response such as face or sound changes. 
MDD divides the cognitive process of users’ decision-making into four phases 
(see Figure 5). The first phase is activation, which occurs when users encounter 
something different from what they are expecting. In the second phase, hypothesis 
generation, users try to develop an explanation for the identified difference between 
expectation and observation. To test the validity of these explanations, users enter the 
third phase, hypothesis evaluation, in which they employ different evaluation 
methods. For example, a user may suspect that an email asking for bank details is a 
phishing email and develops the hypothesis “legitimate email can be confirmed by its 
issuer”. The user calls the bank to confirm the legitimacy of the email. In this case, 
the telephone is used to evaluate the hypothesis. Hypothesis generation and 
hypothesis evaluation both do not necessary need to be one time processes. A user 
can generate many hypotheses and evaluate them as much as he or she can. Finally, 
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the user will sum all the results from hypothesis evaluation and reach to the final 
phase. Global assessment is the final phase which the evaluated hypotheses are 
considered and a final decision is made about what action is to be taken in regard to 
the suspected email. More importantly, Grazioli conclude that commencing the 
model of detecting deception does not guarantee that users will always be detectors. 
Detectors and victims have gone through the four phases of the model of detecting 
deception. However, only detectors were able to detect deception, whereas victims 
failed to detect it (Grazioli, 2004).  
 
 
Figure 5: Model of detecting deception (Grazioli, 2004) 
 
Wright et al. (2009) conducted a study in phishing emails and found two more 
important factors that are responsible for activating users’ suspicion, which is the 
first phase in MDD. These factors are priming and individual factors (see Figure 7). 
Priming is defined as any experience that brings a cognitive structure to the mind that 
makes it available for employment in a subsequent mission (Higgins & Kruglanski, 
1996). In other words, priming is a mechanism that warns users about possible 
deceptive behaviour, such as banks inform their clients that they will never ask about 
passwords via emails. Individual factors are those that differentiate users from each 
other. Wright et al. (2009) showed that users who have the same training and priming 
and are faced with the same phishing email have different responses. Some of these 
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users become detectors and others become victims of the phishing email. This means 
that there are individual factors of the users themselves that make some of them 
detectors and the other victims. These factors should be investigated and identified. 
In our research, we applied MDD model to understand users’ detection 
behaviour when they are faced with phishing emails. Based on MDD which is a 
cognitive process, we were able to extract three main phases in users’ detection 
behaviour: susceptibility, confirmation and response (see Figure 9). For more details 
about these three phases please see Sections 3.2.4, 3.2.6, and 3.2.7. 
Susceptibility is the first phase in users’ detection behaviour. Users begin their 
detection behaviour by suspecting the phishing email. Based on the level of 
susceptibility, users will decide upon their intended behaviour (see Figure 9).  
Confirmation is the second phase in users’ detection behaviour. Users who 
become doubtful about a phishing email will choose a suitable channel to confirm or 
deny their doubts. For example, when questioning the legitimacy of an email, some 
users may contact organisations by phone, while others may email their friends. 
Response is the last phase in users’ detection behaviour. After users come to a 
decision about a suspected phishing email, they will choose the best way that they 
think to deal with suspected phishing email. Ultimately, users can be either detectors 
or victims. Victims are those who chose to perform the action in phishing emails. 
Detectors are those users who saw the phishing email and chose to ignore it.  
 
2.3.2 The decision making model 
The decision making model (Xun et al., (2008) was developed to explain users’ 
cognitive process in relation to phishing emails (see Figure 6). The main feature of 
this model is its ability to identify two main areas of weakness in users’ decision 
making: the type of selected cues and the interpretation of the selected cues. Users 
may select the wrong cues to judge the legitimacy of a phishing email. For example, 
they may assume that an email containing a logo is legitimate. In fact, phishing 
emails may contain simulated company logos to enhance their credibility. The 
second area of weakness is incorrect interpretation of cues that have the potential to 
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alert the user to the fact that this is a phishing email. For example, a user may 
(incorrectly) interpret an email request for private bank details as part of normal bank 
procedure. Similarly, some users have been found to misinterpret phishing email 
cues such as missing images (red Xs) as a system fault (Downs et al., 2006).  
 
 
Figure 6: Decision making model (Xun et al., 2008) 
 
2.3.3 The elaboration likelihood model (ELM) 
The ELM proposes that users process message information via two main 
routes: the central route and the peripheral route (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  The 
central route processes the message by examining the argument it contains and the 
benefits and costs of following the instructions (cognitive processing). The peripheral 
route processes the message according to its overall appearance or other features 
external to the argument it contains. It has been suggested that users who fall victim 
to phishing emails are those who use the peripheral route (Vishwanath et al., 2011). 
In the peripheral route, emails are judged by their appearance (e.g. images) and 
overall design. Aburrous et al. (2010) found that some users ignore phishing email 
cues and base their judgment on the attractive appearance (e.g. colours, animation 
and images). A recent study using the eye-tracker technique showed that users pay 
more attention to the content of phishing emails than to meta-data such as “From” 
email address (Pfeiffer, Theuerling, & Kauer, 2013). As previously explained 
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(Section 2.2), phishing emails are cleverly designed. Users who rely on the 
peripheral route to detect deception are particularly vulnerable.  
These three models explain the cognitive process that underpins users’ 
judgement of the legitimacy of phishing emails. Because the aim of the present study 
is to understand the phases in users’ detection behaviour, the most appropriate model 
is the MDD. The main difference between MDD model and the other two models is 
its ability to explain the cognitive process outside the design features of phishing 
emails.  The ELM and decision making model are explaining the cognitive process 
based on the design features of phishing emails. For example, ELM explains the 
detection based on the way that users examine phishing emails. There are two ways 
of judgment: overall looks or argument quality. Both of these ways do not help our 
research in identifying behaviour. The decision making model explains the detection 
by cues selection and cues interpretation. Again, decision making model depends on 
the design features of phishing emails. The following sections examine the 
differences between detectors and victims.  
2.4 Cognitive Processes in Detectors and Victims  
One way of identifying weaknesses in victims’ detection behaviour is to 
compare their behaviour with that of detectors. To the best of our knowledge, no 
previous study has done this. Grazioli (2004), however, compared the cognitive 
process of detectors and victims. This is a useful foundation for better understanding 
the factors behind users’ behaviour.  
In Grazioli’s (2004) study, participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
websites, a phishing website and a legitimate website.  The findings suggest that 
there are significant differences between detectors and victims in two main cognitive 
phases―hypothesis evaluation and global assessment (see Table 5). Detectors use 
different cues to evaluate hypotheses and judge the authenticity of websites. The 
study did not seek to explain these findings (i.e. what makes detectors better at 
evaluating hypotheses or why they depend on different cues).  
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Table 5: Differences between detectors and victims (Grazioli, 2004) 
MDD Phases Detectors Victims 
Activation Inconsistence cues Inconsistence cues 
Hypothesis generation Priming
6
 not significant Priming is significant 
Hypothesis evaluation Competence at evaluation Incapable of evaluation 
Global assessment Assurance cues Trust cues 
 
Wright et al. (2009) used Grazioli’s MDD model to investigate the impact of 
individual user characteristics on detection behaviour. They interviewed detectors to 
identify the factors that helped them to detect phishing emails. Because the study did 
not include victims, no comparison was possible. Nonetheless, the study identified 
three influential factors in the first phase of the deception detection process 
(activation): cues, priming and individual factors (see Figure 7). Cues, or signifiers of 
phishing emails, have been well documented (Dhamija et al., 2006; Downs et al., 
2006; Xun et al., 2008). Priming is defined as information stored in the memory that 
can be recalled at a later time (Higgins, 1996). In other words, priming can be used to 
warn users about possible deceptive behaviour. Priming has been found to increase 
sensitivity towards deception (McCornack & Levine, 1990). Cues and priming are 
well established in education and training materials. Individual factors have received 
less attention in the field of phishing emails. Our research aims to fill this knowledge 
gap by investigating the impact of users’ characteristics on each phase of detection 
behaviour.  
 
Figure 7: Updated model of MDD (Wright et al., 2009) 
 
                                                 
6
 Priming is a way of warning users about a deceptive behaviour. 
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Vishwanath et al. (2011) found that most users who fall victim to phishing 
emails use the peripheral route in their decision making (see Section 2.3.3). In other 
words, victims base their judgment on design features such as images and 
appearance. The study suggests that victims choose the peripheral route when they 
do not have enough time to process a large number of emails carefully. The study 
also found that knowledge and self-efficacy were associated with high elaboration in 
decision-making (central route) but elaboration did not prevent some users from 
being victims. Drawing on Grazioli’s (2004) work, we can suggest that those victims 
may not generate a strong hypothesis or may weakly evaluate their suspicion.  
Burns et al. (2011) propose that an important factor differentiating victims 
from detectors is their assumption that phishing emails will not target them 
(Davinson & Sillence, 2010). As a result, victims display a lower level of security 
behaviour in relation to checking the authenticity of emails in their inboxes. This 
assumption needs to change if users’ behaviour is to change (Burns, Durcikova, & 
Jenkins, 2011). It is not enough merely to warn users about the dangerous effects of 
phishing emails; they also need to be educated in how to identify phishing email 
cues. Simply knowing that phishing emails can reach users will not improve their 
detection (Sven et al., 2007). Users expect to receive emails in their inbox and to 
respond to them. Therefore, users’ detection ability should be improved in a way that 
does not affect how they deal with legitimate emails.  
Since little is known about users’ ability to detect phishing emails, the 
following discussion focuses on observed weaknesses in their ability to detect 
phishing websites, which employ similar deceptive techniques. 
2.5 Users’ Weaknesses in Identifying Deception Cues  
Websites provide users with signs (indicators) that can be used to evaluate the 
authenticity of the site. These signs, known as browser security indicators, appear in 
browsers because the content of webpages can contain any kind of information and 
does not necessarily enforce security. Browser security indicators, however, are not 
sufficient for effective security (Dhamija & Tygar, 2005; Downs et al., 2006; 
Herzberg & Gbara, 2004; Mannan & van Oorschot, 2008). Users find it difficult to 
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confirm the authenticity of a visited website. Authentication can be revealed in 
various ways, such as a website security certificate, but there are usability issues 
associated with authenticating websites and security cues so that users can ensure 
that the information they are transferring over the Internet is encrypted (Mannan & 
Oorschot, 2008). These forms of insurance can be identified through padlock icons in 
browsers and “https” in URLs (Kuo, 2008). The factors responsible for security 
lapses are explored in the following sections.  
2.5.1 Checking indicators  
Browser security indicators are intended to help users assess the authenticity of 
visited websites (Downs et al., 2006) but only a minority of users rely on these 
indicators to make such judgments (Downs et al., 2006; Mannan & Oorschot, 2008). 
Mannan and van Oorschot (2008) found that 23% of users rely on the content of the 
webpage to authenticate the website while only 9% check all the browser security 
indicators for this purpose. Relying on content alone is inadequate because webpage 
content contains information chosen by the webpage designer. It has also been found 
that only 35% of users notice the existence of the “s” in the address bar (Downs et 
al., 2006) and that these users did not realise that the extra “s” indicated security.  
2.5.2 Understanding indicators  
Browser security indicators are deployed to deliver messages such as secure 
connection and server authentication (Dhamija et al., 2006; Downs et al., 2006; 
Mannan & Oorschot, 2008). Some users notice some indicators but often do not 
know what they mean (Downs et al., 2006). In fact, the majority of users do not 
know the real meaning of browser security indicators (Dhamija et al., 2006). For 
example, one security indicator is the padlock icon. Unlike the padlock icon in the 
browser chrome, a padlock icon in the content of the web page does not necessarily 
indicate an encrypted connection. Users usually do not know the difference and do 
not realise that a webpage can contain any icon that a web page designer wants to 
include (Mannan & Oorschot, 2008). 
2.5.3 Faked indicators 
For the minority of users who check and understand all browser security 
indicators (Downs et al., 2006; Mannan & Oorschot, 2008), there remains a serious 
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problem―they can be faked (Adelsbach, Gajek, & Schwenk, 2005; Herzberg & 
Gbara, 2004; Li & Wu, 2003; Ye, Yuan, & Smith, 2002). Therefore, users who look 
for security indicators can still be tricked into connecting to a malicious server.  This 
can be achieved by redirecting victims to a malicious website that displays similar 
signs to those on the legitimate one (Juels, Jakobsson, & Stamm, 2007; Karlof, 
Shankar, Tygar, & Wagner, 2007a; Wu, Yao, & Bao, 2008). For example, a self-
signed certificate can display the “s” in the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) to 
encrypt information transferred between the victim and the malicious server 
(Mannan & Oorschot, 2008).  
An attacker can also create a spoofed image without implementing its real 
purpose  (Dhamija et al., 2006; Ye et al., 2002); for example, showing a padlock icon 
in a spoofed window where there is no secure connection (Ye et al., 2002). Even 
careful users who check indicators can be tricked by advanced phishing attacks. 
According to Karlof et al. (2007), attackers can present the exact URL requested by 
users when they are actually connected to the malicious website. In this form of 
attack, users type and request the correct URL but the domain name system (DNS), 
which is poisoned, will connect them to a malicious website. This is an example of 
an attack that uses advanced forms of trickery to lure users. Clearly, there are serious 
issues associated with browser security indicators.  
In summary, there are weaknesses in users’ ability to identify phishing 
websites. These vulnerabilities should apply equally to phishing emails, which 
employ similar deceptive tactics. Various solutions to this problem have been 
developed, but users still fall victim to phishing emails. The following section 
discusses and evaluates these solutions.  
2.6 Protective Strategies  
This section provides an overview of the array of defences that have been 
designed to address the problem of phishing email attacks (see Figure 8). These falls 
into two main categories: strategies to prevent phishing emails from deceiving users, 
and techniques to protect users’ accounts.  
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Figure 8: Forms of protection against phishing emails 
 
2.6.1 Preventing phishing emails from deceiving users 
The first defence against phishing emails reaching a user’s inbox is the email 
filter (Bergholz et al., 2010; Fette et al., 2007; Maldonado & L’Huillier, 2013). The 
second form of defence involves users themselves, and the third comprises phishing 
website tools that are designed to prevent users from entering their secret information 
on phishing websites.   
2.6.1.1 Email filters 
Email filters are generally the first line of defence against phishing email 
attacks. They are intended to prevent these emails from reaching the user’s inbox. 
Different approaches have been used. For example, an organisation may employ 30 
analysts to prevent phishing emails from reaching users in the organisation (Knight, 
2005). As well as manual authentication, some solutions rely on advanced 
technology. Phishing email filters can be divided into two main types: those which 
automatically delete identified phishing emails without user involvement, and those 
which issue a warning to users and leave the final decision to users themselves.  
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The first type is designed to detect phishing emails before they reach the user’s 
inbox (Murphy, 2005). Different techniques of detection are employed. For example, 
Chandrasekaran et al. (2006) used distinct structural features to identify phishing 
emails. Fette et al. (2007) developed a machine learning system based on ten features 
of phishing emails that can be adapted to recognise newly developed features. 
Additionally, it has been proposed that digital email signatures improve detection  
ability (Garfinkel, Margrave, Schiller, Nordlander, & Miller, 2005).  
The second type is designed to warn users about phishing emails. This type of 
filter cannot detect all forms of phishing emails (Fette et al., 2007; Maldonado & 
L’Huillier, 2013). Even if it could, the final decision is made by users, who may 
choose to ignore the warning.  
Neither of these email filters can detect all types of phishing emails 
(Chandrasekaran et al., 2006; Cook et al., 2009; Fette et al., 2007; Maldonado & 
L’Huillier, 2013). This is because they mainly detect phishing emails from their 
design, which does not remain constant over time (Wang et al., 2009) or known to 
email filters developers. These email filters, therefore, must continually be updated.  
An addition complexity can be added to email filters by considering new 
designed phishing emails. There is usually a time delay between an update and the 
creation of a new phishing email (zero-day). According to Kumaraguru (2009), 
users’ response time to a phishing email is between two and eight hours after the 
phishing email was sent. Therefore, anti-phishing filters that depend on a black list 
have to be updated regularly, with this time frame in mind, or they will not detect 
new phishing emails (zero-day). It is up to users to determine the legitimacy of 
phishing emails that are not detected by filters. 
Out-of-date email filters and undetected phishing emails mean that users have 
to rely on themselves to detect these emails. Their decision will determine whether or 
not they become victims. The following section describes solutions that have been 
developed to help users reach the right decision. 
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2.6.1.2 Educating users 
Since users are the main target of phishing emails, high priority should be 
given to increasing their protection. Users may fall victim to phishing emails simply 
by opening them. Phishing emails may contain links to malicious downloadable files 
that destroy users’ computers. Improving the ability of users to detect phishing 
emails, therefore, is a critical consideration and various educational programs have 
been developed for this purpose 
Educational programs have shown promising results in improving users’ 
detection ability (Alnajim, 2009). Existing programs, however, fail to take into 
account differences between detectors and victims. Studies have shown, for instance, 
that some users manage to detect phishing emails without any training. These users 
have received less research attention because previous studies have mainly focused 
on improving the success of educational programs around detection (Bekkering et al., 
2009; Kumaraguru et al., 2008; Sven et al., 2007).  
Such programs have not, however, solved the problem, since many users fall 
victim to phishing emails despite receiving education (Karakasiliotis et al., 2006; 
Kumaraguru et al., 2009). Clearly, other factors affect users’ vulnerability. 
Identifying these factors is one objective of the present study. Its focus, moreover, is 
on users themselves, whereas educational programs focus on the technical aspects of 
protection against phishing emails.  
In summary, users show some ability to detect phishing emails but not all can 
do so. These users continue to be harmed because they provide their confidential 
information or become connected to a phishing website. The following subsection 
discusses the solutions that have been developed to tackle phishing websites.  
2.6.1.3 Phishing website security tools 
Phishing websites are most commonly the next step in a phishing email attack. 
Another form of protection, then, targets these sites themselves. There are two main 
types of security tools for phishing websites: (1) those that help users to detect 
phishing websites and (2) those that exclude users from the decision-making process.  
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Firstly, detection tools use information from websites to improve the detection 
capability of browsers (Dhamija & Tygar, 2005; Herzberg & Gbara, 2004; Oppliger 
et al., 2006; Xia & Brustoloni, 2005) and the ability of users to authenticate websites 
(Dhamija & Tygar, 2005; Herzberg & Gbara, 2004; Li & Wu, 2003; Wu, Miller, & 
Little, 2006; Xia & Brustoloni, 2005). Giving users the right tools allows them to 
view some security features on websites. Four examples are discussed below: 
warning windows, website logos, dynamic security skins and personalising windows.  
Warning windows tell users whether their connection to a website is secure or 
not (Xia & Brustoloni, 2005). This is achieved through the use of self-signed 
certificate warning windows. Unfortunately, it has been shown that more users 
choose to proceed with the connection than choose to stop when one of these 
windows appears (Whitten, 2004).  
Website logos are used to authenticate legitimate websites via a tool known as 
a Trusted Credentials Area (TCA) (Herzberg & Gbara, 2004). Users are presented 
with an authenticated website logo rather than a URL. This approach facilitates 
authentication by users, since authenticating URLs is not an easy task. A difficulty  
with this approach is that authenticating a website’s logo is based on its certificate, 
which exposes the validation process to SSL certificate problems (Dhamija & Tygar, 
2005).  
Dynamic security skins (DSS) are designed to generate a unique image for 
websites which appears in two places: in the background of the web page and in a 
trusted window from the legitimate server (Dhamija & Tygar, 2005). Users then have 
to visually match the two images to authenticate the server. Users, however, have to 
reveal their username before DSS authentication takes place and it is easy for a 
phishing attacker to catch the username (Wu et al., 2008).  
Personalised websites have been proposed as a way for users to authenticate 
legitimate websites. This toolbar personalises concepts in an adaptive web browser, 
allowing users to access basic information at a glance (Adelsbach et al., 2005). It is 
claimed that this toolbar is able to defend against attacks that use active web 
languages, since it is located locally in the user’s machine. This approach has two 
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main drawbacks: users have to recognise their personal image at every login (Wu et 
al., 2008), and toolbars can be spoofed (Wu et al., 2006). 
These security tools leave the final decision to users. They enhance decision-
making by providing users with technical means of authenticating websites and 
applying security measures. Even when such toolbars achieve a high rate of success 
in distinguishing between phishing and non-phishing websites, they have two main 
limitations: users may ignore the warnings and, if the solutions fail, users are not 
prevented from providing their secret information (Egelman, Cranor, & Hong, 2008; 
Wu, Miller, & Garfinkel, 2006).  
Secondly, the other kinds of tools have been designed to provide protection by 
excluding users from the process of revealing their secret information to websites. 
This is because users can be tricked into authenticating malicious websites (Karlof et 
al., 2007a; Karlof, Shankar, Tygar, & Wagner, 2007b; Wu et al., 2008). In this 
approach, users give their secret information to security tools which are able to 
authenticate legitimate websites. These tools then provide legitimate websites with 
users’ secret information. Examples of this approach are described below.  
Locked and encrypted cookies (Karlof et al., 2007; Wu et al., 2008) protect 
users’ credentials from being accessed by unauthorised parties by storing users’ 
credentials in encrypted cookies. Encrypted information cannot be retrieved by 
websites that do not have access to the relevant decryption information. This 
approach has two main advantages. First, users’ credentials are better protected by 
encryption. Second, only the website that encrypts these cookies has the ability to 
decrypt and obtain secret information. As with previously discussed strategies, 
however, cookies are not able to prevent users from revealing their credentials to 
phishing websites. 
The active cookie scheme proposed by Juels et al. (2007) holds users’ 
authentication and fixed IP address for servers. Protection is provided by changing 
the URL domain name to the server IP address. This addresses the attack tactic in 
which traffic from a legitimate server is redirected to a malicious one (Gupta, 2007). 
The disadvantage of presenting IP addresses, as shown in Downs et al.’s (2006) 
study, is that some suspect websites present an IP address instead of a URL. It is 
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clear to users that cookies are making the authentication, but this may have a 
negative effect in that users may refuse to deal with websites that present IP 
addresses.  
Overall, cookies have three disadvantages: deleting cookies, obtaining cookies 
and authenticating browsers rather than users. One study found that nearly 58% of 
users delete their cookies at least once a month (O'Malley, 2005). In order to obtain 
authentication cookies, users have to make the initial authentication, which brings us 
back to the first problem associated with users making the authentication (Karlof et 
al., 2007a). Cookies authenticate users’ browsers, not users themselves (Juels et al., 
2007), which means that anyone using the authenticated browser can act on behalf of 
the authorised user.  
In addition, malicious websites can manipulate these tools by pretending that 
the website is experiencing problems reading the information from the tools and 
asking users to enter their secret information manually. The tools cannot prevent this 
action. To address this issue, Wu et al (2006) designed a browser plug-in toolbar, 
called a web wallet toolbar, which prevents users from directly entering their secret 
information into online forms. The weaknesses in this solution are: 1) the toolbar 
does not prevent users from entering their web wallet information into a fake web 
wallet toolbar, and 2) not all users are willing to install the web wallet toolbar. 
The solutions described in this section focus on the computer in preference to 
the user, because users may misinterpret technical security signs that can help them 
to avoid deception. In particular, users cannot distinguish between similar domains 
such as PayPal.com (with the letter L) and PayPa1.com (with the number 1), whereas 
computers can easily make this distinction. Users are required to create a strong 
password to protect their accounts. Because strong passwords can be hard to 
remember, users trade usability for security and choose an easy password (Cormac, 
2009) and may use one password for many online accounts. This behaviour can 
result in users’ passwords being leaked. For example, an adversary can ask users to 
create an online account to a free service and harvest the passwords. 
The main drawback associated with these tools is their inability to prevent 
users from ignoring their warnings (Egelman et al., 2008; Wu, Miller, & Garfinkel, 
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2006). In addition, they require active user interaction, since their benefits will only 
accrue if users install them in the first place.  
2.6.2 Protecting users’ accounts  
Some solutions are designed to protect users’ accounts. They come into play if 
other solutions fail and users provide their secret information to phishing emails. In 
order to render captured information useless, some e-service providers use an 
account protection scheme such as two factors authentication, phony information, or 
information encryption. 
The two factors scheme is based on identifying users by what they know and 
what they have, such as a token that contains a one-off password (Williamson, 2006). 
This approach ensures that the person requesting the e-service is the legitimate one. 
This is achieved by asking for information that is only available to the legitimate 
person (e.g. SMS message via mobile).  
Phony information goes one step further by attacking the attackers. The attack 
begins by providing attackers with fake information and considering whoever 
subsequently uses this information as an attacker (Shujun & Schmitz, 2009). Not all 
e-service providers, however, apply these defences. 
Encrypting secret information is a complicated approach that significantly 
increases the difficulty of obtaining secret information. For example, secret 
information can be stored in external hardware devices to prevent unauthorised 
access. Lin et al. (2007) developed a USB device that is able to encrypt and decrypt 
information outside users’ computers. Rexha (2005) proposed a user certificate to 
protect the identity of the user. These certificates hold users’ credentials encrypted by 
banks so that only banks that make the encryption can access users’ information. 
These certificates allow users to make online purchases secure in the knowledge that 
their bank-related information can only be decrypted by the bank that issued the 
certificate. The main problem with these complicated solutions is the requirement for 
an external device. This device needs to be kept by the user and deployed for every 
transaction. 
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Despite all these available defences, users still fall victim to phishing emails. 
This suggests that both users and technology fail in some way. Moreover, not all e-
service providers employ these devices. When technical solutions fail, users are the 
last line of defence against phishing emails. Yet users themselves have been 
neglected in research to date, which has largely focused on their detection ability in 
general. Clearly, there is a need to improve users’ ability to detect phishing emails. 
To accomplish this, there is a need to identify users’ vulnerabilities more specifically 
through better understanding how they deal with phishing emails and what factors 
affect their detection ability. This is the focus of the present study.  
2.7 Gaps in Understanding Users’ Detection Behaviour 
There is a gap in the extant literature in relation to users’ detection behaviour 
and the impact of users’ characteristics on this behaviour. Differences between users 
have not been thoroughly investigated in the context of phishing emails.  
Phishing emails include design features that make them credible. They mimic 
legitimate organisations to make users believe they originate from those 
organisations (Wang et al., 2009). Solutions have been designed to draw users’ 
attention to phishing email cues such as digit IP addresses or unmatched URLs. Most 
security tools that are designed to detect phishing emails use these cues to achieve 
high detection accuracy (Chandrasekaran et al., 2006; Cook et al., 2009; Fette et al., 
2007). While these tools have the ability to detect phishing emails and warn users 
about them, some users ignore these warnings because they are presented in a 
technical way that many users do not understand (Dhamija et al., 2006; Wu, Miller, 
& Garfinkel, 2006). Thus, usability is an important issue (Cormac, 2009).  
Some users are able to detect certain types of phishing emails but can be 
tricked by other types (Jakobsson, 2007; Karakasiliotis et al., 2006). In other words, 
there is a relationship between the type of phishing email and users’ detection 
behaviour. This suggests that users’ ability to detect is the result of interaction 
between users themselves and the type of phishing email. For example, some users 
consider any email that requests financial information, such as bank account details, 
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to be a phishing email. These users may be tricked by phishing emails that ask users 
to update their account by, for instance, changing their password. 
Some studies have reported the impact of users’ demographics but fail to 
examine these findings more closely. For example, Kumaraguru et al. (2008) 
reported that, on day 28 of their experiment, there was no significant difference 
between the participants who had not received a single training session and those 
who had received multiple training sessions. They conducted the same experiment in 
a different culture and found a significant difference between trained and non-trained 
groups. This suggests that users’ demographics, particularly cultural differences, play 
a major role in participants’ ability to detect phishing emails. The researchers did not, 
however, compare the results of these two experiments.  
Users also fall victim to phishing emails because they ignore warnings from 
security indicators and rely on themselves to evaluate certain cues in phishing emails, 
which does not ensure security (Stebila, 2010). This is another example of the impact 
of users’ characteristics on their ability to detect phishing emails. 
Users’ awareness is another important factor (Aburrous et al., 2010).  Current 
security indicators designed to warn users about phishing are not effective in 
preventing users from falling victim to these attacks. In other words, users need to be 
aware of how to detect phishing emails, not simply that they exist.   
In summary, users’ characteristics impact on their ability to detect phishing 
emails but these characteristics have not been thoroughly investigated in relation to 
their effect on detection behaviour and vulnerability. The following section discusses 
the variables that have been shown to affect users’ detection ability, as well as others 
that are highly likely to do so.  
2.8 Variables in Users’ Detection Ability 
This section discusses variables that have been examined or identified in 
general studies of deception as well as in research on phishing emails. Some 
variables that have been reported to affect users’ ability to detect deception in general 
have not been investigated in relation to phishing emails. Other variables that appear 
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to affect users’ ability to detect phishing emails have not been rigorously tested in 
research. In addition, some studies show contradictory results or used inappropriate 
measures. The present study addresses these limitations.  
Users’ characteristics are those factors which differentiate users from each 
other. Our research focused on those characteristics that make users vulnerable to 
phishing attacks and the impact of these factors on detection behaviour. This will 
help to identify potential victims, who can be targeted to increase their protection. 
The main characteristics that have been investigated are personality, culture and 
experience.  
2.8.1 Culture 
Although culture has not been directly investigated in phishing email studies, 
there are indications that it impacts on detection. For example, users from different 
cultures may not be able to identify spelling and grammatical mistakes in phishing 
emails (Jakobsson et al., 2007). Companies are no longer limited to their own 
geographic location and ecommerce companies increasingly target consumers 
worldwide. This means that customers come from cultures other than that of the 
company itself. What is the impact of an attack launched on a company that has 
customers from different cultures? 
Phishing attacks are mainly based on emails. The fact that emails are a poor 
medium adds complexity to the problem of identifying phishing emails in a different 
culture. It has been shown that it is more difficult to detect deception across cultures 
when the deception is practised in a poor medium (Bond & Atoum, 2000; Bond et 
al., 1990). The problem is compounded because phishing emails can deceive even 
users who belong to the same culture as that of the impersonated company (Dhamija 
et al., 2006; Downs et al., 2006).  
Cultural differences may play a major role in differentiating detectors and 
victims. Users from the same culture as that of the originator of a phishing email are 
likely to be more knowledgeable than others and, hence, better able to detect 
deception. For example, university students in a particular country may know that 
their university would never ask about passwords. Phishing emails which pretend to 
be from a university may have a high chance of tricking users from other cultures.  
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2.8.2 Personality  
Two studies have highlighted the importance of personality in the ability to 
detect phishing emails.  
The first study (Wright et al., 2009) was based on interviews with detectors of 
phishing emails. The findings showed a possible correlation between users’ 
personalities and their success in detecting phishing emails. The personality variables 
identified in the study were: sensitivity towards the value of information; concern for 
privacy/security; obedience to instructions/authorities; and the Big-Five personality 
domains. Each is discussed in more detail below.  
Users who suspected the phishing email showed high sensitivity when they 
were asked to reveal their SSC and showed a high level of concern about their 
privacy when asked to do so (Wright et al., 2009). Studies in ecommerce have 
investigated whether a high level of concern about privacy can be translated into 
secure behaviour. It was found that users showed high levels of concern about 
providing direct information but this did not stop them giving their information when 
presented with short-term benefits (Acquisti & Grossklags, 2005). Concerns about 
privacy may increase users’ suspicions, which may lead them to activate the MDD. 
Such concerns do not, however, mean that users will detect phishing attacks.  
Obedience may have an effect on the likelihood of users’ becoming detectors. 
Users who detected phishing emails remembered that they had been instructed 
several times not to disclose their SSC to anyone (Wright et al., 2009). Because they 
had been repeatedly told to keep this information secret, they did not to respond to 
the email that asked them to reveal it.  
The Big Five personality dimensions are: openness, conscientiousness, 
extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. Each factor includes a cluster of 
characteristics that together make up one’s personality. Wright et al. (2009) found 
that detectors score more highly on conscientiousness than victims. The analysis, 
however, did not include all detectors; detectors who did not inform a third party 
were excluded.  
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The second study (Kumaraguru et al., 2007b) used the Cognitive Reflection 
Test (CRT). Participants with a high CRT score were more likely to click on links 
from phishing emails that claimed to come from companies in which they did not 
hold an account. Users with high CRT are more vulnerable to visual illusions 
(Jensen, 1998). Phishing emails are deceiving users by implementing different 
techniques to make users believe their legitimacy such as including logos and 
padlocks.  
2.8.3 Other variables have been identified in research on phishing emails 
Several different variables have been suggested or investigated in previous 
studies related to users’ ability to detect phishing emails. These are discussed below 
and summarised in Table 6. These variables are: age, gender, education, Internet 
usage and experience, email experience and knowledge about phishing emails which 
are discussed below.  
Age has an effect on the ability to detect phishing emails (Kumaraguru et al., 
2009; Sheng et al., 2010). Other studies, however, found that age does not have a 
significant effect (Dhamija et al., 2006; Kumaraguru et al., 2007; Sheng et al., 2007). 
The difference between these two groups of study is the division of age. These two 
sets of studies used different age categories, and this may have affected the results. 
Users aged 18 - 25 years behave significantly differently from older users, perhaps 
because they are more likely to be risk-takers.  
Studies in gender suggest that there is a relationship between gender and users’ 
ability to detect phishing emails, with females being more vulnerable than males 
(Jagatic et al., 2007; Sheng et al., 2010). This may reflect the fact that women are 
more likely than men to display agreeableness, and this may affect their vulnerability 
(Costa Jr, Terracciano, & McCrae, 2001). 
Users’ level of education has not been found to be a significant differentiating 
factor in their vulnerability to phishing emails (Dhamija et al., 2006; Sheng et al., 
2007). Providing users with educational materials about phishing emails, however, 
increased their ability to detect phishing emails (Bekkering et al., 2009; Kumaraguru 
et al., 2009; Kumaraguru et al., 2008). Not all such educational materials are 
effective in increasing users’ detection ability. One pre/post-test study, for example, 
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showed that the educational materials given to participants increased their fear of 
phishing emails and led them to rank non-phishing emails as phishing emails (Sven 
et al., 2007). 
The number of years of Internet use was not significantly associated with 
differences in the ability to detect phishing emails (Dhamija et al., 2006; Sheng et al., 
2007). Internet usage varies between users, who can employ it to communicate with 
friends or read newspapers, as well as for shopping or banking, which require 
security. The experience of conducting sensitive transactions on the Internet 
influences users’ perceptions and behaviour. Those users who shop online are 
significantly more likely to detect phishing emails (Wright et al., 2009). This may be 
because shopping online requires users to pay attention to security and increases their 
experience of detection. In contrast, Kumaraguru et al. (2007) found that online 
shopping does not significantly differentiate detectors from victims.  
Email experience has not been satisfactorily measured. Some studies 
(Kumaraguru, 2007; Kumaraguru et al., 2007) have not found any significant 
relationship between email experience and users’ ability to detect phishing emails. 
These studies, however, asked about the number of emails that users receive in their 
email account. Users may use emails frequently, but this does not mean that they 
know how to evaluate them. Users may know how to send and receive emails, but 
they do not necessarily know that email addresses can be spoofed, or that a lock icon 
in the content of the email does not guarantee security. In contrast, Vishwanath et al. 
(2011) found that the number of emails received increased the likelihood that users 
would make decisions based on the appearance of the email, which increases their 
vulnerability to phishing emails.  
Knowledge of the existence of phishing emails did not have any significant 
effect on users’ detection ability (Wright et al., 2009). Knowing that security threats 
exist does not prevent users from becoming victims. Many users believe that the 
perpetrators of phishing emails are not interested in targeting them in order to steal 
their information (Herzberg, 2009). Education programs that seek to inform users 
about phishing email cues, such as IP addresses, have achieved some success in 
increasing users’ detection ability.  
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Table 6: Summary of variables 
Factors  Sub-factors Relation with 
phishing 
detection 
Findings 
Culture  Significant Non-phishing 
email studies 
 Language  N/A Spelling 
mistakes 
 Nationality N/A  
Personality  Sensitivity towards 
requested  
information 
N/A Qualitative 
results 
Concern about 
privacy/security 
N/A Qualitative 
results 
Big-Five personality 
dimensions 
Significant Detectors only 
Age   Significant  Younger users  
Gender  Contradictory
7
  Females 
Education   Not significant  
Internet experience Number of years Not significant  
Shopping Contradictory  
Email experience Number of emails Contradictory  
Knowledge of 
phishing emails  
Existence Not significant  
Cues Significant   
 
2.9 Summary  
This study emphasises the importance of including users in the process of 
detecting phishing emails. The problem of phishing emails has two dimensions― 
users and technology. Many technological solutions have been developed to tackle 
this problem, but few have approached it from the perspective of users. Most of the 
technical solutions are preventive and do not stop users from falling victim (Purkait, 
2012; Yue & Wang, 2008). Users must remain alert to the threat from phishing 
emails and cannot always rely on currently available solutions to protect them. 
Dependence on these solutions can have a negative impact by encouraging users to 
                                                 
7
 i.e. some studies show a significant effect for the factor and others do not. 
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trust all the emails that arrive in their inbox. Yet the perpetrators of phishing emails 
are constantly finding new ways to overcome technical solutions (Wang et al., 2009). 
When phishing emails pass security tools, the chance of users becoming victims 
increases significantly.  
Improving users’ ability to detect phishing emails will help to reduce the 
number of victims. In many cases, users are the last line of defence against phishing 
emails. The present study is motivated by the need to find new ways to improve 
users’ defences. Solutions that can detect phishing emails or prevent them from 
reaching users will facilitate this task. This is not always the case, however, and it is 
dangerous for users to rely completely on technological solutions. If they do so, they 
become easy targets.  
We need to better understand users themselves in order to increase their 
protection. Specifically, it is vital to identify weaknesses in users’ detection 
behaviour. Neither users’ detection behaviour nor the impact of users’ characteristics 
on this behaviour has been well investigated. Identifying those factors that make 
users vulnerable to phishing attacks is an important goal if their effects are to be 
reduced. At the same time, identifying those factors that are responsible for turning 
users into detectors will enhance efforts to address the corresponding deficiencies in 
victims. 
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Chapter 3: Research Model 
This chapter explains how the research model was developed.  Users’ detection 
behaviour is examined from a theoretical perspective and user attributes likely to 
impact on that behaviour are identified. The research model and hypotheses are 
presented.  
3.1 Model Building 
As discussed in Chapter 2, despite the availability of many technical solutions 
and educational programs, users continue to fall victim to phishing emails (Wu, 
Miller, & Garfinkel, 2006). Educational programs are designed to increase users’ 
awareness of the technical aspects of phishing emails but little research attention has 
been devoted to better understanding users themselves. Significantly, some 
educational program studies have observed demographic differences in users’ 
detection ability but have not investigated these differences further. Clearly, there 
needs to be a greater research focus on the users’ perspective. Before discussing 
users, the main theory used in our research is explained below.  
The theory of deception is the main theory and defines the intended deception 
as a cognitive process between the deceiver (sender) and the deceivee (receiver) 
under conflict of interest (Johnson & Grazioli, 1993; Johnson et al., 2001; Johnson et 
al., 1992). The deceiver encourages the receiver to take a desired action by 
manipulating the environment of the receiver to produce an incorrect cognitive 
representation. This theory was originally developed to explain deception in 
information-intensive environments such as face-to-face conversations (Grazioli & 
Wang, 2001). Face-to-face interaction is considered to be a rich medium that can 
carry various cues to assist detection of deception. These include real time response, 
the ability to examine different signs (e.g. vocal and body signs) and two-way 
dialogue between detector and deceiver.  
Grazioli (2004) applied the theory of deception in a computer based 
environment and proposed the MDD (see Figure 5). In this kind of environment, the 
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process mainly involves one-way conversation in which the deceiver sends a 
message and the user has to make a decision based on the information contained in 
the message. This environment makes detection more difficult compared to a rich 
medium like face-to-face interaction, where a user can ask questions and observe the 
response in real time. The process of detection in relation to phishing emails is 
explained below.  
Users who open a phishing email fall into one of two categories: detectors or 
victims. Detectors are those who decide not to respond while victims are those who 
perform the requested action. Detectors and victims behave differently in reaching 
their respective conclusions (see Figure 9). The MDD allows us to investigate their 
behaviour from the beginning and to identify three main behavioural phases in 
detection: susceptibility, confirmation, and response. In the following, we will 
discuss our research hypotheses and the relationships between users’ characteristics 
with users’ behaviour with phishing emails.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Users’ behaviour when faced with a phishing email 
3.2  Research Hypotheses 
The research model that was developed and empirically tested in the present 
study is shown in Figure 10. Data were collected using survey, experimental and 
interview methods to obtain a holistic understanding of users’ detection behaviour. In 
a mixed methods approach, the techniques complement each other and each has a 
specific purpose in relation to understanding the research problem (Gable, 1994). 
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Surveys were used to collect information about users’ characteristics and evaluation 
methods. The experimental method captured the real-life behaviour of users when 
they encountered phishing emails and was used to categorise them as detectors or 
victims. Interviews generated in-depth understanding of users’ detection behaviour. 
Research hypothesis were developed to illustrate relationships between variables.  
 
 
Figure 10. Research model and hypotheses  
The research hypotheses in our study are as follows (see Table 8): 
3.2.1 Trust 
Trust is “to willingly become vulnerable to the trustee (another person, 
institution, or people generally) having taken into consideration the characteristics of 
the trustee” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998).  
Trusts can be divided into two types: (1) Trust as a personal characteristic, 
which measures the trusting nature of a person. It measures a person’s inclination to 
trust someone or some organisations, the trustworthiness of which the person has no 
prior knowledge of. (2) Trust as confidence of reliability in specific persons or 
organisations. This measures the trust that a person developed over time after he/she 
has dealt with the specific persons or organisations over time. As our research 
focuses on the user characteristics, our measure of trust focuses on the former.  
H1: Trust increases users’ susceptibility to phishing emails 
Trust is measured with 3 items developed by McKnight et al. (2003).  
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3.2.2 Submissiveness 
Submissiveness, or submission to more dominant entities (Allan & Gilbert, 
1997), is associated with obedience and compliance.  
Phishing emails are always request users to make an action in order to be 
successful. Submissiveness may increase the chance of users comply with phishing 
emails request. Users who have high submissiveness are more likely will not 
question the legitimacy of entities. In phishing emails detection, suspecting the 
legitimacy of phishing emails is an essential aspect to switch user to detection mode. 
Submissiveness has a negative impact on suspicion. Users who have high 
submissiveness are more expected to fall prey to phishing emails since they are more 
likely will not suspect. Furthermore, the qualitative findings of Wright et al. (2009) 
indicate that users who are submissive are more likely than others to submit with the 
requests of phishing emails. 
H2: Submissiveness increases users’ susceptibility to phishing emails 
Submissiveness is measured with 16 items developed by Allan and Gillbert 
(1997). 
3.2.3 Perceived email experience and richness 
Perceived email experience is defined as users’ ability to encode and decode 
information included in emails (Carlson & Zmud, 1999). 
Perceived email richness is defined as users’ ability to extract rich information 
contained in emails (Carlson & Zmud, 1999). Media richness is defined as the ability 
of the medium to convey rich information in its messages (Daft & Lengel, 1986).  
Email, which is the main channel used for deception in phishing attacks, is a 
poor medium for the transfer of information and cues (Daft & Lengel, 1986). A poor 
medium (low information, few cues) makes the task of detecting deception via email 
very difficult for receivers (George & Carlson, 1999). Users find it hard to detect 
cues about the identity of phishing emails, yet cues are very important aides to 
detection (Downs et al., 2006; Grazioli, 2004; Xun et al., 2008).  
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Media richness theory uses four criteria to determine the richness of a medium:  
immediate feedback, multiple cues, language variety and personal emotions (Daft & 
Lengel, 1986). A medium in which all these features are present is considered to be a 
rich medium. The fewer the number of features, the poorer the medium will be. For 
example, face-to-face interaction is considered to be a rich medium because it meets 
all these criteria. Emails are viewed as a poor medium because they cannot meet all 
these criteria. However, email can be considered as a rich channel using channel 
expansion theory (Carlson & Zmud, 1999).  
Channel expansion theory adds another dimension to the idea of media 
richness. Carlson and Zmud (1999) found that emails, which are a poor channel, can 
be perceived by users as a rich channel depending on their previous experience and 
the perceived richness of the email. Richness gives users a baseline for comparison 
between previously obtained information and information extracted from phishing 
emails. Comparison is viewed as the trigger for users’ detection process.  
In addition, some studies have examined the impact of users’ experience with 
emails on their detection ability. The variable considered was the number of received 
emails. For example, Vishwanath et al. (2011) found a positive relationship between 
the number of emails received and users’ vulnerability to phishing email attacks. 
They explain this result by suggesting that receipt of a large number of emails leads 
users to adopt the peripheral route in decision making. In other words, they judge the 
authenticated an email from its appearance which, as previously explained, is a risky 
approach (Jakobsson et al., 2007). This means that the stress associated with having 
to make a quick decision reduces the chances that they will make the right decision. 
Phishing emails exploit this by emphasising the urgency of the situation and pushing 
users to make a decision in a short time.  
The number of emails received, however, is not necessarily an appropriate 
measure of users’ experience with emails. Users may receive a high number of 
emails but not interact with them. In the present study, channel expansion theory is 
used to explain the relationship between email experience and ability to detect.  
Perceived email richness measures users’ ability to observe diverse cues in 
emails (Carlson & Zmud, 1999). A rich medium can contain a number of different 
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cues (Daft & Lengel, 1986). Emails can be perceived as a rich medium by users if 
they are able to extract diverse cues from them. Being able to observe different cues 
as to the identity of the sender of an email enhances users’ ability to detect deception. 
Phishing emails are well designed to hide such cues. In order to spot phishing email 
cues, users need to pay close attention to specific details they contain and know what 
the cues mean. Failure to recognise these cues is the second source of error in users’ 
detection decisions (Xun et al., 2008).  
H3: Perceived email experience decreases users’ susceptibility to phishing emails 
H4: Perceived email richness decreases users’ susceptibility to phishing emails 
Our research proposes that email experience and richness have impacts on the 
ability of users to detect deception carried via emails. The measure includes 6 items 
for email experience and 4 items for email richness developed by Carlson and Zmud 
(1999). Please refer to Appendix A question number 14 for details.  
3.2.4 Susceptibility 
Susceptibility refers to the inability of users to suspect a phishing email. Users 
with a high level of susceptibility have low or no suspicion, and vice versa. 
Susceptibility comes into play when users open a phishing email to decide whether it 
is legitimate or not.  
According to the MDD, users go through four cognitive phases to reach their 
final decision (see Figure 5). The first phase is activation, in which users suspect that 
the received email is a phishing email. The activation phase is triggered by 
inconsistency between observed cues and expected cues (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). 
Observation of cues cannot occur without the user opening the email. Therefore, the 
first behavioural phase in the detection process occurs when users open the phishing 
email. In the present study, this phase is called susceptibility, which is driven by 
users’ level of suspicion towards phishing emails. Users with either low or high 
susceptibility will proceed directly to the third phase, response. Users with neither 
low nor high susceptibility proceed to the second phase, confirmation (see Figure 9). 
According to Stiff et al. (1992), suspicion causes users to focus on making 
reliable judgments based on situational characteristics. Suspicion, then, reduces 
users’ susceptibility to phishing emails, which employ techniques (such as 
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impersonating reputable organisations) to allay suspicion. As noted above, such 
techniques can lead to users exercising less care in authenticating emails.   
Noticing phishing email cues leads detectors to perform the first step in the 
MDD, namely, activation. However, not all users are able to detect these cues. 
According to Xun et al. (2008), the first mistake victims make is mis-selecting cues. 
Some users select cues that have no relation to the task of detecting phishing emails 
(e.g. logos or padlocks). They fail to pay attention to important cues and remain 
unaware of the deception. Selecting the right cues differentiates detectors from 
victims. 
H5: High susceptibility to phishing emails increases users’ response to phishing 
emails 
Susceptibility is the first phase in users’ detection behaviour. Based on the 
level of susceptibility, users will determine their intended behaviour (see Figure 10). 
Therefore, we measured susceptibility with five phishing emails developed by the 
presented study (see Section 4.5.4). 
3.2.5 Big five personality dimensions  
The Big Five personality dimensions are: (1) extraversion, which describes a 
person who interacts more with others; (2) agreeableness, which describes a person 
who is more kind and warm to others and have good intentions; (3) 
conscientiousness, which describes a person who is more determined to complete 
tasks; (4) emotional stability, which describes a person who is more likely to be 
calm; and 5) openness, which describes a person who is more open to new 
experiences (Costa & McCrae, 1992). 
Big five personality dimensions divide individual personality into five main 
categories. Each one of these category summarise more traits which can form the 
high level traits in these personality dimensions (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 
2003). These personality dimensions have an impact on users’ behaviour with people 
and entities. For example, a person who has high score in openness is keen to involve 
in new experience. In other word, openness could increase users to be more risk-
takers or adventurers. Agreeableness involves believing in others and be less 
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suspicious. It can be seen that each one of these personality dimensions are 
responsible in making users behave in a certain way.  
Phishing emails are one of these entities which are impact by these dimensions. 
In fact, phishing emails may benefit from some of these personality dimensions. For 
example, designing a phishing email which presents a prize for risky behaviour may 
attract users who have high score in openness. Those users are more eager to be 
involved in risky behaviour. Furthermore, Phishing emails are well designed to 
minimise users’ suspicions. Would users who have high score in agreeableness be 
more victimised than other users. Since, agreeableness increase users’ tendency to 
give good intentions to others. It has been argued in the current literature that the Big 
Five personality dimensions influence users’ susceptibility to phishing emails 
(Parrish Jr, Bailey, & Courtney, 2009).  
H6: Users with high scores on certain personality dimensions increase 
susceptibility to phishing emails 
H7: Users with high scores on certain personality dimensions increase their 
response to phishing emails 
The relationships between big five personality dimensions and users’ 
susceptibility and response to phishing emails are measured in our research. The 
hypotheses for big five dimensions are: extraversion (H6a, H7a); agreeableness 
(H6b, H7b); conscientiousness (H6c, H7c); emotional stability (H6d, H7d); and 
openness (H6e, H7e). The measure used in the present study was developed by 
Gosling et al. (2003) and contains 10 items. 
3.2.6 Confirmation  
Confirmation channels are those channels which users choose to validate and 
evaluate suspected phishing emails.  
Users who suspect a phishing email will choose a way to evaluate their 
suspicion. The confirmation phase is affected by the assumptions users make in their 
detection behaviour. Some users who are aware of phishing emails fall victim 
because they assume that no-one would be interested in targeting them (Burns et al., 
2011; Davinson & Sillence, 2010; Dhamija et al., 2006). They either do not believe 
that they would receive a phishing email or that attackers would not be interested in 
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stealing their information. Users who make this assumption will not proceed to the 
confirmation phase (see Figure 9).  
Confirmation behaviour plays an important role in detection. When users 
suspect a phishing email, they behave in different ways to verify emails legitimacy. 
Some of these behaviours are not appropriate.  For example, some users who suspect 
a phishing email click on the embedded link on the assumption that, if a website 
similar to what they expect appears, the email is legitimate. This type of confirmation 
behaviour is not reliable, since phishing attacks are designed in a similar way. Wright 
et al. (2009) identified different types of evaluation such as forwarding, replying and 
asking others. Each of these behaviours can be performed through various channels.  
Users choose the type of confirmation channel they think is appropriate. 
According to media richness theory, users will choose rich media when faced with 
uncertain tasks (Daft & Lengel, 1986). If users are uncertain about the task (e.g. 
whether to click on a link or reveal their password), they are more likely to choose a 
richer channel. For example, users will choose a rich channel such as face-to-face 
interaction. Users who are highly uncertain about an email request may choose phone 
or personal communication for confirmation. For certain tasks, users do not make 
much effort to evaluate the task using a richer channel but may even use a poor 
medium (such as email) for verification. Based on the result of this evaluation, they 
move on to the next step. The present study examines the impact of type of 
confirmation channel on users’ detection behaviour. 
Media richness theory can explain some aspects of users’ behaviour that are 
related to the type of confirmation channel. For example, in Wright et al.’s (2009) 
study, participants had been repeatedly instructed not to give their super-secure code 
(SSC) to anyone, including their closest friend or lecturer. This instruction was 
reinforced by having participants sign a form stating that they would not disclose this 
information (SSC), and they received additional reminders from their lecturer. In the 
experiment, participants were sent an email request for their SSC. Some participants 
did not respond directly but waited for more robust information at the next lecture. 
These participants, in other words, chose a richer confirmation channel to resolve the 
uncertainty created by the contradiction between what they had been told (to 
maintain the secrecy of their SSC) and the request (to expose their SSC) in the email. 
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The contradictory requests came from two different channels that varied in terms of 
their richness, and this appears to have affected users’ behaviour. The researchers did 
not examine this finding further, but our study will do so.  
H8: Rich confirmation channel decreases users’ response to phishing emails 
In our research, we hypothesis that rich confirmation will reduce users being 
victim to phishing emails. In the present study, our interest was to investigate the 
relationship between the type of confirmation channel users choose and their 
response to phishing emails. This was measured by asking users to self-report the 
type of confirmation channel that they used. These confirmation channels are 
classified according to their richness (face to face, telephone, email or self-
investigation). Face to face is considered to be a rich medium (Daft & Lengel, 1986). 
3.2.7 Response 
Response is the final action in users’ detection behaviour. In the present study, 
response means that users have complied with the request embedded in the phishing 
email and have thereby become victims.  
The final cognitive phase in the MDD is global assessment. In this phase, users 
sum up the results of their evaluation(s) and come to a conclusion. Some users rely 
on one strong hypothesis and its evaluation to reach a strong conclusion. Others rely 
on various weak hypotheses and outcomes. Grazioli (2004) found that detectors of 
phishing attacks rely on one strong hypothesis and examine different cues in the 
phishing email than victims. This suggests that detectors know what they are looking 
for. Both media richness theory and channel expansion theory (see Sections 03.2.3 
and 3.2.6) are relevant to understanding why detectors examine different cues than 
victims. For example, victims rely on company logos or padlock signs and the 
overall look of the email to judge an email (Dhamija et al., 2006). While, detectors 
found to be using spelling mistakes as a vital sign for phishing emails (Downs et al., 
2006). Based on the result of the global assessment phase, users choose to respond to 
or ignore the phishing email. In the present study, this behavioural phase is called 
response. 
 
 
 55 
Chapter 3: Research Model 55 
Table 7: Summary of constructs  
Construct Definition 
Trust Inclination to trust other people 
Submissiveness Submission to more dominant entities 
Perceived email experience Ability to encode and decode information 
included in emails 
Perceived email richness Ability to extract rich information contained in 
emails   
Confirmation channels Those channels which users choose to validate 
and evaluate their decision about suspected 
phishing emails 
Susceptibility Users’ inability to suspect phishing emails 
Big Five personality dimensions The five main dimensions of personality 
Response Users’ action in response to the phishing email 
used in our research 
 
 
Table 8: Research hypotheses 
Hypothesis Includes Description 
H1 Trust Trust increases users’ susceptibility to phishing 
emails 
H2 Submissiveness Submissiveness increases users’ susceptibility to 
phishing emails 
H3 Perceived email 
experience  
Perceived email experience decreases users’ 
susceptibility to phishing emails 
H4 Perceived email 
richness 
Perceived email richness decreases users’ 
susceptibility to phishing emails 
H5 Susceptibility  High susceptibility to phishing emails increases 
users’ response to phishing emails 
H6 Extraversion,  
agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, 
emotional 
stability and 
openness 
Certain types of personality traits increase 
users’ susceptibility to phishing emails 
H7 Extraversion,  
agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, 
emotional 
stability and 
openness 
Certain types of personality traits increase 
users’ response to phishing emails 
H8 Confirmation  Rich confirmation channels decrease users’ 
response to phishing emails  
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Table 8 List the hypotheses in our research in the “hypothesis” column. Some 
of the hypothesis includes several constructs under the main hypothesis which are 
explained in the “includes” column. For example, the hypothesis H6 and H7 are for 
big five personality traits which includes 5 constructs which form personality traits. 
The rest of the hypothesis H1, H2, H3, H4, H5 and H8 include one construct which 
are listed in the “includes” column.  
3.3 Summary  
This chapter has described the conceptual framework that underpins the design 
of the present study. It has explained the process used to identify users’ detection 
behaviour, defined the relevant parameters of the investigation and presented the 
research model and hypotheses. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
This chapter explains how the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3 
was empirically tested. It describes the research design, participant selection and 
methods of data collection and analysis. Ethical considerations are discussed. The 
pilot study and the instruments used in the survey and experimental procedures are 
presented in detail. Some differences in the design of the Saudi Arabian and 
Australian studies are explained and justified. 
4.1 Research Design  
The study adopted an explanatory design using the participants’ selection 
model (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). This model was chosen because the research 
focus is on two types of participants: detectors and victims (see Figure 11). The aim 
is to investigate the relationship between independent variables (users’ 
characteristics) and dependent variables (susceptibility and response to phishing 
emails). Quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection and analysis were 
used to generate a comprehensive picture from a single study (Saunders, Lewis, & 
Thornhill, 2009).  
A literature review was conducted to identify characteristics associated with 
users’ ability to detect phishing emails and deception in general. An examination of 
relationships between variables was used to develop a conceptual model (see Figure 
10). These steps have been explained in Chapter 3. This model was tested using a 
mixed methods approach comprising two surveys, a phishing email experiment, and 
interviews.  
Before data collection commenced, a pilot study was used to test the survey 
instrument. After appropriate modifications had been made, the full study was 
implemented. The first survey was designed to collect data on users’ characteristics 
and susceptibility. Next, we conducted an experiment in which phishing emails were 
sent to participants. This experiment enabled us to classify participants into detectors 
and victims. The second survey was then conducted to collect data on the evaluation 
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methods users employed after they received the phishing email. Finally, interviews 
provided deeper insight into users’ detection behaviour. The methods used in our 
research are ordered as above and the time gap between them is around two weeks. 
In general, these methods should be done immediately one after another to gain 
accurate data. However, the time gap between these methods is not affecting 
collected data. Each method is specified for collecting different information. The first 
survey collects information about users’ characteristics. The experiment which 
includes sending phishing email to participants does not relate to information 
collected in the first survey. The second survey informs participants about the real 
intention of our research which is phishing email study. Then, the second survey 
collects information about participants’ behaviour with phishing email. Informing 
participants about our research intention needed to be delayed to avoid impacting 
participants who did not yet see the phishing email or decide what to do with the 
phishing email. Two weeks time was needed to give participants enough time to see 
and respond to the phishing email. Especially those participants who may ask other 
participants about the phishing email.  
 
 
Figure 11: Mixed methods with participants’ selection model 
 
All data were analysed using appropriate software and tools. The results were 
validated and recommendations were made. The research plan is summarised in 
Figure 12.  
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Figure 12: Research design  
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4.2 Participants Selection  
The sample comprised undergraduate university students from two countries, 
Saudi Arabia and Australia. Undergraduate students were targeted because they have 
been identified as users who are most vulnerable to phishing emails (Kumaraguru et 
al., 2010; Sheng et al., 2010). Including elder users would have limited our ability to 
measure the impact of users’ characteristics.  
Convenience sampling “involves drawing samples that are both (1) easily 
accessible and (2) willing to participate in a study” (Teddlie & Yu, 2007). University 
students meet these criteria. The research design required that we be able to monitor 
and link participant data from three separate collection methods (survey, experiment 
and interview). In order to maintain anonymity, participants were assigned a number 
that was used to link their responses from each of these three data sources.  
4.3 Data Collection 
This section describes in detail each of the data collection methods that were 
employed in the study, namely, survey, experiment and interview. 
Surveys provide an objective benchmark for research (Cavana, Sekaran, & 
Delahaye, 2001) and are the most efficient way of collecting quantitative data from  
large samples (Darlington & Scott, 2002). We used the survey method to collect data 
on users’ characteristics (the independent variables) and measure the impact of these 
characteristics on the process of detecting phishing emails in two samples (Australia 
and Saudi Arabia).  
In our research, we want to find the impact of users’ characteristics on their 
ability to detect phishing emails. Survey was used to collect information about users’ 
characteristics. Users, ability to detect phishing email can be done by knowing users 
response to phishing emails. The most suitable data can be obtained from real users 
who were encountered with phishing emails. However, obtaining this kind of 
information from organisations is not affordable, since it relates directly to users’ 
privacy. Other way can be seen in some studies which used images of phishing 
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emails and ask participants to rate phishing emails legitimacy (Jakobsson et al., 
2007; Sheng et al., 2010). Our research interested in capturing real behaviour of 
users with phishing emails. Showing images of phishing emails is measuring the 
intention of users not the actual behaviour. In addition, users should not be informed 
about the real intention of the study. Informing users about phishing email study 
affects the data since it will increase users secure behaviour with emails (Wright et 
al., 2009). Therefore, we needed to send a phishing email to our participants without 
informing them about the real intention of our study. In addition, sending phishing 
emails to participants will allow us to classify participants as detectors or victims. 
The classification is done by recording participants’ actions when they receive 
phishing emails.  
Interviews generated in-depth, qualitative information about users’ detection 
behaviour. Unlike surveys, which collect predetermined categories of information, 
interviews have the potential to reveal unexpected findings.  
After the second survey, participants whom we had identified as detectors or 
victims were sent an email invitation to participate in a face-to-face interview. Those 
who agreed were contacted with a follow-up email to specify a suitable time. The 
interviews were conducted by the researcher in a designated meeting room and lasted 
between 20 and 30 minutes. Participants received a coffee voucher in appreciation 
for their time.  
4.4 Data Analysis 
This section describes the procedures used to analyse the quantitative and 
qualitative data, respectively  
4.4.1 Quantitative data 
Quantitative data about users’ characteristics were analysed in the following 
steps: data preparation, data coding, production of codebook, computerised data 
entry, and error checking.  
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Three types of codes were used: codes for numerical data, codes for categorical 
data and codes for missing data (missing data was assigned to a specific numerical 
code). A codebook is a complete record of a series of codes. Each measurement is 
assigned to a code and this code is presented in a table. For example, one code used 
in the study is a 7 point Likert scale (Likert, 1932). Data are entered into a computer 
and prepared for the data analysis software. The data were entered into a spreadsheet 
in preparation for analysis by SPSS software. The group means approach was used to 
substitute some missing variables (De Vaus, 2002). Checking involved examining 
data for errors in the entry stage. Descriptive statistics were used to present the 
results of the analysis.  
4.4.1.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics enable the researcher to describe and compare variables 
from a numerical perspective (Saunders et al., 2009). They can provide measures 
such as standard deviation, mode, mean, median and variance in participants’ 
responses and, importantly for our purposes, help to identify cause and effect 
relationships between dependent and independent variables through regression 
analysis. A t-test was used to find the difference between two means of the 
independent variables. Results were displayed in tables and figures, and the variables 
were firstly tested for reliability and validity.  
4.4.1.2 Reliability and validity of results 
Reliability refers to the extent to which an experiment or other procedure yields 
the same results if it is repeated (Saunders et al., 2009). Validity refers to the degree 
to which a study accurately measures what it is supposed to be measuring (Saunders 
et al., 2009). Several techniques of assessing reliability and validity were used in the 
present study. These included internal consistency, internal validity, content validity, 
criterion-related validity, construct validity and external validity. Relationships were 
measured using regression and structural equation modelling (SEM). 
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4.4.1.3 Correlation, regression and multiple regression analysis 
The correlation coefficient is a measure of the strength of the relationship 
between two variables. It ranges between -1 (negative relationship), 0 (no 
relationship) and 1 (positive relationship). The correlation coefficient does not 
determine the direction of the causal relationship. The regression coefficient is a 
measure of the strength of the relationship between the dependent variable and one or 
more independent variables  (Saunders et al., 2009). In the present study, there are 
two dependent variables (susceptibility and response) and several independent 
variables, so the use of multiple regression analysis is required.  
4.4.1.4 Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) 
SEM is a statistical technique that is used to test and validate the causal 
relationships between variables (Tembe, Hong, Murphy-Hill, Mayhorn, & Kelley, 
2013). SEM can be used to confirm and explore proposed models which contain 
multiple dependent variables as well as the existence of latent variables (Ringle, 
Sarstedt, & Straub, 2012). SEM was used to test our research model and measure the 
relationships we developed. 
4.4.2 Qualitative data 
Qualitative data take the form of words rather than numbers. For analytical 
purposes, recorded interviews need to be accurately transcribed into written 
documents. We used the inductive approach, whereby the data were  coded into 
categories that represented key themes and patterns or relationships (Braun & Clarke, 
2006). We assessed reliability and validity through tests of credibility and 
confirmability.  
The following sections describe in detail the instruments and procedures that 
were used in data collection. 
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4.5 Design of the Survey  
Our hypothesis is that users’ characteristics have a significant impact on their 
detection behaviour. The survey collected data on 12 characteristics:  
1. Trust 
2. Submissiveness 
3. Perceived email experience and richness 
4. Susceptibility  
5. Big Five personality dimensions 
6. Confirmation channels  
7. Response 
8. Age  
9. Gender 
10. Culture (language and nationality) 
11. Usage (years in the Internet, hours in the Internet, years using the email 
service, years using the university email service and number of emails) 
12. Internet activities (surfing, social and transactions) 
 
4.5.1 Trust 
High trust makes users give trust to entities which sometimes does not worth 
the given trust. Phishing emails are one of these entities which should not be trusted. 
In our research, we want to find the impact of this particular construct with users’ 
behaviour with phishing emails. We measured participants’ disposition to trust in 
general in both detectors and victims using instruments from McKnight et al. (2003) 
(see Table 9). Trust was measured on a 7 point Likert scale where 7 is strongly agree 
and 1 is strongly disagree.  
 
Table 9: Trust items 
Code Item 
Trust1 I usually trust people until they give me a reason not to trust them       
Trust2 I generally give people the benefit of the doubt when I first meet them 
Trust3 My typical approach is to trust new acquaintances until they prove I should not 
trust them 
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4.5.2 Submissiveness 
Wright et al. (2009) suggested that the detectors in their experiment did not fall 
victim to the phishing email because they obeyed the instructions which had been 
given to them by the lecturer at the beginning of the semester and followed the rule 
of not disclosing their secret information to anyone. We measured submissiveness 
using instruments from Allan and Gilbert (1997) (see Table 10). Submissiveness was 
measured on a 5 point Likert scale where 5 is always and 1 is never. 
 
Table 10: Submissiveness items 
Code Items 
Missive1 I agree that I am wrong even though I know I’m not 
Missive2 I do things because other people are doing them, rather than because I 
want to 
Missive3 I would walk out of a shop without questioning, knowing that I had 
been short changed 
Missive4 I let others criticise me or put me down without defending myself 
Missive5 I do what is expected of me even when I don’t want to 
Missive6 If I try to speak and others continue, I shut up 
Missive7 I continue to apologise for minor mistakes 
Missive8 I listen quietly if people in authority say unpleasant things about me 
Missive9 I am not able to tell my friends when I am angry with them 
Missive10 At meetings and gatherings, I let others monopolise the conversation 
Missive11 I don’t like people to look straight at me when they are talking 
Missive12 I say ‘thank you’ enthusiastically and repeatedly when someone does a 
small favour for me 
Missive13 I avoid direct eye contact 
Missive14 I avoid starting conversations at social gatherings 
Missive15 I blush when people stare at me 
Missive16 I pretend I am ill when declining an invitation 
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4.5.3 Perceived email experience and richness 
Deception cues in a medium are more likely to be recognised by users with 
more experience in that medium (Carlson et al., 2004; Carlson & Zmud, 1999). 
Therefore, users with more experience in using the email system are more likely to 
identify phishing email cues. Perceived email experience and email richness were 
measured using instruments from Carlson and Zmud (1999) (see  Table 11 and Table 
12). Both characteristics were measured on a 7 point Likert scale where 7 is strongly 
agree and 1 is strongly disagree. 
 
 
Table 11: Perceived email experience items 
Code Items 
Email_Exp1 I am very experienced using e-mail 
Email_Exp2 I feel that e-mail is easy to use 
Email_Exp3 I feel competent using e-mail 
Email_Exp4 I understand how to use all of the features of the e-mail system 
Email_Exp5 I feel comfortable using e-mail 
Email_Exp6 I feel that I am a novice using the e-mail system 
 
 
Table 12: Perceived email richness items 
Code items 
Email_rich1 E-mail allows my communication partner and me to give and receive 
timely feedback 
Email_rich2 E-mail allows my communication partner and me to tailor our 
messages to our own personal requirements 
Email_rich3 E-mail allows my communication partner and me to communicate a 
variety of different cues (such as emotional tone, attitude, or 
formality) in our messages 
Email_rich4 E-mail allows my communication partner and me to use rich and 
varied language in our messages 
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4.5.4 Susceptibility 
In the MDD, the first cognitive step in detection is activation, in which users 
suspect phishing emails. Users’ subsequent behaviour will reflect their level of 
suspicion. To capture this important dimension, which we call susceptibility, we 
developed five phishing emails. Susceptibility was measured by the number of 
emails to which users chose to respond. A user who chooses to respond to all five 
will be categorised as highly susceptible.  
The survey question asks users to pretend that they are a fictional person who 
has received these five emails. They are told that this person is a student with a bank 
account who also shops online and are asked to decide whether to respond to these 
emails or not. Most importantly, they have not been told that these are phishing 
emails, and the survey itself does not mention phishing emails to avoid priming 
participants.  
The examples were carefully chosen to include both easily identified phishing 
emails (such as Nigerian 419 scams) and more complex ones such as personalised 
bank emails. All examples include features of phishing emails similar to those used 
in real phishing emails.  
Participants were asked to play the role of a fictional person (‘John’ or 
‘Mohammed’ for Australia and Saudi Arabia, respectively) who interacts with the 
companies represented in the phishing email examples. The companies themselves 
were well known in their respective countries. English was used in the emails for the 
Australian participants and Arabic for the Saudi Arabian participants.  
The instruction for both studies was similar to each other and we show an 
example of the instruction used in the Australian study: 
“Mr. John Douglas is a student at QUT University. He often shops from the 
Internet for which he uses his eBay and PayPal accounts. John verifies transactions 
done by bank using his online bank statement as he banks with CommBank. These 
organisations send emails about updates done on John’s account and status. John 
always checks his email inbox and reads emails from QUT, eBay, PayPal and 
CommBank.”  
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The five emails are described and displayed in the table below (see Table 13). 
 
Table 13: Emails design  
Emails Personalised Sender Design Response Justification 
Figure 13 No Unknown Text Reply Clear millions 
to charity 
Figure 14 No Known Text Reply Maintenance   
Figure 15 Yes Known 
company 
Text + 
Company 
logo 
Click Remove 
restriction 
Figure 16 No Known 
company 
Text  + 
Company 
logo 
Click Update users’ 
information 
Figure 17 No Known 
bank 
Text  + 
Bank logo 
Click Verification 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: 419 scam email 
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Figure 14: University email 
 
 
 
Figure 15: eBay email 
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Figure 16: PayPal email 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Bank email 
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4.5.5 Big Five personality dimensions 
The Big Five personality dimensions are extraversion, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, emotional stability and openness (Costa & McCrae, 1992). It has 
been suggested that variance in these dimensions may influence users’ ability to 
detect phishing emails (Parrish Jr et al., 2009; Wright et al., 2009). Our research 
measured these personality dimensions in users using the TIPI measure (Gosling et 
al., 2003) (see Table 14), which uses a 7 point Likert scale (where 7 is strongly agree 
and 1 is strongly disagree). Each dimension is measured by the combination of  two 
items and divided by two to form one dimension (GoslingLab, 2012). Please refer to 
the Appendix A question number 5 for more details.  
 
Table 14: Big Five personality dimension items 
Code item 
Extraversion 1 Extraverted, enthusiastic 
Agreeableness 1 Critical, quarrelsome 
Conscientiousness 1 Dependable, self-disciplined 
Emotional stability 1 Anxious, easily upset 
Openness 1 Open to new experiences, complex 
Extraversion 2 Reserved, quiet 
Agreeableness 2 Sympathetic, warm 
Conscientiousness 2 Disorganized, careless 
Emotional stability 2 Calm, emotionally stable 
Openness 2 Conventional, uncreative 
 
4.5.6 Confirmation channels 
Users can be divided into three groups: 1) those who are able to detect a 
phishing email (detectors) and who mostly choose not to perform the requested 
action; 2) those who do not identify the email as a phishing email (victims) and who 
do not hesitate to perform the requested action; and 3) those who have doubts about 
the email and use various strategies to confirm or refute their suspicions.  
Doubtful users use different ways of deciding about the authenticity of the 
suspected email. Our research focuses on their choice of confirmation channel. 
According to media richness theory and channel expansion theory, users are more 
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likely to detect deception in a rich medium. Therefore, we classified confirmation 
channels by their richness and asked users to report which channel they used to 
conduct their confirmation behaviour (see Table 15). 
 
Table 15: Confirmation channel items 
Code Item 
Channel1 Asking other persons face-to-face 
Channel2 Asking other persons Telephone 
Channel3 Asking other persons email 
Channel4 Make a decision by yourself without consulting others 
Channel5 Others 
 
4.5.7 Response 
This construct is measured by the actual response of users to the phishing email 
that was used in our research and which asked participants to reveal their passwords.  
4.5.8 Age and Gender 
Age and gender have been shown to influence users’ ability to detect phishing 
emails (Jagatic et al., 2007; Kumaraguru et al., 2009; Sheng et al., 2010). Participants 
were divided into three age groups (see Table 16).  
 
Table 16: Age and gender items 
Code Item 
Age 1 18 -25 
Age 2 26 -35 
Age 3 Above 36 
M Male 
F Female  
 
4.5.9 Culture 
Culture has been found to play an important role in people’s ability to detect 
lies from different cultures (Bond & Atoum, 2000; Bond et al., 1990). While culture 
has been under-researched in relation to phishing emails, it appears such detection is 
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easier in rich channels such as face-to-face interaction than in poor channels such as 
email. Therefore, it was suggested that culture have an impact of users’ detection 
ability with phishing emails by our research.   
Our research was conducted in two different countries: Saudi Arabia and 
Australia. Saudi Arabia was selected because it supports the research financially. 
Australia was selected because the research was conducted in Australia. In addition, 
both of these two countries have different culture. According to Hofstede (1993) 
these two countries are differ in their culture. Hofstede (1993) differentiate between 
cultures based on four dimensions: (1) power distance index (PDI), Individualism 
(IDV), uncertainty avoidance index (UAI), and masculinity versus femininity 
(MAS). The results for these dimensions are: 95 and 36 for (PDI),  25 and 90 for 
(IDV), 80 and 51 for (UAI), and 60 and 61 for (MAS) for both Saudi Arabian and 
Australian cultures respectively (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede, 2011) . Observing the 
results above from Hofstede, it can be said that the Saudi Arabian culture is different 
from Australian culture. This difference between these two countries will allow our 
research to observe any differences caused by culture.  
In Australian study, we identify culture through two items: first language and 
nationality (see Table 17). Language is important because it affects people’s ability 
to spot deception cues such as typos or grammatical mistakes (Jakobsson et al., 
2007). Nationality was selected because it has been shown that the national culture 
impacts on users’ behaviour; some nationalities, for instance, demonstrate higher 
levels of loyalty to their companies than others (Hofstede, 1993). Such loyalty may 
influence users’ susceptibility to certain types of phishing emails.  
It was not considered necessary to measure these items in the Saudi Arabian 
study, since all participants had Arabic as their first language and Saudi Arabian as 
their nationality. Findings from the Saudi Arabian study were, however, compared 
with those from the Australian study to investigate the impact of culture. 
 
Table 17: Culture items in Australia  
Code Item 
English English 
Other Other 
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Australian  Australian  
Other Other 
 
4.5.10 Internet and email usage   
The most important trigger for the detection of phishing emails is inconsistency 
between what users observe and what they expect (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). 
Phishing emails include information (cues) that aid detection of phishing emails. 
Expectations are generated by experience, which provides users with a baseline of 
knowledge for such comparison (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). Experience can be 
obtained from Internet usage and email usage.  
Email usage is a subsection under Internet usage. Users who use email service 
are definitely using the Internet. However, not all users who surf the Internet is 
necessary has an email account. Furthermore, using the internet is not similar to 
using email. Internet usage is a type of communication between users and servers 
where emails can include other users. The type of information is also different for 
example website includes https or certificate for security measures. Email in other 
hand includes information such as email time and date, email address, email subject 
line, and sender name and contact details which can be used to validate emails. 
Therefore, we want to measure the experience developed by both Internet and email 
usage with users’ ability to detect phishing emails.   
Internet usage was measured by the number of years of Internet use and the 
number of hours of daily Internet use. Email usage was measured by the number of 
years participants had used the email service, the number of years they had used the 
university email service, and the number of emails they received per day. We 
measured years of university email service usage to investigate the relationship 
between detection ability and familiarity with a particular organisation (see Table 
18).  
 
Table 18: Internet and email usage items 
Code item 
Y_Internet How many years have you been using the Internet? 
H_Internet How many hours you usually spend in the Internet per day? 
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Y_Email  How many years you have been using the email service? 
Y_Uni How many years you have been using university email 
account? 
No_Emails What is the average number of emails you normally receive 
per day in your inboxes? 
 
4.5.11 Internet activities  
Some studies suggest that users’ experience with the Internet significantly 
influences their ability to detect phishing emails (Downs et al., 2006; Kumaraguru et 
al., 2007) but others contradict these findings. Wright et al. (2009), for instance, 
reported no significant impact of online shopping on users’ ability to detect 
deception. People use the Internet in different ways, and the experience of different 
activities may affect detection ability. For example, users may use Internet for 
reading newspapers. Such users may not develop a sense of security while using the 
Internet. In contrast, some users may use the Internet for banking and shopping. Such 
users may develop a sense of security which will affect their behaviour. In our 
research, we want to know whether such behaviour may affect users’ ability to detect 
phishing emails.  
In our research, Internet activities were measured differently in each study. In 
the first study (Saudi Arabia), participants were asked whether they perform one of 
the Internet activities or not (Checked/Unchecked). In the second study (Australia), 
the time spent on each Internet activities was  measured using a 7  point Likert scale 
where 7 is more than 8 hours and 1 is none (Table 19).  
The Saudi Arabian study was conducted first. Our interest was in whether 
performing online shopping affects users’ vulnerability but we did not investigate the 
time spent in making such activity. A low level of usage may indicate relatively little 
experience with security issues, and vice versa. The Saudi Arabian results showed no 
significant differences between type of activity and users’ vulnerability to phishing 
emails. Accordingly, in the Australian study, we included a measure of the time 
spent on each activity.  
 
 76 
Chapter 4: Methodology 76 
 
Table 19: Internet activities items 
Code Item 
Activity 1 Surfing the Internet for knowledge (read only) 
Activity 2 Making social activities (communicating with others) 
Activity 3 Making online transactions (shopping – banking) 
 
4.6 Phishing Email Experiment 
This section describes the design and technical features of the phishing emails 
that were used in the experimental study to trick participants into revealing their 
passwords. Two types of phishing emails were tested: reply emails, which directly 
ask participants for their passwords, and click emails, which ask participants to click 
on a link in order to solve a problem in the blog server. They were designed to 
imitate real phishing emails. The main design features are: 
 
1. Spoofing the “From” address line so that it is similar to a real university email. 
2. Subject line is “Your (blog, email) privacy has been compromised” to capture 
users’ attention and provoke fears about security.  
3. Reply Nickname is similar to sender nickname. 
4. Email reply prefix is similar to “From” prefix. 
5.  “Reply address” is hosted in a domain outside the university (malicious server).  
6. The link in click email is hidden under the text “Click here”. 
7. The link points outside the university domain (malicious server). 
8. The message has not been personalised for each student. 
9. Message content presents students with a scenario involving event A which 
requires them to perform event B. In other words, there is a problem requiring 
ameliorative action. 
10. The sender is addressed as “IT person, Subject team” without any 
communication details, as would be the case in a phishing email. It is not 
university practice to omit communication information.  
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Figure 18 and Figure 19 show images of the phishing emails used in the study 
conducted in Australia. Figure 20 and Figure 21 show images of the phishing emails 
used in the study conducted in Saudi Arabia.  
 
 
Figure 18: Reply phishing email (Australia)  
 
 
Figure 19: Click phishing email (Australia)  
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Figure 20: Reply email (Saudi Arabia) 
 
 
Figure 21: Click email (Saudi Arabia)  
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4.6.1 Comparison with real phishing email design  
This section compares the design features of our phishing emails with reported 
features of real phishing emails, as described by Wang et al. (2009) and Sharma 
(2010).  
Email argument quality: To ensure strong argument quality, the email begins 
by explaining why students have received it. The email reports a problem related to 
the receiver. This is the main structure of the argument. The problem has been 
discovered through the routine checking procedure used by the team who is supposed 
to maintain the accuracy and security of the blog or email. The problem is serious 
and needs to be resolved urgently. As similar to most phishing emails, the solution is 
already included in the email. Users are required to comply with the embedded 
request and will face a penalty if they do not.  
Email title: This was designed to capture users’ attention by highlighting the 
impact of the problem on users. We did not include the name of the organisation in 
the title because it can easily be included elsewhere. For example, the company name 
can be included in the metadata (e.g. address domain). We did not include ‘Urgent’ 
in the title because words like “urgent” are a sign of phishing emails and doing so 
may have reduced the likelihood that users would open the email.  
Message appearance: The email did not include message appearance signs as 
reported by Wang et al. (2009). This is because messages sent to students from 
university employees do not display the company logo, third party icon or 
personalisation (except for communication details). Communication details were 
therefore excluded. 
Assurance mechanisms: The email did not contain assurance mechanism signs 
(e.g. padlock icon or anti-fraud statement) since most emails from the university do 
not include these signs.  
Source credibility: The most frequently reported source credibility features are: 
legitimate sender (prefix), legitimate sender domain and clear specific sender. The 
emails used in the Australian and Saudi Arabian experiments displayed a webmaster 
and IT personnel as the legitimate sender (prefix), respectively. The email domain 
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was identical to the domains of both universities. A specific sender was included at 
the end of the email. As explained above, the body of the email did not include 
telephone or email contact details or company logo.  
Message credibility: The design incorporated all three of the most common 
forms of appeal: rational, emotional and motivational. In rational appeals, the email 
explains the reason why users should perform a certain action. Emotional appeals 
rely on fear; for example, informing users about unauthorised access to their 
accounts increases their fears about privacy and data integrity. Safety is the most 
commonly reported feature in motivational appeals. A report of unauthorised access 
to users’ accounts motivates users to perform the action embedded in the email to 
maintain the safety of their account. 
 Message structure: The email included an explicit message, since this is more 
persuasive. Repetition and message order were not incorporated into the design 
because they would have limited impact in a short email. The phishing email used in 
the present study contained only the minimum amount of information considered 
necessary, namely: the reason for receiving the email, the requested action and the 
penalty for ignoring the email. Most of this information can be conveyed in one 
sentence. Providing more information may have negatively impacted on email 
persuasiveness. 
Technical features: The information contained in the metadata was spoofed so 
as not to display any signs of phishing emails. Information included in the email 
header, however, can show that the email has not been sent from a university 
domain, as claimed, and does not have the same email address in the “reply to” bar 
with the email address in the “From” bar. The following is the email header in the 
phishing email.  
Phishing email header (altered) 
Delivered-To: XXX@ XXX.XXX.edu.sa or XXX@ XXX.XXX.edu.au 
Received: by 11.67.159.65 with SMTP id x1cs333633pbq; 
        Wed, 14 Dec 2012 20:13:47 -0800 (PST) 
Received: by 11.17.126.181 with SMTP id 
a11mr624877vvi.44.1121122216699; 
        Wed, 14 Dec 2012 20:06:56 -0800 (PST) 
Return-Path: <webmaster@servername.com> 
Received: from servername (servername.com [89.27.111.222]) 
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        by mx.XXX.com with ESMTPS id            
n11si3333153vvh.58.2012.12.14.20.06.55 
        (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=OTHER); 
        Wed, 14 Dec 2012 20:06:56 -0800 (PST) 
Received-SPF: pass (XXX.com: best guess record for domain of 
webmaster@servername.com designates 89.27.111.222 as permitted 
sender) client-ip=89.27.111.222; 
Authentication-Results: mx.XXX.com; spf=pass (XXX.com: best guess 
record for domain of webmaster@servername.com designates 
89.27.111.222 as permitted sender) smtp.mail= 
webmaster@servername.com 
Received: from webmaster by servername.com with local (Exim 4.77) 
 (envelope-from <webmaster@servername.com>) 
 id 1Rc2ch-0004Fb-0k; Thu, 14 Dec 2012 20:06:56 -0800 
To: XXX@ XXX.XXX.edu.sa or XXX@ XXX.XXX.edu.au 
Subject: Your (blog, email) privacy has been compromised 
From: Name <XXX@XXX.edu.sa or XXX@XXX.edu.au > 
Reply-To: Name <webmaster@yahoo.com> 
Content-Type: text/html  
 
The original email header contained IP addresses that can identify the real 
sender and location of the email. IP addresses can be easily checked from several 
websites that provide this service free of charge. Other indications of illegitimacy are 
the sender domain (servername.com), which is not a university domain (authentic 
domain), and the reply email address (webmaster@yahoo.com).  
4.7 Ethical Considerations 
The conduct of this experiment required the use of deception (Jakobsson & 
Ratkiewicz, 2006) because it imitated real phishing email design. In other words, we 
sent phishing emails to participants. Clearly, this involves important ethical issues 
around the need to avoid harm to participants. Some phishing email studies have 
reported that some participants were upset by the deception (Kumaraguru et al., 
2009; Kumaraguru et al., 2008). We needed to ensure that our experiment minimised 
the risk of harm by carefully controlling the outcome of participants’ responses. 
Therefore, no important information was saved and the information was identified by 
number to maintain participants’ anonymity.  
We addressed these ethical concerns in several ways, taking into account the 
recommendations of Finn and Jakobsson (2007) regarding the design of phishing 
experiments. We did not request users to reveal secret information related to 
important accounts (e.g. enrolment, addresses) and we did not store their secret 
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information. The attacks developed during the project remain undisclosed and will be 
destroyed at the end of the research.  
4.8 Pilot Study  
Two pilot studies were conducted to identify the impact of priming on users’ 
detection behaviour and to test the clarity and quality of the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 survey 
instruments.  
It has been suggested that priming  (warning users about the potential for 
deception) is a key factor that can trigger users to begin the process of detecting 
deception (Grazioli, 2004). For example, banks send emails to their clients informing 
them that the bank will never ask about passwords. This implies that any email 
claiming to come from the bank and asking about passwords is not legitimate. Such 
warnings can also come directly from managers to their employees. The main reason 
for priming is to increase users’ awareness. 
Since we were interested in investigating users’ normal behaviour with 
phishing emails, we tested the impact of priming in two pilot studies with two 
different sets of participants. Participants were shown five phishing emails and asked 
two different questions. The first pilot study included 8 participants who were asked 
about the likelihood that they would respond to these emails using a 7 point Likert 
scale (where 1 is definitely ignore the email and 7 is definitely respond). The second 
pilot study involved 12 participants who were asked to rate the legitimacy of the 
emails on a 7 point Likert scale (where 1 is not a phishing email and 7 is a phishing 
email). Each group of participants was asked to justify their responses.   
The results supported the idea that priming has an impact on users’ ability to 
detect phishing emails. This suggested that we should avoid priming in the 
experiment, because some users may have no suspicions about the authenticity of 
phishing emails.  
In addition to priming, which has been shown to impact on normal behaviour, 
we had to reduce the possible impact of interference by an authority. It was expected 
that some participants may ask the owner of the server (i.e. the lecturer) about the 
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phishing email. Any input from the lecturer could influence normal behaviour. If the 
lecturer advised some participants not to respond, this direct instruction may be 
delivered to other participants who had not yet seen the phishing email. Therefore, 
we delayed the lecturer response to any direct question about the phishing email by 
one week, until participants had sufficient time to see the phishing email and decide 
on an action.  
4.8.1 Pilot study without priming (response to emails) 
This pilot study suggested that participants who had not been informed that 
these were phishing emails did not base their decision (to respond or not) on a 
judgment of the email’s legitimacy but on their interest in the content. Not one 
participant reported that s/he would not respond because these were phishing emails. 
Rather, some said they would not respond to some emails because they were 
irrelevant to them.  
4.8.2 Pilot study with priming (response to phishing emails) 
Participants who had been told to judge whether these were phishing emails 
behaved differently. They engaged in a decision-making process and looked for clues 
to judge the authenticity (or otherwise) of the emails. These findings suggest that 
some participants who suspected phishing emails may not have done so if they had 
not been told to judge their legitimacy. In real life, they may not detect phishing 
emails because detection needs to be triggered by suspicion. This is further supported 
by the findings of the first pilot study, in which no participants appear to have 
suspected that these were phishing emails. As a result, we avoided any form of 
priming in our study design in order to capture participants’ normal behaviour. 
The 20 participants in these pilot studies also provided comments that helped 
us to improve the survey instrument. After these changes were incorporated, data 
collection commenced, beginning with the Saudi Arabian study. 
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4.9 Differences between Saudi Arabian and Australian Studies 
In broad terms, the research design was the same for the studies in Saudi 
Arabia and Australia (see Figure 22 and Figure 23). In both, the first stage involved a 
survey to collect data on users’ characteristics and susceptibility to phishing emails. 
Next, phishing emails were sent to classify users into detectors and victims (the 
experiment). A second survey then collected data on confirmation channels. The last 
stage in both studies comprised interviews to collect more in-depth information about 
users’ detection behaviour.  
There were two minor differences between these studies: translation and type 
of information requested. The Saudi Arabian survey instruments were translated into 
Arabic (the national language of Saudi Arabia and first language of the Saudi 
Arabian participants). The information requested in Saudi Arabia was the 
participant’s email password whereas in Australia it was the password for a private 
blog site that we set up (see Section 4.9.3). The blog was developed in Australian 
study to avoid any ethical issues related to expose participants’ personal information. 
However, in Saudi Arabian study, blogs are not well used between students. 
Therefore, we asked about university email password. Both email and blog 
passwords are forms of credential information. These differences are discussed in 
more detail below.  
 
 
Figure 22: Saudi Arabian study methods 
 
 
Figure 23. Australian study methods 
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4.9.1 Translation of Saudi Arabian survey 
The survey and related instruments were initially developed in English. Most 
Saudi students have very limited knowledge of English. The translation process 
proceeded as follows benefiting from Brislin method (Brislin, 1983):  
1. The survey was developed in English then translated from English to Arabic by a 
specialised translation service.  
2. The resulting Arabic survey was again translated from Arabic to English by a 
different translation service to perform comparison.  
3. The two English versions were compared to identify any differences, especially 
in relation to changes in meaning. Where discrepancies were found, the Arabic 
version was amended to ensure it captured the original meaning. 
4. The final Arabic survey was sent to an Arabic editor for the final correction of 
any mistakes in spelling or grammar.  
4.9.2 Activation of university email service for Saudi Arabian students 
Some Saudi Arabian participants were asked to activate their university email 
because they had not already done so. This request was made by a lecturer who 
contributed to our research project. The activation was requested in such a way to 
avoid priming participants about phishing emails; the lecturer advised students that 
they needed to activate their university email to receive their marks and some unit 
instructions. This encouraged students who had not activated their university email to 
do so. In the month following activation, students received emails from the lecturer 
that included some course materials and exam marks.  
During this month students also received emails from the university, which 
allowed them to become familiar with the university email. During this month, 
students who had not activated their email the system returned undelivered emails to 
the lecturer. Undelivered email notice allowed the research team to exclude such 
students from the study sample. During the second month from activation, the 
research phishing email was sent to students.  
To ensure that all participants had enough time to see the phishing email, the 
lecturer told students that he would be sending the marks from the second 
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examination during the following week (i.e. when the phishing email would be sent). 
Thus participants would be encouraged to check their inboxes during that week. This 
was necessary because some students may not otherwise have opened their emails at 
that time.  
It was important to minimise the gap between sending and receiving the 
phishing email because it emphasised the importance of performing the requested 
action as soon as possible. If there was a long delay (of a week or more), students 
may be less motivated to perform the action. At no time did the lecturer mention the 
phishing email in his classes, since doing so may have led some students to interpret 
the reference as validating the authenticity of the email.   
4.9.3 Development of blog for Australian participants 
The Australian experiment had to adopt a different approach to the provision of 
credential information. In Australia (unlike in Saudi Arabia), students’ email 
credentials are linked to sensitive university information (e.g. addresses, phone 
numbers). However, the phishing email used in our experiment is sent to students 
email similar to the experiment in Saudi Arabia.  
The type of expected attackers in terms of the blog can be limited to the 
number of people who knows about the blog (i.e. students). While in email, the 
expected attackers can be wider than the number of expected attackers in the blog. 
Especially, the blog was designed to be accessed inside the university network. In 
our research, the phishing email is designed to target specific users in an 
organisation. Therefore, the attacker is more expected to know some information 
about the targeted victims. In addition, participants who lose their passwords are 
deceived by the phishing email which makes them believe its legitimacy. Since, we 
have emphasised the importance of keeping the password secret. Furthermore, the 
percentage of victims fall in our experiment is in the range of expected victims fall 
victims in phishing emails studies which are not limited to blog (Sheng et al., 2007; 
Zhang, Luo, Burd, & Seazzu, 2012). 
In both Saudi Arabian and Australian study, the design of the phishing email is 
similar to each other (see Section 4.6). The only difference between these two studies 
is the type of the requested password in the phishing email. In Saudi Arabia the 
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password is used for emails while in Australia the password is used for the blog. It 
can be said that the importance of the email password is not similar to blog 
password. However, we applied the following procedures to increase the importance 
of the blog password. These procedures emphasise the weight of blog privacy.  
In order to ensure privacy, we created a blog on the Internet with the assistance 
of the university’s IT unit. The blog could not be accessed outside the university 
network. Students were required to submit an article to the blog for assessment. 
These articles were private. Students could not view other students’ posts. To gain 
credit for the unit, students had to write several articles in their own account in the 
blog. No priming was involved, since students had not been told that the blog was 
being used to conduct a phishing email experiment.  
To access their account in the blog, students were given usernames and 
passwords. They were informed not to give their credentials to anyone and that the 
blog was private (i.e. students could not see each other’s articles). These measures 
were taken to ensure that students who revealed their credentials were really victims 
of the phishing email and not simply careless about their credentials.  
The privacy of the blog was important for students to make them think about 
protecting their posts. The lecturer emphasised that plagiarism would be taken 
seriously and any student caught plagiarising would be dealt with under the 
university’s plagiarism policy, in which sanctions include suspension for the current 
semester. Both the student who plagiarised and the student whose work was 
plagiarised would be affected, since the latter had allowed access to her/his account. 
The default status for a new post was set to be private, meaning that other students 
cannot see any new posts. To avoid sanctions, therefore, students must ensure that 
their account is protected. 
The process of making the blog private is explained below. By default, 
WordPress does not support this, so we went to the file codes and edited them to 
ensure all posts from students were private. The following are the steps we followed 
to ensure that all posts were private. This was done so that we were able to establish 
that any case of plagiarism was the result of account theft or of students’ 
carelessness. It also highlighted the importance of protecting account information. 
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First, the file “meta-boxes.php” was edited. In this file, the default setting for 
the post is set to public. This was changed to private. This ensures that any new post 
to the blog will be private. Students cannot change the status to public.  
We also disabled the edit time and date function so that post date and time 
cannot be changed. This step would allow us to detect any student who might attempt 
to copy others’ articles.  
The function that allows students to quick edit their post was also disabled. 
This function allows students to change the status to public, which contravenes the 
blog rules. 
The file “functions.php” in the active theme was edited. Themes have a widget 
which is installed as default in the dashboard and appears when users login to their 
account. This function allows users to post their articles directly to the blog. It has 
only one status―public―that has to be disabled to enforce private posts. Deleting 
the widget from the theme prevents students from posting articles publicly.  
By editing these files in the server, we ensured that no student could legally 
access other students’ posts. Enforcing this rule satisfies the unit requirement that 
“assignments should be protected from other students”. At the same time, it served 
the research purpose of emphasising the importance of protecting students’ private 
information on the blog. 
4.9.4 Content of phishing emails  
The phishing email was sent on behalf of an authentic IT person who 
administered the university network and blog maintenance team in the Saudi Arabian 
and Australian experiments, respectively.  This had two main goals. The first was to 
highlight the fact that the email came from the university (since the identified 
problem occurred in the email or blog system). Phishing emails purport to come from 
an organisation known to receivers. For example, phishing email attacks targeting a 
particular bank close their message with the name of a known employee in the bank 
or its security department. The second goal was to identify detectors who use this 
kind of information, since failure to provide specific information about the sender 
should arouse users’ suspicion.   
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The phishing email informed participants about a problem in the blog that had 
damaged some system information in which students’ account information (i.e. 
passwords) was held. It emphasised that the recipient of the email had been affected 
by this problem and needed to act quickly to resolve it. Following this explanation, 
participants were presented with the solution, as in a real phishing email. Because the 
research aimed to identify the impact of the type of the phishing email on 
participants’ responses, two different kinds of email were sent, each presenting a 
possible action: replying to the email address with the requested information or 
clicking on a link embedded in the phishing email.  
The design of the phishing email imitated that of real phishing emails. The 
“From” address was spoofed so that it appeared similar to the university’s domain 
name (a trusted address). The message reported a current problem in the system 
which had damaged the student database (including passwords). Students were asked 
to resolve the problem by responding with their passwords. As noted above, two 
different kinds of email were sent, each presenting a possible action of response: 
replying to the email address with the requested information or clicking on a link 
embedded in the phishing email. Failure to respond, the message claimed, would 
result in suspension of the student’s account.  
4.9.5 Identification of victims 
In reply phishing emails, when participants chose to reply to the phishing email 
they believed they were replying to the email address of the sender (i.e. the 
university, which appears in the address bar). Clicking on reply generated a prompt 
that has the same sender name but a different email address. Only cautious 
participants would notice the difference between received address (“From”) and 
sending address (“Reply to”). This design feature allowed us to capture participants 
who check email addresses before sending emails.  
Emails from participants who choose to reply are sent to the address specified 
in the phishing email, which is controlled by the research team. In this way, we can 
identify victims and match their responses to the phishing email with their responses 
to the survey. 
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In the click phishing email, participants are requested to click on an embedded 
link. The email appears to come from an authentic entity in the university but the link 
points to a different address, outside the university, which can be identified by 
moving the mouse over the link. The link is hidden as a hyperlink behind the “Click 
here” text. A hyperlink is used to avoid email filters, which compare URL addresses 
with displayed addresses, and to prevent participants from making their own 
comparison. 
Each participant was assigned a unique ID number. When participants click on 
the embedded link in the phishing email, they will be connected to a website created 
for this research. This website captures participants’ ID number and sends it to an 
email address managed by the researcher. The website then redirects the connection 
to a real university website where email or blog passwords can be reset. This is 
similar to the action of phishing emails, which ask users to connect to a malicious 
website, where their secret information is captured, and then connect them back to a 
legitimate website to reduce the chances of detection. Thus, users do not know that 
they have fallen victim to a phishing attack. If they did become aware of this, they 
may deactivate their accounts or change their secret information to make the lost 
information useless.   
4.10 Summary  
This chapter has presented the research design and described the quantitative 
and qualitative methods employed in the study. Differences in the design of the 
Australian and Saudi Arabian studies were explained and justified.  The instruments 
and procedures used to collect data and identify detectors and victims were described 
in detail.  
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Chapter 5: Quantitative Analysis  
A total of 780 participants, 350 from Saudi Arabia and 430 from Australia, 
were initially targeted in this study. Only those participants who successfully 
completed the two surveys and the experiment used in our research are included in 
the analysis. The final sample comprised 383 participants, 196 from Saudi Arabia 
and 187 from Australia.  
This chapter describes the quantitative data analysis procedures employed in 
this study and presents the descriptive outcomes from the survey. It examines 
reliability and validity of the survey instruments and explains how SEM was used to 
measure the overall research model.  
We used SPSS software version 21 and SmartPLS software version 21 to 
analyse the data from both surveys and the experiment. The final model was 
analysed with structural equation modelling (SEM) using R software with Lavaan 
packages. The results of this analysis are presented in detail.  
5.1 Data Preparation 
Data preparation is an important step to make data ready for analysis. The data 
were prepared for analysis following the four steps suggested by Fink (2009): data 
coding, data entry, data cleaning, and finding missing values. These steps are 
explained below:  
 
1. Data coding: Produce a code book for the data. For example, the three age 
groups (18-25), (26-35) and (36 and above) were coded age1, 2 and 3 
respectively. 
2. The survey was conducted online, which means that the data were entered 
electronically. However, the dataset had to be cleaned of unrelated entries 
such as questions.  
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3. Data eligibility: This step involves an examination for ineligible data. It has 
two phases: data eligibility and response eligibility.  For example, data 
eligibility for scales in some survey questions was from 1 to 7. We ensured 
that the answers to these question range between 1 and 7. Response eligibility 
involves making sure that answers are not exactly the same for all questions. 
4. Missing values: In the case of participants who did not complete and submit 
all the required questions in the two surveys, the data were considered 
incomplete. Answers from these participants were omitted from the dataset. 
5. Negative statements were reversed to avoid extremity bias.    
6. Raw data were first entered into a Microsoft Excel file and then exported to 
SPSS statistical software. 
7. An additional test was conducted using SPSS (version 21) which produced 
frequencies of the entered data so they could be examined for missing values 
and outlier responses.  
5.2 Descriptive Outcomes 
This section summarises the descriptive data, beginning with the demographic 
items for both studies. 
5.2.1 Demographic items 
There was no diversity in the demographic characteristics of the Saudi Arabian 
participants, all of whom belonged to the first age group, were male, spoke Arabic as 
their first language and gave Saudi Arabian as their nationality. This mainly reflects 
the fact that most Saudi Arabian universities only accept Saudi Arabian students. 
Usage and Internet activities showed some variance. On the other hand, there was 
variance in the demographic items in the Australian study, as explained below, since 
Australian universities are open to local and international students from different 
cultures.  
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5.2.1.1 Age, gender and culture 
In the Australian study, two-thirds (69.5%) of the 187 participants were under 
26 years of age and 77.5% (N=145) were male (Table 20). Some 57.2% (N=107) 
spoke English as their first language and 58.3% (N=109) identified their nationality 
as Australian (Table 21). 
 
Table 20: Age and Gender 
Age Frequency Percent Gender Frequency Percent 
 
18-25 130 69.5 Male 145 77.5 
26-35 57 30.5 Female 42 22.5 
 
 
Table 21: Culture (Language and Nationality) 
Language Frequency Percent Nationality Frequency Percent 
 
English 107 57.2 Australian 109 58.3 
Not English 80 42.8 Not Australian 78 41.7 
 
5.2.1.2 Internet and email usage 
Participants from both studies were asked five questions about their Internet 
and email usage (Table 22). 
Table 22: Descriptive statistics for usage 
 Saudi Arabia Australia 
Statistics Mean Mean 
Number of years using the Internet 7.02 9.92 
Number of hours per day spent on 
the Internet 
3.19 5.37 
Number of years using email 
service 
5.80 8.64 
Number of years using university 
email service 
1.49 1.60 
Average number of emails received 
per day 
10.2 10.43 
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As shown in Table 22, Saudi Arabian participants had used the Internet on 
average for about 7 years, spent about 3.2 hours per day on the Internet, had used an 
email service for about 6 years, had used a university email service for 1.5 years, and 
received about 10 emails per day. Australian participants, on average, had used the 
Internet for about 10 years, spent around 5 hours per day on the Internet, had used an 
email service for about 9 years, had used a university email service for 1.6 years, and 
received about 10 emails per day. 
5.2.1.3 Internet activities 
These questions were designed to identify the relationship between users 
Internet activities and their detection behaviour in relation to phishing emails. 
Previous studies have suggested that experience with activities that involve secret 
information, such as online shopping, affects users’ ability to detect phishing emails 
(Kumaraguru et al., 2007). The present study sought to identify the impact of certain 
activities on users’ detection behaviour, but the measurement in the questions in the 
Saudi Arabian and Australian studies were slightly different (the reason for the 
differences is explained in Section 4.5.11).  
In Saudi Arabia, participants were asked to indicate their response (Yes, No) to 
three items asking about their main use of the Internet. Australian participants were 
asked to rate themselves on three items that described Internet activities using a 7 
point Likert time-based rating scale (None, 1-30min, 30-60min, 1-2hrs, 2-4hrs, 4-
8hrs, More than 8hrs).  
The results from this question were quite similar in both studies; that is, there 
was little difference in Internet activities between the two groups. Both Saudi 
Arabian and Australian participants were most likely to report that they mainly 
surfed the Internet for knowledge and least likely to report that they mainly used it 
for online transactions.  
5.2.2 Trust  
Participants from both studies were asked to rate three items related to trusting 
other people, using a 7 point Likert agreement scale (Strongly disagree, Moderately 
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disagree, Disagree a little, Neither agree nor disagree, Agree a little, Moderately 
agree, Strongly agree). The results are shown in Table 23. 
Table 23: Descriptive statistics for the three trust items  
 Saudi Arabia Australia 
Statistics  Mean Mean 
Usually trust people until have a reason 
not to trust them 
 
 
 
4.89 4.90 
My typical approach is to trust new 
individuals until they prove I should not 
trust them 
 
 
 
 
4.57 4.78 
Generally give people benefit of doubt 
when first meet them 
 
 
 
4.09 4.72 
 
As shown in Table 23, Saudi Arabian participants were most likely to agree 
that they usually trusted people until they had a reason not to do so. They were least 
likely to agree that they generally gave people the benefit of the doubt when first 
meeting them. Australian participants were most likely to agree that they usually 
trusted people until they had a reason not to do so. They were least likely to agree 
that they usually trust people until they have a reason not to trust them. In general, 
Saudi Arabian and Australian participants fall in the category neither agree nor 
disagree to trust people. 
5.2.3 Submissiveness  
Participants from both studies were asked to rate themselves in terms of 16 
items that described various kinds of submissive behaviours. They did so using a 5 
point Likert frequency rating scale (Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Mostly, and Always). 
The results are shown in Table 24. 
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Table 24: Descriptive statistics for 16 submissiveness items  
 Saudi Arabia Australia 
Statistics Mean Mean 
Say thank you enthusiastically & repeatedly when 
someone does a small favour 
4.20 4.14 
If I try to speak and others continue, I shut up 3.73 4.21 
I continue to apologise for minor mistakes 3.28 4.06 
I do what is expected of me even when I don't want 
to 
3.18 4.44 
At meetings & gatherings I let others monopolise 
conversation 
3.06 3.84 
I am not able to tell my friends when I am angry 
with them 
2.97 3.88 
I avoid starting conversations at social gatherings 2.92 3.63 
I avoid direct eye contact 2.80 3.56 
I would walk out of shop without question knowing 
I'd been short-changed 
2.79 3.80 
I agree I'm wrong even when know I'm not 2.71 3.63 
I blush when people stare at me 2.64 3.52 
I pretend I am ill when declining an invitation 2.58 3.60 
I don't like people to look straight at me when they 
are talking 
2.55 3.52 
I listen quietly if people in authority say unpleasant 
things about me 
2.48 3.97 
I do things because others are doing them rather 
than because I want to 
2.42 3.66 
Let others criticise me or put me down without 
defending myself 
2.26 3.52 
 
As shown in Table 24, Saudi Arabian participants were most likely to state that 
they say thank you enthusiastically and repeatedly when someone does them a small 
favour. They were least likely to state that they let others criticise them or put them 
down without defending themselves. Australian participants were most likely to state 
that they do what is expected even when they do not want to. They were least likely 
to let others criticise them or put them down without defending themselves.  
5.2.4 Perceived email experience 
Participants from both studies were asked to rate six items listing various 
aspects of email experience, with responses utilising the 7 point level of agreement 
Likert rating scale initially used for Trust. The results are shown in Table 25.  
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Table 25: Descriptive statistics for six items related to email experience  
 Saudi Arabia Australia 
Statistics Mean Mean 
Feel that email is easy to use 5.70 5.48 
Feel competent using email 5.62 5.18 
Feel comfortable using email 5.13 5.71 
Very experienced at using email 4.92 5.40 
Understand how to use all the features of email system 4.81 5.36 
Feel that am a novice at using email system 3.01 2.30 
 
As shown in Table 25, Saudi Arabian participants were most likely to agree 
that email is easy to use and that they feel competent using email. They were least 
likely to agree that they felt they were novices at using the email system. Australian 
participants were most likely to agree that they feel comfortable using email. They 
were least likely to agree that they felt they were novices at using the email system. 
5.2.5 Perceived email richness 
Participants from both studies were asked to rate four items describing various 
aspects of the richness of the (shared) email experience with responses utilising the 7 
point level of agreement Likert rating scale initially used for Trust. The results are 
shown in Table 26.  
 
Table 26: Descriptive statistics for four items related to email richness  
 Saudi Arabia Australia 
Statistics Mean Mean 
Email allows communication partner & me to tailor messages to 
personal requirements 
5.08 4.44 
Email allows communication partner & me to give and receive 
timely feedback 
4.97 4.55 
Email allows communication partner & me to use rich and 
varied language in messages 
4.97 3.97 
Email allows communication partner & me to communicate a 
variety of cues 
4.90 3.84 
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As shown in Table 26, Saudi Arabian participants were most likely to agree 
that email allows communication partner and me to tailor messages to personal 
requirements. They were least likely to agree that email allows communication 
partner and me to communicate a variety of cues. Australian participants were most 
likely to agree that email allows communication partner and me to receive timely 
feedback and to tailor messages to personal requirements. They were least likely to 
agree that email allows communication partner and me to communicate a variety of 
cues. Table 26 suggests that both groups of participants perceived emails as a rich 
channel.  
5.2.6 Susceptibility 
Participants from both studies were asked to rate five phishing emails from five 
different sources using a 7 point likelihood of response Likert scale (Definitely will 
delete or ignore the email, Most likely will ignore or delete the email, Maybe will 
ignore or delete the email, Do not know, Maybe will respond, Most likely would 
respond, Definitely would respond). The results are shown in Table 27.  
 
Table 27: Descriptive statistics for five items related to susceptibility  
 Saudi Arabia Australia 
Statistics Mean Mean 
How likely that will click on bank link 4.79 4.84 
How likely that will click on eBay link 4.08 4.34 
How likely that will click on PayPal link 3.63 3.70 
How likely that will reply to Uni. email 3.46 3.16 
How likely that will reply to scam 3.40 3.34 
 
As shown in Table 27, both groups of participants were most likely to respond 
to the email if it contained a bank link. They were least likely to respond to the email 
if it is a scam or university email. 
5.2.7 Big Five personality dimensions  
Participants from both studies were asked to rate themselves in terms of five 
personality traits, based here on 10 summary descriptive items (where answers to a 
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larger array of items are summarised in terms of the five personality traits). These 
items are based on the Big Five personality traits (see Section 4.5.5).  
Participants rated themselves on the 10 summary items on a 7 point Likert 
scale (Strongly disagree, Moderately disagree, Disagree a little, Neither agree nor 
disagree, Agree a little, Moderately agree, Strongly agree). The results are shown in 
Table 28.  
 
Table 28: Descriptive statistics for the 10 personality dimension items  
 Saudi Arabia Australia 
Statistics Mean Mean 
Dependable, self-disciplined 5.70 4.77 
Sympathetic, warm 5.61 4.03 
Extraverted, enthusiastic 5.41 4.49 
Reserved, quiet 5.27 3.82 
Calm, emotionally stable 4.96 4.63 
Open to new experiences, complex 4.71 5.19 
Anxious, easily upset 4.33 3.56 
Critical, quarrelsome 3.51 4.10 
Conventional, uncreative 3.36 2.72 
Disorganised, careless 3.28 3.09 
 
 
As shown in Table 28, Saudi Arabian participants were most likely to agree 
that they were dependable and self-disciplined, sympathetic and warm, or extraverted 
and enthusiastic. They were least likely to agree that they were disorganised and 
careless, conventional and uncreative, or critical and quarrelsome. Australian 
participants were most likely to agree that they were open to new experiences, 
complex, or dependable and self-disciplined. They were least likely to agree that they 
were conventional and uncreative, or disorganised and careless. 
In this report of outcomes, the 10 items were combined in pairs to obtain scores 
related to each of the five personality dimensions. The procedure used was to add 
related pairs, with the negative item reverse scored, and to divide the resulting total 
by two to obtain the mean score (GoslingLab, 2012). The results are presented in 
Table 29. 
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Table 29: Descriptive statistics for Big Five personality dimension scores  
 Saudi Arabia Australia 
Statistics Mean Mean 
Conscientiousness mean score 5.186 4.54 
Openness mean score 4.663 5.23 
Extraversion mean score 4.069 4.33 
Emotional  mean score 3.688 3.29 
Agreeableness mean score 2.964 3.97 
 
 
As indicated in Table 29, Saudi Arabian participants were most likely to agree 
that they were conscientious, open and extraverted and least likely to agree that they 
were emotional or agreeable. Australian participants were most likely to agree that 
they were open and least likely to agree that they were agreeable and emotional. 
5.2.8 Confirmation Channels  
Participants from both studies were asked to indicate whether or not they took 
one of four ways to check the authenticity of the phishing email used in our 
experiment. The results are shown in Table 30.  
 
Table 30: Descriptive statistics for four items related to confirming the 
authenticity of emails  
 Saudi Arabia Australia 
Statistics Mean Mean 
Confirm by asking others via telephone 0.70 0.15 
Confirm by asking others face-to-face 0.23 0.22 
Confirm by asking others by email 0.05 0.21 
Confirm by making decision without consulting others 0.01 0.31 
 
 
As indicated in Table 30, Saudi Arabian participants were most likely to 
confirm by asking others via the telephone. They were least likely to do so by 
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making decisions without consulting others. Australian participants were most likely 
to confirm by making decisions without consulting others. They were least likely to 
do so by asking others via telephone. 
5.2.9 Response 
This is the final action in users’ detection behaviour. This action determines 
victims who have actually responded to the phishing emails used in our research. We 
sent two types of phishing emails to participants: reply emails and click emails. The 
score is calculated based on whether or not users responded to these phishing emails.  
In the Saudi Arabian study, of the 350 targeted participants, 4% (N=14   
responded to the phishing email used in our research. This percentage fell in the 
normal range for the percentage of users who fall victim to phishing email incidents 
(Jakobsson & Ratkiewicz, 2006; Knight, 2004; Pettey, 2006).  
In the Australian study, of the 430 targeted participants, 26% (N=112)
8
 
responded to the phishing email. This percentage is higher than the percentage of 
victims in the Saudi Arabian study as well as higher than the normal estimated 
percentage (Pettey, 2006). However, it is in the normal range for users who become 
victims in an experimental setting (Sheng et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2012). Sheng et 
al. (2007) reported that nearly 38% of their participants fell victim in their 
experiment, while Zhange et al. (2012) reported that 36% did so. These differences 
are discussed in more details in Chapter 7 (see Section 7.2.1). 
We recorded the first Saudi Arabian victim 24 hours after the phishing email 
had been sent, while the first response from an Australian victim came during the 
first five minutes. In fact, the majority of Australian victims responded in the first 
four hours. 
5.3 Demographic Analysis 
As explained in Section 5.2.1, the Saudi Arabian participants did not display 
variance in the three demographic variables of age, gender and culture. The low 
                                                 
8
 This number includes all victims in this study even those who did not complete all data collection. 
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variance resulted in these variables result in omitting them from further analysis. 
These participants, however, showed variance in the items on usage and Internet 
activities. The analysis showed that there is no significant impact of these variables 
on users being victims. This is mainly because the number of victims in the Saudi 
Arabian study was very low (4%). On the other hand, the Australian study showed a 
variance between the items included in each variable. This variance led us to analyse 
the demographic variables in the Australian study. The results are presented below.  
5.3.1 Age 
We used Sheng et al.’s (2010) categorisation of age groups (18-25, 26-35, 36 
and above). As Table 31 shows, only two categories were represented in the 
Australian study (18-25, 26-35). The Chi-square test was used to test the relationship 
between age and users’ response to the phishing email. It showed a significant 
relationship between young users and response to the phishing email (see Table 32). 
This supports previous findings that younger users are more likely to be more 
vulnerable to phishing emails than other age groups (Sheng et al., 2010). Figure 24 
shows the frequency between users’ age and response (action). 
 
Table 31: Frequencies age 
 Action Total 
Victim Detector 
Age 
18-25 
Count 58 72 130 
Expected Count 50.7 79.3 130.0 
26-35 
Count 15 42 57 
Expected Count 22.3 34.7 57.0 
Total 
Count 73 114 187 
Expected Count 73.0 114.0 187.0 
 
 
Table 32: Chi-square test age 
 Value df Asymp. Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.576 1 .018   
Continuity Correction 4.833 1 .028   
Likelihood Ratio 5.765 1 .016   
Fisher's Exact Test    .022 .013 
Linear-by-Linear Association 5.546 1 .019   
N of Valid Cases 187     
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Figure 24: Frequencies chart age 
 
5.3.2 Gender 
The Australian study showed a difference in users’ gender, with males 
representing 78% of the sample. The results in Table 33 show that males are less 
vulnerable to phishing emails than females. The Chi-square test shows that the 
difference due to gender is not significant (see Table 34). This finding is consistent 
with the results obtained by Sheng et al. (2010), who found gender was not a 
significant predictor of users being victims. Figure 25 shows the frequency between 
users’ gender and their response (action).  
 
Table 33: Frequencies gender 
 Action Total 
Victim Detector 
Gender 
Male 
Count 53 92 145 
Expected Count 56.6 88.4 145.0 
Female 
Count 20 22 42 
Expected Count 16.4 25.6 42.0 
Total 
Count 73 114 187 
Expected Count 73.0 114.0 187.0 
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Table 34: Chi-square test gender 
 Value df Asymp. Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.676 1 .195   
Continuity Correctionb 1.243 1 .265   
Likelihood Ratio 1.652 1 .199   
Fisher's Exact Test    .212 .133 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.667 1 .197   
N of Valid Cases 187     
 
 
 
 
Figure 25: Frequencies chart gender 
 
5.3.3 Culture 
As noted above, the Australian study (but not the Saudi Arabian study) showed 
variance between users in relation to cultural background. The culture variables were 
measured with two items (language and nationality) and tested with users’ response 
to the phishing email. The results are shown below.  
 105 
Chapter 5: Quantitative Analysis 105 
5.3.3.1 Language 
In the Australian study, the majority of participants (57%) reported that their 
first language is English (see Table 35), which enhances the ability to spot phishing 
email cues. Previous studies have reported that users are able to detect phishing 
emails through grammatical or spelling mistakes in their content (Jakobsson et al., 
2007). Our results using the Chi-square test showed that users whose first language is 
not English have significantly increased vulnerability to phishing emails (see Table 
36). Figure 26 shows the frequency between users’ first language and users’ response 
to phishing emails (action). 
Table 35: Frequencies language 
 Action Total 
Victim Detector 
Language 
English 
Count 24 83 107 
Expected Count 41.8 65.2 107.0 
Not English 
Count 49 31 80 
Expected Count 31.2 48.8 80.0 
Total 
Count 73 114 187 
Expected Count 73.0 114.0 187.0 
 
 
Table 36: Chi-square test language 
 Value df Asymp. Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 28.987 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 27.379 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 29.444 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
28.832 1 .000   
N of Valid Cases 187     
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Figure 26: Frequencies chart language 
 
5.3.3.2 Nationality 
The majority (58%) of participants in the Australian study reported their 
nationality as Australian (see Table 37). Analysis using a Chi-square test showed that 
users’ whose nationality differs from that of the impersonated entity have 
significantly increased vulnerability to phishing emails (see Table 38). Australian 
participants were more able to detect phishing emails that impersonated 
organisations in their country.  
This is consistent with the findings from deception studies generally. Users 
found it hard to detect deception across cultures if the deception was conducted in a 
poor medium (Bond et al., 1990). Email is a poor medium, which increases the 
difficulty for users from a different culture to spot cues of deception.  
The results on language and nationality show that users who come from a 
culture other than that from which phishing emails are generated are more vulnerable 
than users who come from the same culture. In our study, it should be noted, such 
participants are students who may only have lived in Australia for a couple of years 
and therefore may not have sufficient knowledge of the language or organisational 
policy to detect phishing emails that impersonate Australian organisations and use 
Australian (English) language. These findings may not apply to users who come 
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from a different culture but have been here long enough to be familiar with 
Australian culture. Further investigation is needed. Figure 27 shows frequency in 
relation to users’ nationality and their response (action). 
 
Table 37: Frequancy nationality 
 Action Total 
Victim Detector 
Nationality 
Australian 
Count 28 81 109 
Expected Count 42.6 66.4 109.0 
Not Australian 
Count 45 33 78 
Expected Count 30.4 47.6 78.0 
Total 
Count 73 114 187 
Expected Count 73.0 114.0 187.0 
 
 
Table 38: Chi-square test nationality 
 Value df Asymp. Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 19.568 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 18.246 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 19.687 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
19.464 1 .000   
N of Valid Cases 187     
 
 
Additionally, our study provides the opportunity to compare users from two 
cultures who receive phishing emails generated in their own culture. The comparison 
between two different cultures (Saudi Arabia and Australia) shows that culture does 
impact users’ ability to detect. The Saudi Arabian study has fewer victims than the 
Australian study. This finding, however, does not suggest that Saudi Arabian users 
are better detectors than Australian users. Several other factors have an impact on 
users’ detection. These are discussed in more detail in Section 7.2. 
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Figure 27: Frequency chart nationality 
5.3.4 Usage 
Spearman’s test measures the correlation between two variables. This measure 
shows a significant correlation between the five items measuring users’ usage with 
their response to phishing emails (Table 39). The findings show that years using the 
Internet (rho= -0.290, p<0.001), years using the email service (rho= -0.326, 
p<0.001), and years using the university email service (rho=-0.208, p<0.01), have a 
significant negative correlation with users’ response to phishing emails. This means 
that when these three items increase, the likelihood of users responding to phishing 
emails decreases.  
In contrast, number of hours using the Internet (rho=0.243, p<0.001) and 
number of emails received per day (rho=0.217, p<0.01) has a significant positive 
correlation with users’ response to phishing emails. This means that when these two 
items increase, users’ likelihood of responding to phishing emails increases. An 
explanation is that these users are heavy users. Spending much time in the Internet 
and receiving high number of emails limit these users ability to make a rigours and 
reasonable decision about phishing email. Since, those users need to make dictions to 
high number of emails. Vishwanath et al. (2011) found a similar result which is high 
number of received emails increase users being victims to phishing emails. These 
 109 
Chapter 5: Quantitative Analysis 109 
results are from the Australian study. The Saudi Arabian study did not show any 
significant correlation between variables which might have contributed to the low 
number of victims (14) in the Saudi Arabian study. 
 
Table 39: Spearman's rho test with usage (Australia) 
 Response Y_Internet H_Internet Y_Email Y_Uni No_Email 
Response 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.290** .243** -.326** -.208** .217** 
Sig. (1-tailed) . .000 .000 .000 .002 .001 
N 187 187 187 187 187 187 
Y_Internet 
Correlation Coefficient -.290** 1.000 -.138* .707** .100 -.168* 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 . .030 .000 .086 .011 
N 187 187 187 187 187 187 
H_Internet 
Correlation Coefficient .243** -.138* 1.000 -.170** -.046 .046 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 .030 . .010 .264 .268 
N 187 187 187 187 187 187 
Y_Email 
Correlation Coefficient -.326** .707** -.170** 1.000 .145* -.207** 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 .000 .010 . .024 .002 
N 187 187 187 187 187 187 
Y_Uni 
Correlation Coefficient -.208** .100 -.046 .145* 1.000 -.094 
Sig. (1-tailed) .002 .086 .264 .024 . .101 
N 187 187 187 187 187 187 
No_Email 
Correlation Coefficient .217** -.168* .046 -.207** -.094 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .001 .011 .268 .002 .101 . 
N 187 187 187 187 187 187 
 
 
5.3.5 Internet activities 
Spearman’s test measures the correlation between two variables. This measure 
shows a significant correlation between the three items measuring Internet activities 
with users’ response to phishing emails (Table 40). The findings show that shopping 
(rho= -0.183, p<0.01) has a significant negative correlation with users’ response to 
phishing emails. This means that when this item increases, the likelihood of users 
responding to phishing emails decreases. In contrast, surfing the Internet (rho=0.131, 
p<0.05) has a significant positive correlation with users’ response to phishing emails. 
This means that when this item increases, users’ likelihood of responding to phishing 
emails increases. This is consistent with the findings from Wright et al (2009). 
People use the Internet for different purposes, such as communicating with friends or 
reading newspapers, or for shopping or banking, which require knowledge of 
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technical security. Our study found that conducting sensitive transactions in the 
Internet influences users’ security perceptions and behaviour. These results only 
relate to the Australian study. The Saudi Arabian study did not show any significant 
correlation between variables, which might reflect the way in which the question was 
asked (see Section 4.5.11) as well as the low number (14) of victims in the Saudi 
Arabian study. 
 
Table 40: Spearman's rho test with Internet Activities (Australia) 
 Response Surfing Social Shopping 
 
Response 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .131* .101 -.183** 
Sig. (1-tailed) . .037 .085 .006 
N 187 187 187 187 
Surfing 
Correlation Coefficient .131* 1.000 .232** .163* 
Sig. (1-tailed) .037 . .001 .013 
N 187 187 187 187 
Social 
Correlation Coefficient .101 .232** 1.000 .078 
Sig. (1-tailed) .085 .001 . .145 
N 187 187 187 187 
Shopping 
Correlation Coefficient -.183** .163* .078 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .006 .013 .145 . 
N 187 187 187 187 
 
5.4 Instrument Validation 
This section describes the processes we used to measure instrument reliability 
and factor analysis to test uni-dimensionality and validity of variables. 
5.4.1 Reliability 
Reliability measures the internal consistency between items to measure 
constructs. The reliability measure concerns consistency and stability of a measure 
(Sekaran, 2003). 
Table 41 presents the values obtained from conducting a reliability test using 
SPSS. Cronbach’s alpha was used to measure reliability in each construct. Scholars 
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suggests that Cronbach’s alpha of 0.7 is the acceptable cut-off value (Hair, Black, 
Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2010).  
 
Table 41: Reliability measure  
 Saudi Arabia Australia 
Variables Alpha Items Alpha Items 
Trust .395 3 .864 3 
Submissiveness .894 16 .981 16 
Email experience .872 6 .910 6 
Email richness .743 4 .925 4 
Susceptibility .775 5 .932 3 
 
In both studies, almost all the constructs included in our research complied 
with the requirements of the reliability measure, with one exception―the trust 
variable in the Saudi Arabian study. Therefore, the trust variable in the Saudi 
Arabian study was omitted from further analysis.  
5.4.2 Variables validity 
Variables validity and uni-dimensionality were measured using exploratory 
factor analysis (EFA). Variables validity was also measured by obtaining convergent 
validity as well as discriminate validity which were conducted using confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA).  
5.4.2.1 Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) 
Exploratory factor analysis is a useful technique which can be used to 
understand a set of constructs (Field, 2009). Principal component factor analysis with 
varimax rotation was used in the measurement for each reliable construct in the 
survey. The measurement was conducted using SPSS version 21. The pilot study did 
not have sufficient participants to conduct EFA, in addition to the existence of latent 
variables, so our research included factor analysis in this stage. The extraction 
method called “fixed number of factors” is used to force the measurement under four 
factors for the Saudi Arabian study (trust is omitted) and five factors for the 
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Australian study. The number of factors forced in these two studies is limited to the 
number of satisfied latent variables achieved by Cronbach’s alpha test. The results 
for both Saudi Arabian and Australian studies are shown in Table 42 and Table 43 
respectively.  
Table 42: Exploratory factor analysis (Saudi Arabia) 
 1 2 3 4 
 Email_Exp1 0.811 0.023 -0.193 0.259 
 Email_Exp2 0.755 -0.045 -0.161 0.285 
 Email_Exp3 0.739 -0.073 -0.126 0.326 
 Email_Exp4 0.736 0.048 -0.136 0.213 
 Email_Exp5 0.736 0.063 0.021 -0.127 
 Email_Exp6 0.439 0.222 0.212 -0.349 
Email_rich1 0.653 0.041 0.133 -0.096 
Email_rich2 0.645 -0.011 0.144 -0.102 
Email_rich3 0.58 -0.157 0.167 -0.222 
Email_rich4 0.69 -0.078 0.074 -0.031 
   Missive1 0.186 0.541 0.111 -0.059 
  Missive2 -0.247 0.611 0.033 0.003 
  Missive3 -0.07 0.232 0.069 0.458 
  Missive4 -0.005 0.624 0.158 -0.082 
  Missive5 0.07 0.612 -0.039 -0.005 
  Missive6 0.023 -0.055 0.26 0.556 
  Missive7 0.039 0.117 -0.017 0.299 
  Missive8 0.075 0.497 0.116 -0.254 
   Missive9 -0.082 0.317 0.131 0.505 
   Missive10 0.123 0.517 0.147 0.278 
   Missive11 -0.082 0.26 -0.143 0.342 
   Missive12 0.079 -0.06 0.064 0.525 
   Missive13 0.011 0.155 -0.102 0.614 
   Missive14 -0.096 0.658 -0.215 0.022 
   Missive15 -0.121 0.241 0.153 0.462 
   Missive16 -0.098 0.442 0.375 -0.32 
       Bank 0.191 0.097 0.599 0.159 
       eBay 0.034 -0.049 0.806 0.023 
     PayPal -0.094 0.099 0.735 0.005 
       Scam -0.176 0.143 0.206 0.483 
        Uni -0.017 -0.011 0.385 0.513 
 
In the Saudi Arabian study, exploratory factor analysis showed that some items 
had weak loadings on their expected factor. As a result these items were removed 
from their expected factors. Only those items with a load high on their expected 
factors were retained. In addition, perceived email experience and email richness 
items have high loading as one factor (Table 42). This means that these 10 items 
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measure the same construct. Therefore, one of the factors was removed; we chose to 
remove perceived email experience because either factor will give the same results.  
 
Table 43: Exploratory factor analysis (Australia) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
     Trust1 -0.175 -0.534 0.526 -0.19 0.345 
     Trust2 -0.232 -0.418 0.559 -0.222 0.369 
     Trust3 -0.239 -0.343 0.613 -0.258 0.32 
 Email_Exp1 0.245 0.721 -0.176 0.2 -0.071 
 Email_Exp2 0.383 0.701 -0.335 0.003 0.267 
 Email_Exp3 0.347 0.701 -0.316 0.027 -0.058 
 Email_Exp4 0.268 0.613 -0.316 0.066 0.19 
 Email_Exp5 0.376 0.683 -0.264 0.128 -0.078 
 Email_Exp6 -0.075 0.632 0.149 -0.329 0.259 
Email_rich1 0.356 0.265 0.29 0.717 -0.046 
Email_rich2 0.358 0.24 0.371 0.734 0.094 
Email_rich3 0.302 0.141 0.371 0.642 0.16 
Email_rich4 0.235 0.187 0.34 0.632 0.291 
   Missive1 0.897 -0.013 0.15 0.078 0.028 
  Missive2 0.884 0.025 0.236 0.023 -0.003 
  Missive3 0.857 0.066 0.144 -0.001 -0.001 
  Missive4 0.912 -0.026 0.119 -0.022 0.003 
  Missive5 0.747 0.223 0.278 -0.079 -0.162 
  Missive6 0.835 0.145 0.322 -0.055 -0.022 
  Missive7 0.811 0.171 0.209 0.052 -0.024 
  Missive8 0.856 0.174 0.155 -0.141 0.094 
   Missive9 0.867 0.077 0.221 0.022 -0.124 
   Missive10 0.882 0.153 0.163 -0.068 0.07 
   Missive11 0.884 -0.047 0.134 -0.02 -0.109 
   Missive12 0.802 0.17 0.213 -0.007 0.138 
   Missive13 0.897 -0.015 0.075 -0.008 -0.048 
   Missive14 0.887 0.021 0.173 -0.056 0.015 
   Missive15 0.874 -0.073 0.153 0.022 -0.16 
   Missive16 0.857 -0.064 0.205 -0.015 -0.041 
       Bank 0.195 -0.495 0.225 -0.184 0.599 
       eBay 0.259 -0.444 0.229 -0.133 0.69 
     PayPal 0.285 -0.366 0.038 -0.179 0.756 
       Scam 0.231 -0.082 0.15 -0.108 0.844 
        Uni 0.237 -0.206 0.031 -0.198 0.815 
 
 
EFA result in finding four constructs in Saudi Arabian study and five 
constructs in Australian study (see Table 42 and Table 43). In Saudi Arabia, 4 items 
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used to measure email richness. 8 items out of 16 items used to measure 
submissiveness. 3 items used to measure susceptibility. Items loaded high outside 
their expected constructs were omitted. In Australian study, 3 items used to measure 
trust. 4 items used to measure email richness. 16 items used to measure 
submissiveness. 6 items used to measure email experience. 5 items used to measure 
susceptibility. It can be seen from these two tables that there are some items loaded 
weak in their expected construct in Saudi Arabia (see Table 42) not like the results 
obtained in Australia (see Table 43). An explanation for these differences can be 
attributed to biased answers given by Arab participants (Baron-Epel, Kaplan, 
Weinstein, & Green, 2010; Smith, 2004). Arab participants have been found to give 
more positive or extreme answers to attitude questions. Most of our items ask about 
attitudes which indicate that Arab participants gave biased answers. In our research, 
items used to measure constructs are obtained from validated studies. The survey was 
piloted twice and the translation followed back translation with translation service 
experts.  
5.4.2.2 Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
Confirmatory factor analysis is used to examine construct validity for all the 
valid variables used in our research. CFA also has a strong relationship with structure 
equation modelling (SEM). CFA cannot be employed using SPSS. Therefore, partial 
least Square (SmartPLS 2.0) was used to conduct CFA.  
Table 44 shows that the minimum requirement for factor loading above 0.4 is 
met by the items in the survey. All items have loaded on their expected factor. 
Average variance extracted (AVE) for each construct met the minimum requirement 
of 0.5 and above, as suggested by Fornell and Larcker (1981). Results shown in 
Table 44, Table 45, Table 46 and Table 47 support the conclusion that convergent 
validity is obtained among constructs in both studies.  
Discriminant validity was also tested using a suggestion made by Anderson 
and Gerbing (1960). The test suggests that discriminant validity can be obtained by 
comparing the average variance extracted (AVE) for each variable and the square 
correlation between a pair of latent variables. AVE (bolded numbers in tables: 44 and 
46) should be greater than the square correlation between a pair of latent variables. 
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Table 45 and Table 47 show that this requirement has been satisfied in both studies. 
It can be concluded that discriminant validity has been obtained for the constructs 
used in our research.  
Table 44: Factor loading (Saudi Arabia) 
          Email richness Submissiveness Susceptibility 
Email_rich1         0.9592    -0.0869         0.2675 
Email_rich2         0.9648    -0.1110         0.3354 
Email_rich3         0.9719    -0.1877         0.2559 
Email_rich4         0.9662    -0.0918         0.2656 
   Missive1        -0.1079     0.7749         0.1430 
  Missive10        -0.0457     0.7702         0.0902 
  Missive14        -0.1285     0.8029         0.1130 
  Missive16        -0.1489     0.8340         0.1611 
   Missive2        -0.0098     0.8321         0.0932 
   Missive4        -0.1483     0.8802         0.0886 
   Missive5        -0.0873     0.7605         0.0969 
   Missive8        -0.1324     0.8409         0.0913 
       Bank         0.2666     0.1268         0.8522 
     PayPal         0.1624     0.0976         0.7128 
       eBay         0.1758     0.0859         0.7399 
 
 
Table 45: Discriminate validity (Saudi Arabia) 
               Email richness Submissiveness Susceptibility 
Email richness 0.578 
  
Submissiveness 0.006512 0.6695 
 
Susceptibility 0.003856 0.019612 0.6365 
 
 
Table 46: Factor loading (Australia) 
          Email 
experience 
Email 
richness 
Submissiveness Susceptibility Trust 
     Trust1 -0.0744 -0.356 0.3491 0.5362 0.8546 
     Trust2 0.0836 -0.4585 0.4729 0.5235 0.8922 
     Trust3 0.1746 -0.4713 0.5307 0.4353 0.913 
 Email_Exp1 0.8374 -0.1643 0.4357 0.1728 0.0653 
 Email_Exp2 0.8696 -0.2217 0.3469 0.1562 -0.029 
 Email_Exp3 0.8892 -0.2705 0.4142 0.1748 0.0497 
 Email_Exp4 0.8804 -0.2598 0.4295 0.2607 0.0878 
 Email_Exp5 0.8785 -0.2364 0.4484 0.2306 0.0728 
 Email_Exp6 0.6868 0.1162 0.0796 -0.0875 -0.103 
Email_rich1 -0.2307 0.9064 -0.6321 -0.6741 -0.477 
Email_rich2 -0.2803 0.949 -0.6359 -0.6747 -0.511 
Email_rich3 -0.3123 0.8907 -0.5559 -0.5424 -0.355 
Email_rich4 -0.2424 0.871 -0.547 -0.5519 -0.396 
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   Missive1 0.419 -0.5904 0.9071 0.342 0.534 
  Missive10 0.5259 -0.5954 0.9031 0.4496 0.3992 
  Missive11 0.3878 -0.4379 0.8937 0.5099 0.5317 
  Missive12 0.494 -0.4863 0.8341 0.5768 0.3585 
  Missive13 0.422 -0.5654 0.8976 0.4299 0.517 
  Missive14 0.4214 -0.6312 0.9086 0.3833 0.4528 
  Missive15 0.3484 -0.6213 0.8847 0.4107 0.541 
  Missive16 0.3472 -0.595 0.8788 0.5877 0.4923 
   Missive2 0.4178 -0.5659 0.9154 0.3735 0.4932 
   Missive3 0.4668 -0.5697 0.871 0.5648 0.4613 
   Missive4 0.421 -0.656 0.9164 0.4385 0.5388 
   Missive5 0.4699 -0.4521 0.7926 0.4803 0.2803 
   Missive6 0.4446 -0.5001 0.8861 0.591 0.3457 
   Missive7 0.479 -0.4936 0.8395 0.5872 0.3862 
   Missive8 0.5285 -0.602 0.8775 0.3182 0.3463 
   Missive9 0.452 -0.5614 0.8977 0.5353 0.4636 
       Bank 0.0524 -0.5077 0.5087 0.8273 0.3376 
       eBay 0.1014 -0.546 0.4055 0.9032 0.4493 
     PayPal 0.2098 -0.6594 0.5668 0.9135 0.5049 
       Scam 0.4064 -0.6072 0.384 0.884 0.5553 
        Uni 0.3369 -0.6858 0.5323 0.9053 0.5694 
 
 
Table 47: Discriminate validity (Australia) 
               
Email 
experience 
Email 
richness 
Submissiveness Susceptibility Trust 
Email experience 0.753    
 Email richness 0.07177 0.8187   
 Submissiveness 0.256441 0.395641 0.7753  
 Susceptibility 0.015826 0.389251 0.374789 0.8429 
 Trust 0.004733 0.234159 0.216783 0.47087 0.787 
 
5.5 Hypothesis Testing 
This section presents the results obtained from hypothesis testing and the 
structural model. Since our research has a categorical dependent variable (response), 
logistic regression was employed to test the hypothesis with a binary categorical 
variable. R software with Lavaan packages was employed to test the overall model 
(Rosseel, 2012). Lavaan packages have been proposed to test SEM models which 
include categorical variables as  dependent variables (Rosseel, 2013).  
Since our research has two dependent variables (susceptibility and response), 
multiple linear regression was used to test the hypothesis regarding the susceptibility 
variable, and logistic regression was employed to test the hypothesis regarding the 
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response variable. The final model was tested with R software which has the ability 
to test SEM that includes a categorical variable as a dependent variable (i.e. 
response), unlike AMOS or SmartPLS. The analysis is organised to show results 
from the Saudi Arabian study first, because this study was conducted first and its 
data were analysed before the Australian study was implemented. 
5.5.1 Justification for using regression 
At the beginning of the analysis we applied linear and logistic regression. The 
advantage of linear regression is its ability to test the regression coefficient (Beta 
value) individually between variables, and the advantage of logistic regression is its 
ability to test the regression coefficient on a binary categorical dependent variable 
which is not typical for SEM. One drawback of linear and logistic regressions is that 
they are limited to measuring only one dependent variable. Since our research has 
two dependant variables, the overall model is measured using SEM.  
5.5.2 Hypothesis testing using regression 
We were interested in investigating the impact of unique variables on their 
dependent variable, which can be achieved by regression. Regression was applied by 
conducting several linear regressions with the susceptibility variable and several 
logistic regressions with the response variable. The hypothesis testing involves 
investigating the impact of various predictors on a singular dependent variable (Hair 
et al., 2010).  
5.5.2.1 Regression analysis steps 
This section explains the three main analytical steps used to test our research 
hypotheses. These are:  
1. Factors are presented by their scores which are obtained from computing the 
average scores for the items in each factor. 
2. Testing predictors individually with their related dependent variable.  
3. Applying the regression and interpreting the results. 
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5.5.2.2 Factor score 
This step is applied to enable us to conduct the regression analysis. The factor 
score was calculated by computing the score for every item presenting the factor 
(Comrey & Lee, 2013). Then, the score was divided by the number of items to 
maintain the scale metric. For example, email richness is measured with 4 items. 
Therefore, the final score was calculated as follows:  
Email richness = (Email_rich1 + Email_rich2 + Email_rich3 + Email_rich4)/ 4.  
5.5.2.3 Regression analysis 
The regression coefficient value is used for comparison and to help test the 
relationship between variables used in the regression model. The importance and 
strength of the relationship can be obtained by examining the value of the coefficient. 
The relationship between independent variables and dependent variables can be 
positive or negative. The significance of the relation can be obtained when the value 
of “p” is less than 0.05 (Field, 2009). 
5.5.2.4 Testing the relationship between variables individually  
The first step in regression was to test the impact of each independent variable 
with its related dependent variable (susceptibility and response). Only those 
independent variables that have a significant relationship with the dependent variable 
were grouped together and entered into the final model. This procedure allows us to 
prevent insignificant variables from entering the final model. The results of this 
procedure are explained below (see Table 48, Table 49, Table 50 and Table 51). 
Since submissiveness was significant in the Saudi Arabian study, in the Australian 
study it was entered first with susceptibility, along with susceptibility and openness 
with response (see Table 50 and Table 51). These tables’ summaries the results 
obtained from these tests. For more information please see the following section. 
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Table 48: Linear regression with susceptibility as a dependent variable (Saudi 
Arabia) 
Independent variables Test results 
Submissiveness There is a positive and significant relationship between 
submissiveness and users’ susceptibility 
 
 
Table 49: Logistic regression with response as a dependent variable (Saudi Arabia) 
Independent 
variables 
Test results 
Susceptibility There is a positive and significant relationship between 
susceptibility and users responding to phishing emails 
Openness There is a positive and significant relationship between 
openness and users responding to phishing emails 
 
 
Table 50: Linear regression with susceptibility as a dependent variable (Australia) 
Independent variables Test results 
Submissiveness There is a positive and significant relationship between 
submissiveness and users’ susceptibility 
Trust There is a positive and significant relationship between 
trust and users’ susceptibility 
Perceived Email 
Richness 
There is a negative and significant relationship between 
email richness and users’ susceptibility 
Extraversion There is a positive and significant relationship between 
extraversion and users’ susceptibility 
Agreeableness There is a positive and significant relationship between 
agreeableness and users’ susceptibility 
Conscientiousness There is a positive and significant relationship between 
conscientiousness and users’ susceptibility 
Emotional Stability There is a negative and significant relationship between 
emotional stability and users’ susceptibility 
Openness There is a positive and significant relationship between 
openness and users’ susceptibility 
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Table 51: Logistic regression with response as a dependent variable (Australia) 
Independent variables Test results 
Susceptibility There is a positive and significant relationship between 
susceptibility and users responding to phishing emails 
Openness There is a positive and significant relationship between 
openness and users responding to phishing emails 
Trust There is a positive and significant relationship between 
trust and users responding to phishing emails 
Email Richness There is a negative and significant relationship between 
email richness and users responding to phishing emails 
Extraversion There is a positive and significant relationship between 
extraversion and users responding to phishing emails 
Agreeableness There is a positive and significant relationship between 
agreeableness and users responding to phishing emails 
Conscientiousness There is a positive and significant relationship between 
conscientiousness and users responding to phishing emails 
Emotional Stability There is a negative and significant relationship between 
emotional stability and users responding to phishing 
emails 
Confirmation  There is a negative and significant relationship between 
the type of confirmation channel and users responding to 
phishing emails  
 
5.5.2.5 Applying the regression and interpreting the results  
This section describes the results obtained from testing only significant 
independent variables with dependent variables (susceptibility and response). 
Susceptibility as an outcome 
The major hypothesis is that predictor variables have an impact on users’ 
susceptibility (i.e., likelihood that he/she would not suspect a phishing email). In the 
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beginning, we need to satisfy the assumptions of linear regression. The results 
obtained are presented below: 
Linearity and homoscedasticity  
Linearity can be examined from the scatter plot (see Figure 28 and Figure 29). 
As can be seen, residuals did not show any nonlinear pattern (Hair et al., 2010). The 
data points in the scatter are random. We can conclude from this result that linearity 
and homoscedasticity are satisfied.  
 
 
 
Figure 28: Regression scatter plot (Saudi Arabia) 
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Figure 29: Regression scatter plot (Australia)  
 
Normality 
Normality can be examined by looking at the values provided by skewness and 
kurtosis. The normal distribution of the data is close to zero of these two measures 
(Field, 2009; Hair et al., 2010). In addition, some scholars suggest that normality can 
be assumed by having a large number sample size (e.g. more than 40 cases) (Field, 
2009). In both our studies, the number of participants exceeded 100 cases, which 
satisfies the normality requirement.  
Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity measures the relationship between the predictors and suggests 
that these predictors have a strong relationship (Hair et al., 2010). There are two 
measures to satisfy this requirement: variable inflation factor (VIF), which should be 
below 10, and tolerance level (TOL), which should be above 0.1 to conclude the 
absence of multicollinearity (Field, 2009; Hair et al., 2010). In the Saudi Arabian 
study, this test was not required (i.e. multicollinearity) since the regression test only 
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had one independent variable. For the Australian study, Table 52 shows that 
predictors examined in our research are suitable for conducting multiple regressions. 
 
Table 52: Collinearity statistics 
Predictors Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
Submissiveness .374 2.671 
Trust .481 2.081 
Email Richness .391 2.558 
Extraversion .447 2.236 
Agreeable .819 1.221 
Conscientious .672 1.487 
Emotional Stable .623 1.605 
Openness .589 1.698 
 
 
Independence of residuals 
The Durbin-Watson test can be used to test the dependency of residuals. 
Durbin-Watson measures the correlations between residuals. If the result obtained 
from the Durbin-Watson test is close to 2, this means that there is an independency 
between residuals (Field, 2009). This measure has been satisfied in both studies. The 
values obtained from the Durbin-Watson test are 1.938 and 1.812 for the Saudi 
Arabian and Australian studies, respectively, both of which are very close to 2. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the independence of residuals is satisfied.  
Outliers 
The Cook distance measured with the regression shows that the outliers’ values 
do not influence the regression model. The values obtained from the Cook Distance 
test range between 0.000 and 0.166 and 0.000 and 0.170 in the Saudi Arabian and 
Australian studies, respectively, which is an acceptable result. Values greater than 1 
would raise concern about the results (Field, 2009). Having satisfied the assumptions 
for linear regression, we discuss the results below. The Saudi Arabian results are 
presented first.  
Saudi Arabian results from linear regression (Table 53 and Table 54) show that 
there is a positive significant relationship between submissiveness and susceptibility. 
Submissiveness explains 3% of the variance in susceptibility. The overall model 
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shows a significant impact on susceptibility caused by the proposed model (p < 0.05) 
(see Table 53).  
Table 53 shows that the standardised coefficient (Beta value) for 
submissiveness is 0.167 and the relationship between submissiveness and 
susceptibility is positive.  
Table 53: Linear regression result – susceptibility (Saudi Arabia) 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 3.122 .372  8.402 .000 
Submissiveness .323 .148 .167 2.188 .030 
 
Table 54: Model summary – susceptibility (Saudi Arabia) 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .167 .028 .022 1.3371 
 
 
 
Figure 30: Scatter plot with submissiveness mean scores on X axis 
 and susceptibility mean scores on the Y axis 
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As shown in Figure 30, participants with a higher mean score for 
submissiveness also had higher mean scores for susceptibility. The flaring out of 
confidence intervals is consistent with less-than-perfect fit at the extremes of low and 
high scores.  
Australian results from multiple regressions (Table 55 and Table 56) show that 
there are two positive significant relationships between submissiveness and trust with 
susceptibility being the dependent variable. There is also a negative and significant 
relationship between perceived email richness and susceptibility. The results show 
that submissiveness, trust and email richness explain 64% of the variance in 
susceptibility. The overall model shows a significant impact on susceptibility caused 
by the proposed model (p < 0.001) (see Table 55).  
Table 55 shows that the standardised coefficients (Beta value) are 0.190 for 
submissiveness, 0.475 for trust and -0.199 for email richness. There is a positive 
relationship between submissiveness and trust, and susceptibility.  In contrast, there 
is a negative relationship between email richness and susceptibility.   
 
Table 55: Linear regression result – susceptibility (Australia)  
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 1.870 1.343  1.392 .166 
Submissiveness .188 .074 .190 2.542 .012 
Trust .546 .076 .475 7.208 .000 
Email_Rich -.210 .077 -.199 -2.724 .007 
Extraversion .048 .067 .050 .727 .468 
Agreeableness .108 .109 .050 .999 .319 
Conscientiousness .009 .079 .006 .114 .909 
Emotional -.094 .080 -.068 -1.174 .242 
Openness -.125 .090 -.083 -1.389 .167 
 
 
Table 56: Model summary – susceptibility (Australia) 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .802 .643 .616 1.19161 
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Response as an outcome 
A major hypothesis is that predictor variables have an impact on users’ 
response (i.e., likelihood that he/she would respond to a phishing email). Initially, we 
needed to satisfy logistic regression assumptions. The main assumptions for logistic 
regression are binary categorical dependent variable and sample size above 50 
(Hutcheson, 1999). These two assumptions are satisfied in our study. The dependent 
variable response is a binary category (detectors or victims) and the sample size is 
large enough for the conduct of logistic regression. The sample sizes are 196 and 187 
in the Saudi Arabian and Australian studies, respectively. Having satisfied these 
assumptions, we present the results obtained from logistic regression below. The 
Saudi Arabian data are examined first.  
In the Saudi Arabian study (Table 57), both predictors, openness and 
susceptibility, were significant at the p < 0.05 level. These variables increase users’ 
response to phishing emails.  
Based on the Cox & Snell R-square (see Table 58), this model explained 6% of 
the variance, with the Omnibus model of coefficients statistically significant at the p 
< 0.01 level, which is consistent with this model explaining a significant percentage 
of the variance. Both openness and susceptibility have a positive and significant 
relationship with response.  
 
Table 57: Final logistic regression model with response as outcome (Saudi Arabia)  
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Susceptibility .465 .203 5.221 1 .022 1.592 
Openness .588 .255 5.307 1 .021 1.801 
Constant -7.700 1.725 19.922 1 .000 .000 
 
Table 58: Model summary – response (Saudi Arabia) 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 88.088 .063 .157 
 
As indicated in Table 57, both susceptibility and openness predicted response 
as an outcome at the p < 0.05 level. Those with higher openness and susceptibility 
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scores were two times more likely than others (Exp (B)) to respond to the phishing 
emails.  
In Australia, Table 59 shows that both predictors, openness and susceptibility, 
were significant at the p < 0.01 level. These variables increase users’ response to 
phishing emails. This result supports the findings from the Saudi Arabian study. In 
addition to other predictors that are significant included extraversion, agreeableness 
and type of confirmation channel.  
Based on the Cox & Snell R-square (see Table 59), this model explained 49% 
of the variance, with the Omnibus model of coefficients statistically significant at the 
p < 0.001 level, consistent with this model explaining a significant percentage of the 
variance. Susceptibility, openness, extraversion and agreeableness have a positive 
and significant relationship with response. Susceptibility and agreeableness are 
highly significant p < 0.001 and openness and extraversion are significant p < 0.01. 
The type of confirmation channel shows a negative and significant relationship. This 
means that rich confirmation channels are more likely to increase users’ ability to 
detect phishing emails. Confirmation channel type shows a significant level with p < 
0.05.  
Table 59: Final logistic regression model with response as an outcome (Australia)  
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
 Susceptibility .914 .224 16.678 1 .000 2.495 
 Openness .859 .257 11.195 1 .001 2.360 
Step 1 
Extraversion .540 .174 9.672 1 .002 1.716 
Agreeableness 1.289 .330 15.248 1 .000 3.631 
Conscientiousness .246 .202 1.473 1 .225 1.278 
Emotional .127 .200 .403 1 .526 1.135 
Trust .039 .201 .037 1 .847 .962 
Email_Rich -.359 .195 3.377 1 .066 1.432 
Channel -.432 .200 4.643 1 .031 .649 
Constant -16.920 3.786 19.973 1 .000 .000 
 
 
Table 60: Model summary – response (Australia) 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 123.586 .492 .667 
 
 128 
Chapter 5: Quantitative Analysis 128 
As indicated in Table 59, both susceptibility, openness, extraversion, 
agreeableness and confirmation channel predicted response as an outcome at the p < 
0.05 level. Those with higher susceptibility and openness scores were two and half 
times more likely than others (Exp (B)) to respond to the phishing emails. Those with 
higher extraversion scores were two times more likely than others (Exp (B)) to 
respond to phishing emails. Those with higher agreeableness scores were four times 
more likely than others (Exp (B)) to respond to phishing emails. Those with higher 
confirmation channel scores were one time more likely than others (Exp (B)) to 
detect phishing emails. Table 61 shows the supported hypotheses obtained from 
regression in both studies.  
 
Table 61: List of supported hypotheses 
 Saudi Arabia Australia 
No. Variables Result Supported Result Supported 
H1 Trust  N/A
9
 β = 0.475 and 
p = 0.000 
Yes 
H2 Submissiveness β = 0.167 
and  
p = 0.030 
Yes β = 0.190  
and  
p = 0.012 
Yes 
H3 Perceived email 
experience 
 N/A  No 
H4 Perceived email 
richness 
 No β = -0.19910 
and  
p = 0.007 
Yes 
H5 Susceptibility B = 0.465 
and  
p = 0.022 
Yes B = 0.914 
and  
p = 0.000 
Yes 
H6 Personality traits  No  No 
H7 Personality traits     
Openness B = 0.588 
and  
p = 0.021 
Yes B = 0.859 
and  
p = 0.001 
Yes 
 Extraversion   No B = 0.540 
and p = 0.002 
Yes 
 Agreeableness  No B = 1.289 
and p = 0.000 
Yes 
H8 Rich 
confirmation 
channel 
 No B = -0.432 
and  
p = 0.031 
Yes 
                                                 
9
 N/A means that the hypothesis was not tested because the construct did not satisfy validity 
measurements  
10
 Red indicates negative impact 
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5.5.3 Structural equation modelling (SEM) 
SEM is suitable for analysing multiple dependent variables as well as multiple 
independent variables. One issue with SEM is the requirement for measuring the 
latent variable instead of the manifest variable. In our research, R software with 
Lavaan packages was used to analyse the overall model because of its ability to 
analyse SEMs with categorical dependent variables (Rosseel, 2013), unlike AMOS 
or SmartPLS. The results are explained below.  
The measurement model has provided satisfactory reliability and validity. This 
means that the items used in our research have the ability to measure the construct 
they are expected to measure. The second step is to evaluate the research model 
using structural equation modelling (SEM). SEM is widely used as a test in 
behavioural studies (Baumgartner & Homburg, 1996).  
Our research investigates users’ behaviour when they are faced with phishing 
emails. Goodness of fit for the research model is explained in Figure 31 and Figure 
32. Saudi Arabia and Australia have different values for the explained variance for 
response. The reason for this difference is discussed in Chapter 7. In Saudi Arabia, 
the overall model explains 13% of the variance responsible for users’ behaviour 
(responding to phishing emails) (  = 0.126). In Australia, the overall model explains 
45% of the variance responsible for users’ behaviour (responding to phishing emails) 
(  = 0.45). Please the following tables for more details Table 62, Table 63, Table 
64, and Table 65. 
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Figure 31: Structural model for Saudi Arabian study 
 
 
Table 62: R Software results – Saudi Arabia 
Path Path 
coefficient 
Standard 
error P-value ID DV 
Submissiveness  Susceptibility 0.433 0.169     0.000 
Susceptibility Response 0.422 0.128 0.022 
Openness Response 0.354 0.157 0.038 
 
 
 
 
Table 63: R square values – Saudi Arabia 
 R square  
Susceptibility 0.187 
Response 0.126 
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Figure 32: Structural model for Australian study 
  
 
Table 64: R software results - Australia 
Path Path 
coefficient 
Standard 
error P-value ID DV 
Trust Susceptibility 0.396 0.067 0.000 
Submissiveness  Susceptibility 0.330 0.067 0.000 
Email Richness Susceptibility -0.316 0.083 0.000 
Susceptibility Response 0.539 0.019 0.000 
Openness Response 0.284 0.030 0.000 
Extraversion Response 0.188 0.029 0.018 
Agreeableness Response 0.227 0.032 0.019 
Channel Response -0.263 0.024 0.032 
 
 
 
Table 65: R square values - Australia  
 R square  
Susceptibility 0.703 
Response 0.450 
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5.6 Summary 
This chapter has described how we analysed the data from both the Saudi 
Arabian and Australian studies. The analysis began with preparation of the data to be 
entered into the analysis software. The chapter has presented the descriptive 
outcomes of data and explained how data validity and reliability were tested. We also 
explain how we tested the hypotheses and the final model. Hypothesis testing was 
conducted using multiple regression and logistic regression. The final model was 
tested with R software with Lavaan packages.  
The results from the Saudi Arabian study show that users’ submissiveness 
increases their susceptibility to phishing emails. Users’ high level of susceptibility 
and their open personality increase their tendency to respond to phishing emails. The 
results from the Australian study support this finding from the Saudi Arabian study. 
The results from the Australian study show that users’ submissiveness, in addition to 
trust, increases users’ susceptibility. Users’ high level of susceptibility and their 
openness, as well as extraversion and agreeableness, increase their tendency to 
respond to phishing emails. 
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Chapter 6: Qualitative Analysis 
This chapter presents the results of our analysis of the qualitative data obtained 
from interviews. The main purpose of this method was to generate deeper 
understanding of users’ detection behaviour and of the differences between detectors 
and victims. Qualitative data is intended to answer questions 1, 2, and 3. The setting 
of the interviews was explained earlier (see Section Error! Reference source not 
ound.) and the research questions can be found in the Appendix B.  
The chapter begins by explaining the measures of reliability and validity that 
were applied to these results. The process used to analyse the data is then described. 
Finally, the findings are presented and interpreted.  
Invitations to participate in an interview were sent to those participants who 
were classified as detectors or victims (see Section 4.9.5) and had completed the 
second survey. Both detectors and victims responded to the invitation. A total of 17 
participants agreed to be interviewed, nine of whom were classified as detectors and 
eight as victims (see Section 4.9.5).  
6.1 Reliability and Validity  
The reliability of our method was assessed using the Cohen’s Kappa index of 
inter-rater reliability (Carletta, 1996), which is often used to measure agreement 
between coders in qualitative research.  Seven of the interviews were analysed by 
two different coders. Both were provided with transcripts of the interviews and the 
interview codebook and they conducted their analyses separately. The initial coding 
was based on four a priori topic categories that were derived from the MDD model. 
The results show a satisfactory level of agreement since the K value is above 0.7 (see 
Table 66). The codebook itself is displayed in Table 67. Please note that the first raw 
in Table 66 shows the themes used to categorise codes which are described in Table 
67.  
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Table 66: Inter-coder reliability 
Unit Activation Hypothesis 
generation 
Hypothesis 
evaluation 
Global 
assessment 
Participant 1 a 1 1 1 1 
Participant 1 b 1 0 1 1 
Participant 2 a 1 1 1 1 
Participant 2 b 1 0 0 1 
Participant 3 a 1 1 1 1 
Participant 3 b 1 0 0 1 
Participant 4 a 1 0 1 1 
Participant 4 b 1 0 1 1 
Participant 5 a 1 0 1 1 
Participant 5 b 1 0 0 1 
Participant 6 a 0 0 0 1 
Participant 6 b 0 1 1 1 
Participant 7 a 0 0 0 1 
Participant 7 b 1 1 1 1 
 
         
  
 b 
      
 
  Agree Disagree 
      
a 
Agree 14 6 
 
Disagree 10 12 
     
         
         
 
Pr (a):= [(Coder 1 agree & Coder 2 agree) + ( Coder 1 disagree & Coder 2 
disagree)/ all cases]  
And that equals 0.92 
 
Pr (e):= 0.5 
      
         
 
 
     
 
(Galton, 1892) 
    
      
 
K=  0.85 
      
         
         
 
The inter-coder reliability is satisfactory because k > 0.7 
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The validity of our findings was assessed by comparing them with findings 
from the survey (i.e. data triangulation) (Emory & Cooper, 1991; Sekaran, 2003).  
6.2 Analytic Procedure 
As explained in Chapter 3, most of the interviews were audio recorded and 
additional notes were taken by the interviewer to capture important information. 
Only one participant requested to not record the interview. Therefore, only notes 
were taken during that interview. Each recorded interview was transcribed in full, 
yielding 16 transcripts, each of three to four pages in length. 
The qualitative data were analysed in four phases. The first three phases were 
data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing (Miles and Huberman(1994). 
The final phase, data interpretation, integrated the findings from the previous three 
phases (Silverman, 2006).  
6.2.1 Data reduction 
Data reduction involves selecting those segments of the raw data which should 
be the focus of attention, and transforming these into a manageable form (e.g. a 
theme) (see Table 67). 
 
Table 67: Codebook for analysis of the interviews 
Phase Description 
Activation Refers to the phase in which a user suspects the existence of 
a phishing email. Suspicion begins by observing 
inconsistency between what users expect to see in real emails 
and what they actually observe in the phishing email. 
Hypothesis 
generation 
Refers to the phase in which a user develops an explanation 
for the inconsistency (interpretation of the inconsistency). 
Hypothesis 
evaluation 
Refers to the processes that a user chooses to test the 
explanation (interpretation of the inconsistency). 
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Global assessment Refers to the final decision a user makes based on the 
combined results from hypothesis evaluation. 
  
6.2.2 Data display   
Data display refers to how the information is organised and presented for 
analysis. In the present study, the data were displayed in the form of a table in which 
the participants were divided into two groups (detectors and victims) and their 
responses were listed under each a priori topic category. Data that could not be 
classified under one of these categories were grouped in a separate category for 
further analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  
6.2.3 Conclusion drawing  
This refers to the process of identifying regularities and patterns in the data and 
their related conditions and consequences (Glaser, 1978).  
6.2.4 Data interpretation 
The final phase in qualitative data analysis is interpretation, in which the 
results from the previous phases are integrated. In this phase, dominant and emergent 
themes are identified. The dominant themes from our analysis were detectors’ 
behaviour and victims’ behaviour, each of which contained several sub-themes.  The 
emergent themes were: perceived account importance, communication between 
users, awareness of phishing email cues, and choosing whom to consult.  
6.3 Results 
The results obtained from the interview analysis are presented in this section.  
6.3.1 Detectors’ behaviour 
Detectors identified the phishing email and chose not to comply with its 
request. The analysis revealed three main factors that differentiated detectors from 
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victims (see Table 68): perceived negative consequences; knowledge of phishing 
email cues; and high importance of the requested information.  
Perceived negative consequences. Detectors ignored the phishing email 
because they believed that responding might be harmful to them.  
Knowledge of phishing email cues. Knowledge of the existence of phishing 
emails by itself appears to not prevent users from responding to them. Unlike victims 
in the present study, detectors knew how to identify cues which led them to identify 
phishing emails, such as requests for passwords.  
High importance of the requested information. Some detectors ignored the 
phishing email because they thought the requested information was too important to 
reveal. This was an important source of difference between detectors and victims. 
Table 68 illustrates detectors’ responses to the question of why they did not perform 
the action requested in our phishing email.  
 
Table 68: Detectors’ responses 
Code Excerpt from transcript 
Negative 
consequences  
“I am afraid that the attacker will identify me as a vulnerable user 
and send me harmful emails” 
Low security 
behaviour 
“I did not respond because I know this kind of action is behaviour 
of phishing emails. That is why I did not respond” 
Importance 
of the 
requested 
data 
“I did not respond with my password because it is not a secure 
behaviour to send password via email. Most importantly, my 
password is very important to me because it is linked to my other 
accounts which are very important. If I lose my password, I will 
lose valuables in my other accounts” 
 
As can be seen from these responses, detectors felt responsible for protecting 
their information and behaving securely. They did not shift the responsibility for 
protection onto others.  
Detectors were asked to identify the source of their knowledge about phishing 
emails. They gave a variety of responses, including: 1) general publicity about the 
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negative consequences of losing private information, such as identity theft; 2) 
specific warnings about phishing emails associated with online gaming and how 
these can be identified; 3) personal experience in designing websites, which gave 
them insight into their weaknesses and how these weaknesses can be exploited by 
attackers.  
6.3.2 Victims’ behaviour 
Most phishing email studies classify users into two main categories: victims 
and detectors. This classification is based on the final behaviour (i.e. respond or not). 
Our investigation, however, identified three types of victims: naïve victims, doubtful 
victims and risk-taker victims based on the investigation of users’ detection 
behaviour (see Figure 33).  
 
Figure 33: Users’ behaviour when faced with phishing emails 
 
6.3.2.1 Naïve victims 
Naïve victims have little or no suspicion (i.e. they have high levels of 
susceptibility). Most did not generate or evaluate a deception hypothesis. Their 
explanation support the deception by believing that the phishing email is real.  Their 
suspicion levels were very low, they believed the phishing email was real, and as a 
result they responded directly to it (see Table 69). Significantly, they had not even 
considered the possibility of a phishing email before they responded. They had no 
doubts about whether it was legitimate.  
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Table 69: Naïve victims 
Code Excerpt from transcript 
No suspicion  
 
 
 
“I thought it was some routine check and that something had 
happened. I did click on the link and reset my password. I did 
not think it would have any effect. I thought it was from the 
university, like some sort of support.”  
New situation “The first unit that I took, which had a classroom blog; this 
made me think that the email came from the lecturer because a 
problem had occurred in the blog.” 
Trust “I did not have any doubts because it came from the official 
university website.” 
“No. Because it is from my university and my university is a 
trustworthy educational institution.” 
 
 
The quantitative data suggested that certain personality characteristics, such as 
trusting new people, low perceived email richness and high submissiveness increase 
users’ susceptibility to phishing emails. These characteristics were found to be 
negatively associated with users’ suspicion. Thus the quantitative data support the 
findings from the interviews (i.e. users with low suspicion respond to phishing 
emails directly).   
6.3.2.2 Doubtful victims 
Doubtful victims suspected the phishing email but failed to confirm their 
suspicion. Their weakness was that they lacked a strong confirmation channel (see 
Table 70).  
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Table 70: Doubtful victims 
Code Excerpt from transcript 
Weak confirmation 
channel 
 
“I asked some of my colleagues if they received the same 
email. Then, I realised that all of them had received the 
same email.” 
Verification with 
peers 
 
“After I asked my university colleagues if they received the 
email, my doubt was gone when they confirmed that they 
also received the email.” 
Consult a victim “In the beginning I had doubts, but in the end I felt safe 
because the email was from the university.” 
 
 
The quantitative data support these findings. The type of confirmation channel 
has a significant impact on users’ accuracy in detecting phishing emails. Users who 
chose to authenticate the phishing email by consulting others were more likely to 
detect phishing emails than those users who depended on themselves for detection.  
6.3.2.3 Risk-taker victims 
Risk-taker victims chose to respond to the phishing email because they did not 
see any harm in adopting low-security behaviour. These victims did not lack 
knowledge about phishing emails or secure behaviour. Two main factors were 
associated with this risk-taking behaviour: the level of importance participants 
ascribed to the requested information, and the perceived negative consequences (see 
Table 71). In interview, these victims reported that they felt the requested 
information was not worth protecting and did not believe that behaving less securely 
would cause them any harm (such as loss of their blogs).   
 
 
 
 141 
Chapter 6: Qualitative Analysis 141 
 
Table 71: Risk-taker victims 
Code Excerpt from transcript 
Perception of 
low- risk 
consequences  
 
“I trust that the university will understand my situation if my blog 
is damaged. The worst case scenario is I lose the content in the 
blog. In this case I can contact the lecturer and tell him about what 
happened.” 
“I know that what I did is wrong; I should not send my password. 
However, I thought that the email came from the lecturer himself.” 
Protecting 
requested 
information is 
not important 
“For me, the password’s importance is related to its purpose. For 
example, passwords for my bank account and other important 
accounts are very important to me. On the other hand, passwords 
for forums and blogs are less important to me.” 
“In the blog, the content is stored with me. I will not lose anything” 
 
 
The quantitative data support these findings. There was a significant 
relationship between certain personality characteristics, such as extraversion and 
openness, and users’ response to phishing emails. Users with these characteristics are 
more willing to accept and experience new ideas. For some participants in our study, 
phishing emails may be a new experience. Some acknowledged that sending 
passwords via email constitutes low-security behaviour but they did not worry about 
complying with the request. Their explanation was that they would not lose anything 
if someone obtained their passwords.  
6.3.3 Emergent themes  
The analysis identified several additional factors that directly influenced users’ 
detection behaviour. These factors were: perceived account importance, 
communication between users, awareness of phishing email cues, and choosing 
whom to consult. Each is discussed below. 
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6.3.3.1 Perceived Account Importance 
An important factor in some victims’ decision to respond to the phishing email 
was the perceived importance of protecting their account. These victims responded 
because they did not think their account was important, so they were not concerned 
about losing it (see Table 72). 
One participant, for instance, reported that he knew about phishing emails and 
the dangers associated with them. In fact, he had lost online accounts as a result of 
phishing emails in the past. He also described another incident in which he had 
received a phishing email that pretended to come from his bank. His response on that 
occasion (he called the bank directly and informed them about the incident) was very 
different from his behaviour in our study (he responded to the phishing email). The 
participant himself explained the difference between these behaviours as the result of 
perceived level of importance. If the email supposedly from his bank was a phishing 
email, he could lose money. On the other hand, he had no important information in 
his blog account and was not worried about losing it. Even if this happened, he could 
prove to the authorities (i.e. the lecturer) that he had completed the unit requirements 
and was eligible to receive the unit marks for the blog assignments.  
Similarly, another victim in our study acknowledged that he did not think about 
the consequences of responding to the phishing email. He responded as soon as he 
opened the email. He admitted that he knew he should not send passwords via email 
but, when asked if he would send his blog password if the lecturer asked him to, he 
stated that he would do so. He explained this behaviour in relation to the nature and 
importance of the account. Bank accounts, for example, are very important and their 
passwords should be difficult. Bank passwords should contain letters, numbers and 
symbols. Other less important accounts, such as blogs and forums, do not need such 
complicated passwords. Thus he behaved less securely in protecting his blog 
password, as he considered it less important.  
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Table 72: Perceived account importance 
Code Excerpt from transcript 
No losses 
 
 
“I have a backup in my computer. So anything lost in the blog I can 
retrieve it from my computer. 
 
“The significant difference is the interest. The Bank and PayPal 
related to my money. I will lose my money and I can’t retrieve it. In 
the blog, the content is stored with me, so I will not lose anything.” 
Different 
classification 
for different 
accounts 
“The password importance is related to its purpose. For example, 
passwords for my bank account and other important accounts are 
very important to me. On the other hand, passwords for forums and 
blogs are less important to me.” 
 
6.3.3.2 Communication between users 
The interviews revealed very low levels of communication (warnings) between 
users themselves, particularly by participants who were early detectors of the 
phishing email. When asked if they warned other users about their discovery of the 
phishing email, many said that they did not do so. Such detectors mainly focused on 
warning a relevant authority. Their reasoning was that the authority responsible for 
protection would take the necessary steps to warn other users (see Table 73). 
In our study, we were only able to make a limited assessment of the impact of a 
warning from an authority. A relevant authority (the lecturer) could warn users after 
a certain time that a phishing email had been sent. It was anticipated that early 
warning from an authority would increase the detection rate and may reach users 
who had not yet opened the phishing email. Therefore, the warning was sent after 
allowing time for users to decide on their response (see Section 4.8).  
As mentioned previously, detectors themselves displayed different forms of 
warning behaviour. Some warned the owner of the server while others did nothing 
after they had detected (and ignored) the phishing email.  
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Table 73: Users’ responses to the phishing email  
Code Excerpt from transcript 
Detectors 
 
“If he (the owner of the server) sees the email from me he will say 
hang on I did not sent this email. Then he will know that his email 
has been compromised” 
“I did not want him (the lecturer) to tell me what to do. I 
forwarded it to him because he has to do what he should do” 
Doubters “I was not sure if it was a scam or not. But I am pretty sure that 
there is something fishy, dodgy. So, I consulted the lecturer to tell 
me what to do” 
“If the lecturer is aware of this he will advise us what to do next” 
Victims Respond by clicking or replying 
 
The findings indicate that communication between participants was extremely 
low. Participants who detected the email as a phishing email did not take the 
initiative to warn their peers. Yet detection time is crucial. In the Australian study, 
for example, some participants detected the phishing email in its early stages (first 
three hours), which was the period during which nearly half of the victims responded 
to the phishing email.  
6.3.3.3 Awareness of phishing email cues 
Many studies propose that awareness of phishing emails can increase users’ 
protection. Indeed, this is the main or only aim of many phishing email education 
programs. Our qualitative data, however, show that awareness alone did not prevent 
some participants from responding to the phishing email. The majority of identified 
victims had heard about phishing emails and some had fallen victim to them in the 
past.  In this context, the main difference between victims and detectors is that 
detectors were able to identify certain cues as signs of phishing emails while victims 
were not (see  
 
Table 74). 
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Table 74: Awareness of phishing emails  
Participant Excerpt from transcript 
Detector 
(Participant 2) 
“I got this information from the Internet. I play video online 
games and often people will send you emails like the email you 
sent asking for your details.”  
Detector 
(Participant 1) 
“I am from ‘a specific country’ and we have strict security 
rules and we are very aware of phishing emails; most of them 
are usually from banks.” 
Victim  
(Participant 6) 
“Yes, I heard about them (phishing emails). They send a 
program through email. When a user opens this email they can 
steal your information.” 
Victim  
(Participant 7) 
“Yes, I know about it but I am not interested in it.” 
 
As Table 80 shows, detectors have specific knowledge about how phishing 
emails work and how to identify them. On the other hand, victims had heard about 
phishing emails but did not know how to identify them.  
6.3.3.4 Choosing whom to consult  
Some doubtful users consulted others to help them decide. One of our research 
objectives was to examine the impact of the richness of the confirmation channel on 
users’ detection ability. The qualitative data suggested that the choice of person to 
consult was also important.  
The qualitative data suggested that both richness of the confirmation channel 
and the type of person consulted affect users’ detection behaviour. One participant, 
for example, consulted his friend, who was also a victim. The friend said that he had 
responded to the phishing email, which encouraged the participant to do so as well. 
In other words, despite the use of a rich medium (face to face) as the confirmation 
channel, this user became a victim. 
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Table 75: Choosing Whom to Consult 
Participant Excerpt from transcript 
Detector 
(Participant 16) 
“I did not respond to it. I asked a couple of my friends whether 
they received it as well. They said they were going to ask the 
lecturer. They asked the lecturer and he said do not respond to 
emails that ask about passwords.”  
Detector 
(Participant 4) 
“Then, I sent an email asking the lecturer about that email. The 
admin can reset the password, so why would they ask about it?” 
Victim 
(Participant 10) 
“I did make sure by asking my colleagues if they had received 
this email.” 
Victim 
(Participant 6) 
“I asked some of my colleagues if they received the same email. 
Then, I realised that all of them had received the same email.” 
 
Table 75 shows that the type of person consulted affects the likelihood of users 
becoming victims. Consulting the appropriate person increases users’ chances of 
becoming detectors, while consulting an inappropriate person increase their chances 
of becoming victims.  
6.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented the findings from analysis of the qualitative data. 
Three main factors were shown to differentiate detectors from victims: perceived 
negative consequences; knowledge of phishing email cues; and high importance of 
the requested information.  
Our findings extend previous work by identifying three categories of victims: 
(1) naive victims, who did not even suspect the phishing email and responded 
directly to it; (2) doubtful victims, who suspected the phishing email but failed to 
confirm their suspicion; and (3) risk-taker victims, who knew that their action 
(sending passwords via email) was a form of low-security behaviour but performed 
the action because they perceived it to be harmless. Detectors, by contrast, 
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demonstrated greater care and responsibility in relation to protecting their passwords 
and behaved more securely.  
An unexpected finding was that the majority of detectors simply ignored the 
phishing emails but took no steps to warn others. Some, however, warned an 
authorised person who, they believed, had the responsibility to warn others. Such 
warnings need to be sent immediately following detection if the authorised person is 
to be able to take appropriate action. Only some detectors did this.  
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Chapter 7: Discussion 
This chapter begins by summarising the findings of our research. Our results 
confirm that users’ detection behaviour has three main phases and that certain users’ 
characteristics affect these phases. This is followed by a discussion of the main 
differences between the two studies (Saudi Arabia and Australia). Next we discuss 
the implications of our findings in relation to strategies for improving users’ 
protection against phishing emails. The chapter concludes with recommendations for 
each of the main stakeholders in the search for solutions to the problem of phishing 
emails: victims, IT professionals and organisations.  
7.1 Summary of Findings 
The aim of our research was to identify weaknesses in users’ detection 
behaviour and the characteristics that affect that behaviour. Our results show that 
several characteristics impact on users’ detection behaviour and differentiate between 
detectors and victims. Some characteristics increase users’ vulnerability to phishing 
emails while others reduce their vulnerability. Figure 34 presents an answer to the 
first question in our research (Q1) and summarises the findings in relation to three 
phases: susceptibility, confirmation and response (see also Figure 9).  
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Figure 34: Impact of users’ characteristics on phases in detection behaviour  
 
In order to answer the second and third questions (Q2 and Q3), the following 
paragraphs present our findings. The process of detection begins with awareness of 
phishing email cues. Awareness is essential if users are to identify phishing emails 
and is a key consideration in reducing their susceptibility. 
Susceptibility is affected by perceived email richness (a user characteristic), 
which increases the number of cues upon which users can draw to determine the 
legitimacy of an email and, hence, enhance their protection. In this context, it is 
important to note, email is considered a poor medium that presents insufficient cues 
for a reliable judgment. 
Phishing email cues are one of the triggers for detection. Identification of these 
cues requires attention to certain features that ordinary users may neither notice nor 
understand. Perceived high email richness helps detectors to extract the relevant cues 
from phishing emails.  
Users’ susceptibility is increased by two characteristics―trust and 
submissiveness. Both of these characteristics can be exploited by the perpetrators of 
a phishing email attack. Phishing emails ask users to trust them by impersonating 
trustworthy entities. Users with high levels of trust and submissiveness are less likely 
to question the legitimacy of emails that pretend to come from a trustworthy entity. 
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Users who do not question the legitimacy of emails that purport to come from 
trustworthy entities need to be informed that if they do suspect an email, this does 
not mean they suspect the entity itself.  
High submissiveness also increases users’ susceptibility. Highly submissive 
users are more likely to obey orders, and this decreases their ability to question the 
instructions in a phishing email. Phishing emails always make a direct request for the 
recipient to comply with a specified action. Hence high submissiveness increases 
users’ susceptibility to phishing emails.  
The second phase in users’ detection behaviour is confirmation. Our findings 
showed that the confirmation phase is affected by two main factors: the type of 
confirmation channel (quantitative data) and the type of person consulted (qualitative 
data). A rich confirmation channel helped users to identify phishing emails and 
reduced the likelihood that they would respond to phishing emails.  
The qualitative data showed that the choice of person to consult also affected 
participants’ ability to detect phishing emails. The choice of a person with the 
appropriate knowledge, such as a server administrator or IT expert, helps users to 
identify phishing emails. For example, server administrators are likely to know 
whether the email was initiated from the institution. An IT expert, on the other hand, 
knows how to distinguish phishing emails from legitimate ones. Our findings suggest 
that it is more beneficial to consult an authorised person within an organisation rather 
than an IT expert because the former can provide an unequivocal answer as well as 
warn other potential victims.  
The third phase in users’ detection behaviour is response. The survey identified 
three personality characteristics that increase users’ response to phishing emails: 
openness, extraversion and agreeableness. The qualitative data provided additional 
insight by suggesting that the level of importance users assign to the requested 
information influences their response. Participants who perceived the requested 
information as relatively unimportant were more willing to take the risk of 
responding. 
Clearly, defences against phishing emails need to address all potential 
weaknesses in users’ detection behaviour. Concentrating on only one area of 
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weakness leaves other users, who have a different weakness, still vulnerable. As our 
qualitative data showed, there are at least three types of victims, each with its own 
areas of weakness. 
Question four (Q4) is answered by comparing the findings between the two 
group of participants Saudi Arabian and Australian participants. Culture was also 
found to impact on users’ ability to detect phishing emails. Both intracultural (within 
Australia) and cross cultural (Saudi Arabia and Australia) differences were observed. 
The Australian study included participants from different cultural backgrounds. 
Native Australian participants were found to be less vulnerable to phishing emails 
from Australian sources than their counterparts from other cultures. The likely 
explanation for this is that Australian nationals, whose first language is English and 
who are familiar with local organisational practices, are better able to detect 
linguistic and cultural cues of phishing emails. 
Saudi Arabian participants were less vulnerable to phishing emails than 
Australian participants. The reasons for this are discussed below.  
7.2 Comparative Analysis of the Saudi Arabian and Australian 
Studies 
Both studies were similar in overall design. In the first stage, a survey was used 
to collect information about users’ characteristics and levels of susceptibility. In this 
survey, users were not informed about the actual intention of the research (i.e. that it 
concerned phishing emails). In the second stage, users were sent phishing emails 
asking them to reveal their secret information (passwords). Their actions (i.e. 
respond or ignore) were recorded. In the third stage, users were sent a second survey 
that informed them of the real intention of the research and collected information 
about the confirmation behaviour they had employed when they received the 
phishing email. In the final phase, survey respondents who had been identified as 
detectors or victims were invited to participate in an interview. The key difference 
between these two studies is culture. The Saudi Arabian study was conducted in 
Saudi Arabia where Australian study was conducted in Australia (see Section 4.9).  
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There were two main differences in the results of these two studies: the 
response rate (see Section 7.2.1) and the number of users’ characteristics that had an 
impact (see Section 7.2.2). The number of victims in the Saudi Arabian study was 
significantly lower than the number of victims in the Australian study. In addition, 
fewer users’ characteristics were identified in the Saudi Arabian study than in the 
Australian study. The reasons for these differences are discussed below. Overall, 
however, the results from both studies support each other.  
7.2.1 Number of victims 
There were 14 victims (4%) of the total study population in Saudi Arabian 
study and 112 victims (26%) of the total study population in the Australian study. 
This was a significant difference. Two factors accounted for the difference: the 
perceived importance of email as a communication channel and differences in users’ 
characteristics. The second cause is considered in Section 7.2.2.  
The first factor can be explained in terms of social presence. Social presence 
measures the level of effectiveness of  a medium by its ability to include 
interpersonal involvement required for a certain task (Miranda & Saunders, 2003). 
Contributing factors are as follows:  
1. Unlike the Australian participants, the Saudi Arabian participants do not 
check their emails regularly. This was evidenced in the observed response 
time among victims in both studies.  
2. In the experience of the student researcher, who is a Saudi Arabian national, 
email is not viewed as an important and reliable medium for communication 
by Saudi Arabian users. By contrast, Australian users regularly check their 
emails and use emails for work.  
3. Some participants in the Saudi Arabian study had to be instructed to activate 
their university email account in order to communicate with the lecturer, 
which supports the suggestion that email does not have high importance as a 
communication channel in Saudi Arabia. In the Australian study, all 
participants already had an active email account and they used it to 
communicate with their lecturer.  
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4. In Saudi Arabia, the majority of online services, such as banking, do not use 
email as an official communication channel. Offers and notices from banks 
are mainly sent via short message system (SMS) to clients’ mobiles. In 
Australia, most updates are sent via email unless an urgent response from 
clients is needed. 
 
The number of Saudi Arabian victims is expected to increase in the future, as 
email becomes more widely accepted as an important medium for communication. 
Saudi Arabia is still a developing country in relation to the importance and spread of 
the e-services provided in both the private and public sectors. The Saudi Arabian 
government, however, is moving towards providing its own  services online and 
encouraging organisations to do so (Yesser, 2013). As more citizens connect to the 
Internet, the chances of users receiving phishing emails increase. Since users are the 
weakest link in the protection chain, appropriate action is needed to educate them 
about the problem of phishing emails.  
7.2.2 Differences in users’ characteristics 
Certain characteristics were similar in both studies. These included trust, 
submissiveness, perceived email experience and richness, and susceptibility to 
phishing emails. There were differences in Internet and email experience, preferred 
type of confirmation channel and Big Five personality dimensions.  
Both Saudi Arabian and Australian participants agreed that they are more 
likely to trust others. Participants from both studies mainly agreed on submissiveness 
and on the final item (they do not let others criticise them or put them down without 
defending themselves). There were no significant differences in perceived email 
experience and richness. Participants in both studies had the same susceptibility to 
phishing emails. In both studies, participants were more susceptible to bank phishing 
emails and less susceptible to university or scam emails.  
Saudi Arabian and Australian participants differed in relation to Internet usage 
and email usage. On average, Australian and Saudi Arabian participants had used the 
Internet for 10 years and 7 years, respectively. Australian participants spent, on 
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average, more time (5.4 hours) using the Internet than Saudi Arabian participants 
(3.2 hours). Australian and Saudi Arabian participants had been using the email 
service, on average, for 9 years and 6 years, respectively. On the other hand, there 
were no significant differences in average number of years using the university email 
service or in the number of emails received per day. This latter observation is 
accounted for by the fact that the most participants in both studies were 
undergraduate students in their second year of university.  
Clearly, Australian participants had longer histories of Internet and email 
service usage than Saudi Arabian participants. Users with more experience are 
expected to be more likely to detect phishing emails. Yet our study found more 
victims in Australia than in Saudi Arabia. At the same time, our results show that 
native Australian users were significantly better able than non-Australian users to 
detect the phishing email used in the study. Why, then, were there more victims in 
the Australian study? The most likely explanation for this is that the phishing emails 
used in the Australian study were written in English and impersonated an Australian 
organisation. It can be concluded that native Australians are better at spotting 
problematic issues in language and local organisational policy than are those whose 
first language is not English or are less knowledgeable about Australian culture and 
organisational practice.  
There were also differences between the studies in preferred confirmation 
channel. In the Saudi Arabian study, users preferred confirmation channels that 
involved asking others (endorsing behaviour). In the Australian study, users 
preferred to depend on themselves for confirmation (investigation behaviour). In the 
survey, Saudi Arabian participants scored highly on the item asking others via 
telephone and recorded low scores on the item making a decision without consulting 
others. In the Australian study, these scores were reversed.  
These differences can be explained as the result of cultural differences. Saudi 
Arabian culture endorses collectivism while Australian culture endorses 
individualism (Hofstede, 2011). Individualism encourages people to depend on 
themselves rather than others. Therefore, Australian participants chose to depend on 
themselves to authenticate the legitimacy of the phishing emails while the Saudi 
Arabian participants chose to consult others for this purpose. 
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Our findings showed that the confirmation channel played an important role in 
influencing users’ behaviour towards phishing emails. Specifically, choosing a rich 
confirmation channel decreased users’ vulnerability. Saudi Arabian users were more 
likely to choose a rich confirmation channel (i.e. phone). Australian participants, who 
were more likely to depend on themselves for evaluation, were significantly more 
vulnerable.  
The Big Five personality dimensions were ordered differently in the two 
studies. Saudi Arabian participants were more conscientious and less agreeable. 
Australian participants were more open and less emotionally stable. Average 
extraversion scores were the same in both studies. These differences suggest a further 
reason for the higher number of Australian victims. Previous research (Wright et al., 
2009) suggest that users who were able to detect phishing emails scored highly on 
conscientiousness, as did our Saudi Arabian participants, while agreeableness has 
been shown to correlate with increased susceptibility to phishing emails (Srivastava, 
John, Gosling, & Potter, 2003). Our data also showed that openness increased users’ 
response to phishing emails. 
It is reasonable to conclude that culture does not directly affect users’ ability to 
detect phishing emails. Rather, culture directly impacts on users’ characteristics, and 
these characteristics have a direct impact on users’ ability to detect phishing emails. 
For example, spotting spelling and other linguistic mistakes is a challenge for users 
who come from different cultures. Similarly, certain personality traits are more 
prevalent in some cultures than in others. Both studies showed that openness 
increases users’ vulnerability to phishing emails, but Saudi Arabian users were more 
conscientious than open, while Australian participants were more open than 
conscientious.  
7.3 Implications of our Findings for Protective Strategies 
This section discusses the implications of our findings for the development of 
strategies to increase users’ ability to detect phishing emails. In particular, we focus 
on the three phases in users’ detection behaviour, each of which is associated with a 
particular weakness, as explained below. 
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7.3.1 Focus on email content  
Victims of phishing emails focus more on the content in the body of the 
message. A recent study using eye-tracker technology found that even users with 
advanced technical knowledge spent more time on the email content than on meta-
data when judging its authenticity (Pfeiffer et al., 2013). As explained in Chapter 2, 
phishing emails are designed to imitate legitimate email design in order to conceal 
deception and increase trust. Users who cannot spot the relevant cues are more 
vulnerable. According to Xun et al. (2008), the first weakness in victims’ decision-
making is the choice of unreliable cues to judge an email’s legitimacy. Our findings 
show that this weakness is associated with three characteristics that increase users’ 
susceptibility to phishing emails. These characteristics are trust, submissiveness and 
low perceived email richness.  
Users with high trust and submissiveness are more vulnerable to phishing 
emails. It is difficult, if not impossible, to change an individual’s personality 
characteristics but their effects can be reduced. Submissiveness, for example can be 
employed to increase users’ protection against phishing emails. Highly submissive 
users are more likely to follow instructions. Hence, a direct instruction to protect 
their secret information that comes from an authoritative source can increase their 
protective behaviour (Wright et al., 2009). The effects of trust can be mitigated by 
informing such users that emails are not always trustworthy and their legitimacy 
should be checked.  
Perceived email richness, on the other hand, has been shown to decrease users’ 
vulnerability. Users who perceived email to be a rich medium were able to extract 
more cues than those who perceived email to be a poor medium. Users are more 
likely to detect deception conducted in a rich medium than in a poor medium (Daft & 
Lengel, 1986). Email richness can be achieved by improving users’ knowledge and 
experience about emails and, especially, cues that aid detection of phishing emails.  
Our qualitative data showed that knowledge of the existence of phishing emails 
does not improve users’ defences, whereas knowledge of phishing email cues does 
do so. Both victims and detectors knew about phishing emails but victims did not 
know how to identify them. Security knowledge did not have any significant impact 
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on the likelihood of users being detectors (Wright et al., 2009). Many users believe 
that the perpetrators of phishing emails are not interested in targeting them and 
stealing their information (Alnajim, 2009; Herzberg, 2009). As a result, they take 
less care to authenticate the legitimacy of emails. Therefore, merely warning users 
about phishing emails is not sufficient.  
7.3.2 Inability to follow up suspicion effectively 
Observing inconsistent cues is an important aspect of the detection process in 
general (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). In relation to phishing emails, inconsistent 
observation occurs when users observe cues that differ from what they expected. 
When users observe inconsistent cues, they become suspicious about the email. 
Different types of confirmation channel are available for users to validate their 
suspicion.  
The type of confirmation channel significantly affected participants’ ability to 
detect phishing emails, and there were cultural differences in preferred confirmation 
channel. Saudi Arabian users chose a rich confirmation channel (consulting others by 
phone) while the Australian users chose to confirm their suspicion by themselves, 
without consulting others. This difference, we have proposed, reflects the fact that 
Saudi Arabian users come from a collectivist culture whereas Australian users came 
from an individualist culture. Choosing a rich confirmation channel increased users’ 
chances of being detector.  
We also found that the type of the person consulted has an important impact on 
the chances of users being victims. Those users who consulted other victims became 
victims themselves, since victims are unable to authenticate the legitimacy of an 
email. On the other hand, those users who consulted people in authority become 
detectors, since they received the correct information. For example, one participant 
who responded to the phishing email reported that he suspected that the email was 
illegitimate. He became a victim because he generated the hypothesis: “If other 
students received this email, then it is genuine”. After contacting one of his friends, 
who confirmed having received the phishing email, he decided to respond simply 
because other students had received the same email. Because phishing emails target 
large numbers of users, this is clearly not a safe assumption. This is in sharp contrast 
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to the behaviour of detectors in our study. For example, one such participant 
forwarded the phishing email to the owner of the blog and asked if it was genuine. 
This allowed him to identify it as a phishing email.  
7.3.3 Carelessness in dealing with emails  
This weakness is affected by two main factors: perceived importance of the 
requested information and users’ personality.  
Perceived importance of the requested information prevented some detectors 
from responding to the phishing email. Victims, by contrast, attached low importance 
to their passwords and were not concerned about losing their information. The 
qualitative results showed that these victims responded to the phishing email because 
they did not consider that they would be harmed by this kind of low-security 
behaviour (i.e. sending their password via email). These victims knew about phishing 
emails and some had actually fallen victim to them in the past. This experience did 
not, however, prevent them from again engaging in low-security behaviour. 
Certain personality dimensions also contributed to users’ response. The survey 
results identified three such dimensions: openness, extraversion and agreeableness. 
Openness encourages users to be adventurous and try new experiences; hence they 
respond to phishing emails despite the potential risks involved. Extraversion 
encourages interaction with the phishing emails and the behaviour embedded in 
them. Agreeableness discourages suspicion and encourages a positive response to the 
requested action.  
The combination of these personality traits increases users’ risk-taking 
behaviour. This behaviour can be addressed by raising the stakes for a risky action 
(Burns et al., 2011). 
7.4 Recommendations to reduce victimisation  
From our findings, we have generated three sets of recommendations. These 
recommendations target victims, security tool designers and organisations, 
respectively. 
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7.4.1 Victims 
We identified three types of victims: naïve, doubtful and risk-taker victims. 
Each has its own areas of vulnerability to phishing emails.  
Naïve victims are vulnerable because they fail to observe and interpret the 
relevant cues (low suspicion). Their susceptibility is increased by their 
characteristics. The protection of such victims can be improved by enhancing their 
ability to suspect phishing emails. This can be accomplished by increasing their 
awareness of the design features of phishing emails.  
Doubtful victims are vulnerable because they fail to choose an appropriate 
confirmation channel for their suspicion (medium suspicion). Their vulnerability can 
be ameliorated by forcing them to choose a rich confirmation channel. They also 
need to be informed that the best strategy is to communicate with an authorised 
entity.  
Risk-taker victims’ vulnerability is driven by their personality, which 
encourages them to engage in risky behaviour. They also attach a low level of 
importance to the requested information. These victims know that they are engaging 
in low-security behaviour (high suspicion), but continue to do so. They justify their 
behaviour through a belief that no harm will come to them as a result. In order to 
improve their defences, they need to change their perception of the level of risk 
involved in such behaviour.  
7.4.2 Security tool designers  
It has been reported that phishing websites have very short life spans, from 
hours to days (Moore & Clayton, 2007). This means that many security tools have 
limited ability to prevent phishing attacks on day Zero (Sheng et al., 2009). 
Designers need to investigate new ways of warning users in the early stages of a 
phishing email attack. We suggest that it would be beneficial to involve those users 
who are able to detect phishing emails in their early stages and who could report their 
discovery to the security tool designer. 
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7.4.3 Organisations 
Organisations have some responsibility to protect their employees from 
phishing email attacks. In addition to implementing new security tools to prevent 
phishing emails from reaching users, organisations needs to find new ways of 
improving users’ protection.  
In one study (Kumaraguru et al., 2009), participants were divided into three 
groups: no training, one session of training and two sessions of training. On the final 
day of the experiment, there was a significant difference between the ‘no training’ 
group and the trained groups. Untrained participants, however, were able to identify 
phishing emails on days 2 and 7. This was because trained participants had discussed 
the training session with their fellow employees. Overall, 87% learned of the training 
from the original email, 5% from a forwarded copy of the original email, and 5% 
learned about it directly from their peers. Some 13% of participants discussed 
security tips provided by the security training with their peers. This suggests that 
information sharing can improve users’ protection against phishing, and 
organisations can facilitate this type of behaviour.  
Organisations should develop communication channels for their employees and 
encourage them to use these channels to warn about phishing attacks. There should 
be a website, email address or designated person with whom detectors can 
communicate to report new phishing attacks. In our experiment, only one person 
informed the university security department. This person was in fact a member of 
that department. Security departments should make themselves known to employees 
and share information. Our findings highlighted the importance of a reliable 
consultation source. To be effective, this source should be easily accessible to users.  
Some of our study participants explained why they had not informed or 
consulted with their security department. They gave three main reasons: 1) they did 
not want to bother the department about an incident which the participant perceived 
to be of low importance to that department; 2) the department was not clearly 
identified (for instance, on the university’s home page); 3) one participant thought 
that the department would not take the issue seriously and, if it did, the response 
would be too late (one or two days after the incident).  
 162 
Chapter 7: Discussion 162 
Organisations would benefit by encouraging detectors to report their discovery, 
thus enabling the organisation to warn others. Users who detect phishing emails 
should have a clear pathway for reporting their discovery to the relevant authority, 
which should be responsible for issuing a warning to other users. The response time 
could be significantly reduced in this way, since some users detect phishing emails at 
an early stage. More importantly, the warning should come from an appropriate 
authority rather than from colleagues. In a previous study, some detectors warned 
their colleagues about a phishing email but this did not prevent the colleagues from 
falling victim to it (Coronges et al., 2012). Wright et al. (2009), by contrast, found 
that warnings from an authorised person for users not to reveal their private 
information were effective in preventing some users from revealing their private 
information when they were exposed to the phishing email. The difference between 
these two studies is the source of the warning: in Wright et al.’s experiment, the 
person who issued the warning had authority over users, whereas in Coronges et al.’s 
experiment the warning came from colleagues who had no authority over them. This 
may help to explain the behaviour of risk-taker victims, who respond to phishing 
emails even when they are highly suspicious about them.  
7.5 Summary  
Users’ detection behaviour comprises three phases. In each phase, certain 
characteristics impact on that behaviour and differentiate victims from detectors. 
Awareness of these relationships can help organisations to improve their protective 
strategies. The findings from two separate studies (Saudi Arabia and Australia) 
supported these findings. It can be concluded that the research model developed in 
this study can explain users’ detection behaviour. Our findings have added to 
knowledge about users’ weaknesses in detecting phishing emails and suggest ways of 
addressing these weaknesses through strategies directed at users, security tool 
developers and organisations. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
Chapter 1 of this thesis explained the research problem under investigation. 
Chapter 2 presented a critical review of literature and identified important gaps in 
knowledge about the topic. The causal model that was developed to guide the 
investigation was described in Chapter 4. The research design and methods used to 
test the model were explained in Chapter 5. Findings from the analysis of 
quantitative and qualitative data were presented in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively. 
The results were discussed in Chapter 7 and their implications for strategies to 
address the problem of phishing emails were considered. This chapter summarises 
the main academic and practical contributions of the thesis, discusses the limitations 
of the study, and presents guidelines for future work. 
Our main findings can be summarised as follows; 
 Users’ detection behaviour has three main phases: susceptibility, 
confirmation and response.  
 Users’ characteristics have a significant impact on their detection behaviour 
in each phase. 
 Culture impacts on users’ ability to detect phishing emails.  
 There is not a single type of victim and, therefore, no single solution to the 
problem of phishing emails. Protective strategies need to target specific 
vulnerabilities and weaknesses.  
8.1 Academic Contributions 
The main academic contributions of our research can be summarised as 
follows.  
1. We have developed a model to examine the entire process of users’ detection 
behaviour and identify weaknesses in their behaviour.  
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2. We have used quantitative data to identify the impact of users’ characteristics 
on detection behaviour, in particular: 
 the impact of trust, submissiveness and email richness on users’ 
susceptibility;  
 the impact of the type of confirmation channel on users’ response; and  
 the impact of personality traits on users’ response.  
 
3. We have used a qualitative method to identify additional factors that affect 
different phases in the model.  
 
4. We have identified three categories of victims.  
 
5. We have demonstrated the impact of culture on users’ ability to detect 
phishing emails.  
8.2 Contributions to Practice  
The main contributions of our research to the development of practical 
strategies to address the problem of phishing emails can be summarised in relation to 
the three phases in detection behaviour and their vulnerabilities. These phases are: 
susceptibility, confirmation and response. 
Susceptibility. Various studies have reported that educating users about 
phishing email cues can improve their detection ability. The ability to spot such cues 
alerts users to potential danger and prevents them from responding (Fette et al., 
2007). Our data supported this finding and identified three characteristics that should 
be targeted in order to decrease users’ susceptibility (see Section 7.3). These 
characteristics are trust, submissiveness and email richness. Trust can be addressed 
by educating users that phishing emails can impersonate any organisation and target 
any individual. Submissiveness has been found to increase users’ susceptibility to 
phishing emails. At the same time, research has shown that the number of responders 
to phishing emails can be reduced by a direct instruction from an authorised person 
not to disclose private information (Wright et al., 2009). Thus the negative effects of 
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submissiveness could be addressed by issuing such authoritative directions and 
warning users about deceptive behaviour (i.e. priming). Email richness can be 
addressed by educating users about the various kinds of cues that help to identify 
phishing emails.  
Confirmation. Our findings also showed that the choice of a rich confirmation 
channel and consultation with authorised personnel increased users’ protection 
against phishing emails (see Section 7.3). While some users chose not to respond to 
phishing emails because they were suspicious of them, others harboured some 
suspicions but responded anyway. We found that users who chose a poor 
confirmation channel or consulted inappropriate sources (such as an inexperienced 
colleague) become victims. We also found that those who depended on themselves 
were more vulnerable. These findings strongly suggest that users should be 
encouraged to choose a rich confirmation channel and only consult with authorised 
personnel when they suspect a phishing email. Organisations have an important role 
to play here by providing their employees with clear communication channels and 
identified staff for contact in the case of a suspected phishing email.  
Response. We found that some users who respond to phishing emails do so 
because of certain personality traits (see Section 7.3) that encourage them to take 
risks. Some victims responded to phishing emails because they did not see any need 
to behave more securely or to protect their private information. They also did not 
believe that any serious negative consequences would follow from their action. If 
such users are to be encouraged to behave more securely, they need to perceive the 
negative consequences of non-secure behaviour. Organisations can help in this 
regard by applying penalties for non-secure behaviour, such as revealing private 
information to others.  
In summary, users’ protection against phishing emails can be improved by: 
1. Increasing users’ awareness of phishing email cues. 
2. Informing users that the organisation is a potential target for phishing email 
attacks. 
 166 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 166 
3. Informing users about a deceptive behaviour such as requests for 
passwords. 
4. Encouraging users to choose a rich confirmation channel to evaluate 
suspected phishing emails. 
5. Encouraging users to consult with an authorised person about a suspected 
phishing email. 
6. Encouraging users not to depend on themselves to evaluate a suspected 
phishing email. 
7. Encouraging users to reduce their risk-taking behaviour when they suspect 
a phishing email. 
8.3 Types of Victims 
Our data showed that there is not a single type of victim. We identified three 
categories: naïve victims, doubtful victims and risk-taking victims.  Each type has its 
own areas of weakness and, therefore, needs to be treated differently (see Section 
7.3).  
Naïve victims have low or no suspicion in relation to phishing emails. These 
victims’ vulnerability occurs when they open the email and choose to respond 
directly. This area of vulnerability can be addressed by raising awareness of phishing 
emails through the development of appropriate educational programs and security 
tools that help users to identify phishing emails. Naïve victims fall prey to phishing 
emails because they have a high level of susceptibility in the first phase.  
Doubtful victims have sufficient awareness to suspect phishing emails but fail 
to confirm their suspicions. In other words, they fail in the second phase of detection 
behaviour―confirmation. They do not use a robust confirmation channel. Rather, 
they are vulnerable because they test their suspicion through a poor confirmation 
channel. Their level of protection would be increased by providing them with 
information about suitable, rich confirmation channels that produce an immediate 
response and have their trust.  
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Risk-taking victims know that they are behaving less securely by responding to 
suspected phishing emails, but they assume that their behaviour will not have 
harmful consequences. Their personality encourages them to engage in dangerous 
behaviour, which increases their chance of falling victim to phishing emails. These 
victims ignore warnings about potential risks involved in responding to phishing 
emails. Organisations can address this behaviour by imposing a penalty for low 
security behaviour. Risk-taking victims are likely to choose a certain loss (not 
responding to suspected phishing email) over a higher potential loss (the penalty for 
responding). In addition, these victims do not attach high importance to protecting 
their private information. This perception can also be addressed by organisations. 
Organisations can increase the value of protecting private information by linking it to 
valued resources. For example, some banks do not reimburse funds that have been 
lost to a phishing attack if the user is responsible for disclosing their account 
information.  
8.4 Limitations of the Study  
In real life, users are exposed to more phishing emails than we tested. The 
research emails, however, imitated the behaviour of real phishing emails and their 
design incorporated features commonly used in most phishing emails (see Section 
4.6). The study did not include all such design features, and the perpetrators of 
phishing email attacks will undoubtedly come up with new features. Nevertheless, 
the main design features used in our research will continue to be used. 
The second limitation of our study is the age of participants (18 years and 
older). In real life, phishing emails can reach any user with an email address. 
Younger users are likely to be more vulnerable to phishing emails. A previous study, 
for instance, found users under 25 years of age are more susceptible to phishing 
emails than older users (Sheng et al., 2007). For ethical reasons, our study was 
limited to participants aged 18 years and above.  
A third limitation is that those participants whom we identify as ‘victims’ did 
not actually provide their secret information to a phishing website. The study was not 
designed to capture such information. Rather, we identified participants who clicked 
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on the phishing email link as victims because other research has shown that most 
users who click on a link will continue to follow the instructions. In addition to the 
fact that these participants clicked on the link indicates that they had been deceived 
and, hence, warrant identification as victims.   
Another important limitation is the fact that all participants in both studies were 
university students. The effect of this limitation was somewhat mitigated by the fact 
that they came from different countries and cultural backgrounds.  
8.5 Recommendations for Future Research  
Users are the last line of defence against phishing emails (see Section 2.6). 
Their defences should be constantly improved. While our research identified some 
weaknesses in users’ detection behaviour and established the impact of some 
characteristics on these weaknesses, further research is needed to extend these 
findings and explore users’ vulnerability in greater depth. 
An important area for future experimental work is the impact of priming on 
users’ ability to detection ability. Better understanding the impact of priming on 
users’ ability to detect deception in phishing emails would enhance our knowledge of 
users’ vulnerabilities. 
Based on our findings, we recommend the development of a new warning 
system that could reduce the number of victims. We identified some users who were 
able to detect phishing emails at an early stage. It would be interesting to investigate 
the effect of implementing a system in which these early detectors were encouraged 
to warn authorities who, in turn, warned other users in an organisation.  
We recommend that organisations develop rich confirmation channels that are 
cost-effective. The effects of instructing users to consult an authorised person using 
such rich channels could usefully be examined in relation to users’ behaviour with 
suspected phishing emails.  
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We have also suggested that the imposition of penalties for poor security 
behaviour should reduce the number of users who respond to phishing emails. 
Empirical evidence is needed to verify this expectation.  
The qualitative data in our research has found interesting findings. These 
findings can help is explaining the main differences between detectors and victims. A 
quantitative data can serve to find the significance of this impact statistically.  
Finally, our identification of three types of email victims and their respective 
weaknesses provides the foundation for future work. It would be interesting, for 
instance, to examine whether some categories of victims are more or less likely to 
comply with recommendations to address their weaknesses.  
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Appendix A 
Research survey 
 
The survey for both experiments:  
 
First survey: 
Email has become a very important way of communication. Unfortunately, on 
a daily basis we receive emails which may not be useful or appropriate. We are 
currently doing a research which aims to help users filter out such emails. 
Specifically, this research investigates different aspects of various users’ behaviour 
in their interaction with emails. 
You can help us achieve this goal by answering these questions which will take 
approximately 15-20 minutes. This research comprises two surveys in which this 
survey is the first. The second survey will be sent to you at a later date.  
 
1. Age: 
(18-25) (26-35) (36 and above) 
 
2. Gender: 
 
Male Female     
 
3. First Language:11 
 
English Other     
 
4. Nationality:12 
 
Australian  Other     
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 Not applicable in Saudi Arabia because all participants have Arabic as their first language  
12
 Not applicable in Saudi Arabia because all participants have Saudi Arabian nationality 
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5. Please circle the corresponding number in each statement which best describes the degree to 
which a statement is true for you: 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Disagree a 
little 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree a 
little 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Big Five Personality Dimensions Variables 
I see myself as:        
 Extroverted, enthusiastic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Critical, quarrelsome 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Dependable, self-disciplined 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Anxious, easily upset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Open to new experiences, 
complex 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Reserved, quiet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Sympathetic, warm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Disorganized, careless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Calm, emotionally stable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Conventional, uncreative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Trust Variable        
 I usually trust people until they 
give me a reason not to trust them       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 I generally give people the benefit 
of the doubt when I first meet them 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 My typical approach is to trust new 
acquaintances until they prove I 
should not trust them 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Submissiveness Variable 
6. Please circle the corresponding number in each statement which best describes the degree to 
which a statement is true for you: 
 
Never Rarely Sometimes Mostly Always 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 I agree that I am wrong even though I know I’m not 1 2 3 4 5 
 I do things because other people are doing them, rather than 
because I want to 
1 2 3 4 5 
 I would walk out of a shop without questioning, knowing that 
I had been short changed 
1 2 3 4 5 
 I let others criticise me or put me down without defending 
myself 
1 2 3 4 5 
 I do what is expected of me even when I don’t want to 1 2 3 4 5 
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 If I try to speak and others continue, I shut up 1 2 3 4 5 
 I continue to apologise for minor mistakes 1 2 3 4 5 
 I listen quietly if people in authority say unpleasant things 
about me 
1 2 3 4 5 
 I am not able to tell my friends when I am angry with them 1 2 3 4 5 
 At meetings and gatherings, I let others monopolise the 
conversation 
1 2 3 4 5 
 I don’t like people to look straight at me when they are 
talking 
1 2 3 4 5 
 I say ‘thank you’ enthusiastically and repeatedly when 
someone does a small favour for me 
1 2 3 4 5 
 I avoid direct eye contact 1 2 3 4 5 
 I avoid starting conversations at social gatherings 1 2 3 4 5 
 I blush when people stare at me 1 2 3 4 5 
 I pretend I am ill when declining an invitation 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Internet usage  
7. How many years you have been using the Internet?  
 
       Number of years 
 
 
8. How many hours you usually spend in the Internet per day? 
 
       Number of hours 
 
 
For Australian survey Internet activities 1, 2 and 3 
9. On average, how much time per week do you spend on each of the following Web activities? 
 
None 1-30 Min 30-60 Min 1-2 Hours 2-4 Hours 4-8 Hours More than 8 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 Surfing the Internet for knowledge (read only) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Making social activities (communicating with 
others) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Making online transactions (shopping – 
banking) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
For Saudi survey Internet activities 1, 2 and 3 
10. You mainly use the Internet for:   (Tick all that applies) 
 
Surfing the Internet for knowledge (read only) 
Making social activities (communicating with others) 
Making online transactions (shopping – banking) 
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Email usage 
11. How many years you have been using the email service? 
 
       Number of years 
 
12. How many years you have been using university email service? 
 
       Number of years 
 
13. What is the average number of emails you normally receive per day in your inboxes: 
 
       Number of emails 
 
Perceived email Experience and Richness Variables 
14. Please circle the corresponding number in each statement which best describes the degree to 
which a statement is true for you: 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Disagree a 
little 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree a 
little 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Perceived email Experience Variable 
 
 I am very experienced using e-mail 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 I feel that e-mail is easy to use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 I feel competent using e-mail 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 I understand how to use all of the features of the e-mail 
system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 I feel comfortable using e-mail 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 I feel that I am a novice using the e-mail system 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Perceived Email Richness Variable         
 E-mail allows my communication partner and me to give 
and receive timely feedback 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 E-mail allows my communication partner and me to tailor 
our messages to our own personal requirements 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 E-mail allows my communication partner and me to 
communicate a variety of different cues (such as emotional 
tone, attitude, or formality) in our messages 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 E-mail allows my communication partner and me to use 
rich and varied language in our messages 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Susceptibility Variable 
15. Please read this short paragraph to answer this question 
 
Mr. John Douglas is a student at QUT University. He often shops from the Internet for which he uses 
his PayPal and eBay accounts. John verifies transactions done by PayPal using his online bank 
statement as he banks with commonwealth bank of Australia. These organisations send emails about 
updates done on John’s account and status. John always checks his email inbox and reads emails from 
QUT, Commonwealth Bank, PayPal and eBay. 
 
Dear participant, please pretend that you are John Douglas with the email address 
john@yahoo.com.au and you received the next three emails. The question is how likely that you 
will click on the link included in these emails. Rate your answer from 1 to 7 where: 
 
1 Definitely will delete or ignore the 
email 
5 Maybe will respond 
2 Most likely  will delete or ignore the 
email 
6 Most likely  will respond 
3 Maybe will delete or ignore the email 7 Definitely will respond 
4 I do not Know 
 
 
 
  
Email 1 (Scam): 
Answer:  1  2   3  4   5   6  7 
 
Email 2(University email): 
Answer:  1  2   3  4   5   6  7 
 
Email 3(PayPal): 
Answer:  1  2   3  4   5   6  7 
 
Email 4 (eBay): 
Answer:  1  2   3  4   5   6  7 
 
Email 5 (Bank): 
Answer:  1  2   3  4   5   6  7 
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Second survey: 
This survey tries to capture the process that you have done when you received 
the phishing email used in our research. This survey will takes from 2 to 5 minutes 
from your valuable time. 
 
16. Did you see this email 
Image of the phishing email 
Yes  No 
 
Confirmation Channel (Channel) Variable 
17. What did you do to check the authenticity of the email?: (Tick all that applies) 
 
 Asking other persons face-to-face 
 Asking other persons by Telephone 
 Asking other persons by email 
 Make a decision by yourself without consulting others 
 Other:  
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Appendix B 
Interview questions 
 
1. Have you heard about phishing emails? 
2. How do you identify phishing emails? 
3. Can you please explain the situation when you received our phishing email? 
4. What did you do when you opened the phishing email? Why? 
5. Have you checked the links in the phishing email? What did you found? 
6. Have you checked the reply address in the phishing email? What did you found? 
7. What did you do when you suspected the phishing email? 
8. Why did you respond to the phishing email? (for victims) 
9. What did you do when you discover the phishing email? (for detectors) 
10. What is your reaction if someone accesses your account? 
11. How important is your account to you? 
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Appendix C 
Information sheet 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FOR QUT RESEARCH PROJECT 
– Interview – 
Distinguishing between detectors and non-detectors of phishing emails  
QUT Ethics Approval Number 1100001164 
RESEARCH TEAM  
RESEARCH TEAM INFORMAITON 
DESCRIPTION 
This project is being undertaken as part of PhD project for Mr Ibrahim Alseadoon at QUT. The 
purpose of this project is to find important characteristics in Internet users which make them to 
respond to phishing emails. The main aim of phishing emails is to gain access to your secret personal 
information.  
This project also aims to find the impact of users characteristics on their detection decision. The 
outcome of this research will help in identifying users who are more likely to be vulnerable to 
phishing emails. Finding these users will help to improve their defences against phishing emails. 
Furthermore, this research will help in classifying users using their characteristics to draw the line for 
security designers to design special security tools for users, based on the variety of users’ 
characteristics. You are invited to participate in this project because you responded to a phishing 
email. Please be assured that this is a common occurrence, and your experience is valuable to us and 
may prevent other users from responding to these harmful emails. 
PARTICIPATION 
Your participation in this project is entirely voluntary. If you do agree to participate you can 
withdraw from the project without comment or penalty. If you withdraw, on request any identifiable 
information already obtained from you will be destroyed. Your decision to participate or not 
participate will in no way impact upon your current or future relationship with QUT.  
Your participation will involve an audio recorded interview (optional) at my office XXX or other 
agreed location that will take approximately 20 to 30 minutes of your time. Questions will include 
the reasons why you responded to the email, the time of the email and your email experience.  
EXPECTED BENEFITS 
It is expected that this project will not directly benefit you immediately. However, it may benefit you 
by improving security and defences against phishing emails in the near future in order to make this 
world a better place for providing secure online services as well as protecting users from phishing 
attacks. 
To recognise your contribution should you choose to participate the research team is offering you a 
XXX Coffee voucher. 
RISKS 
There are no risks beyond normal day-to-day living associated with your participation in this project. 
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
All comments and responses will be treated confidentially and will not be used outside this research 
project. Also, your name will be replaced with numbers during the research to protect your privacy. 
Non-identifiable data collected in this project may also be used as comparative data in future 
projects. 
The project is funded by Saudi Arabian Government however they will not have access to the data 
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obtained during the project and all private information will be protected during this research. 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
We would like to ask you to sign a written consent form to confirm your agreement to participate. 
QUESTIONS / FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROJECT 
If you have any questions or require any further information please contact one of the research team 
members below. 
RESEARCH TEAM INFORMAITON 
CONCERNS / COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF THE PROJECT 
QUT is committed to research integrity and the ethical conduct of research projects. However, if you 
do have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of the project you may contact the 
QUT Research Ethics Unit on 3138 5123 or email ethicscontact@qut.edu.au. The QUT Research 
Ethics Unit is not connected with the research project and can facilitate a resolution to your concern 
in an impartial manner. 
Thank you for helping with this research project.  Please keep this sheet for your 
information. 
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Appendix D 
Consent form 
 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR QUT RESEARCH PROJECT 
– Interview – 
Distinguishing between detectors and non-detectors of phishing emails  
QUT Ethics Approval Number 1100001164 
RESEARCH TEAM CONTACTS 
RESEARCH TEAM INFORMAITON 
STATEMENT OF CONSENT 
By signing below, you are indicating that you: 
 Have read and understood the information document regarding this project. 
 Have had any questions answered to your satisfaction. 
 Understand that if you have any additional questions you can contact the research team. 
 Understand that you are free to withdraw at any time, without comment or penalty. 
 Understand that you can contact the Research Ethics Unit on 3138 5123 or email 
ethicscontact@qut.edu.au if you have concerns about the ethical conduct of the project. 
 Understand that non-identifiable data collected in this project may be used as comparative 
data in future projects. 
 Agree to participate in the project. 
Please tick the relevant box below: 
 I agree for the interview to be audio recorded. 
 I do not agree for the interview to be audio recorded. 
 
Name  
Signature  
Date   
 
Please return this sheet to the investigator. 
 
